Wesley Kingsbury v. United States , 900 F.3d 1147 ( 2018 )


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  •                        FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WESLEY HARLAN KINGSBURY,                       No. 16-56789
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    D.C. Nos.
    v.                        2:15-cv-09697-DSF
    2:12-cr-00903-DSF-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.                      OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 10, 2018
    Pasadena, California
    Filed August 21, 2018
    Before: D. Michael Fisher, * Paul J. Watford, and
    Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    *
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for
    the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    2                KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES
    SUMMARY **
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    The panel held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58’s
    requirement that a separate document be filed upon entry of
    judgment applies in proceedings under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .
    The panel concluded that the petitioner’s notice of appeal
    was therefore timely, and that this court has jurisdiction over
    his appeal. In a concurrently filed order, the panel granted
    in part the petitioner’s request for a certificate of
    appealability and set a briefing schedule.
    COUNSEL
    Stephanie Marie Adraktas (argued), Berkeley, California,
    for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Christopher Jackson Smith (argued) and Michael A. Rotker,
    Attorneys; John P. Cronan, Acting Assistant Attorney
    General; Appellate Section, Criminal Division, United
    States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
    Respondent-Appellee.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES                   3
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    After pleading guilty to fraud-related charges and being
    sentenced, Wesley Kingsbury filed a motion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     seeking to vacate his guilty plea and sentence. The
    district court denied that motion, but it did not enter
    judgment in a separate document.
    Kingsbury filed a notice of appeal just over two months
    after the district court denied his § 2255 motion. Whether
    his notice of appeal was timely depends on whether Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 58’s requirement that a separate
    document be filed upon entry of judgment applies in § 2255
    proceedings. The parties here agree that Rule 58’s separate
    document requirement does apply, but because this question
    determines whether we have appellate jurisdiction over
    Kingsbury’s appeal, we must resolve it ourselves. See WMX
    Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 
    104 F.3d 1133
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 1997)
    (en banc). We now join the majority of our sister circuits in
    holding that Rule 58’s separate document requirement
    applies in § 2255 proceedings. Kingsbury’s notice of appeal
    was therefore timely, and we accordingly have jurisdiction
    over his appeal.
    I.
    Kingsbury pled guilty to one count each of conspiracy to
    commit health care fraud, conspiracy to obstruct a Medicare
    audit, and making a materially false statement to law
    enforcement officers. He was sentenced to 78 months in
    prison. Kingsbury appealed his convictions and sentence but
    voluntarily dismissed his appeal before filing an opening
    brief.
    4              KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES
    Kingsbury then filed a pro se sworn motion under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , seeking to vacate his conviction and
    sentence on several grounds, including that his counsel was
    ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowing,
    voluntary, and intelligent. The district court denied the
    motion and declined to issue a certificate of appealability.
    But it did not file a document entering judgment separate
    from its order denying the § 2255 motion. Kingsbury filed
    a pro se notice of appeal, which also serves as a request for
    a certificate of appealability, see 9th Cir. R. 22-1(d), 64 days
    after the district court denied his motion.
    Unsure whether the notice of appeal had been filed in
    time to give us jurisdiction, we appointed counsel and
    ordered briefing so we could “determine whether entry of a
    separate judgment is required in section 2255 proceedings
    and whether this court has jurisdiction over appellant’s
    request for a certificate of appealability.” Our order
    recognized that it was “an open question in this Circuit as to
    whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) requires the entry of judgment
    on a separate document when a district court enters an order
    denying relief in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     proceedings,” that
    “[o]ther Circuits are split on this issue,” and that “[i]f entry
    of a separate judgment [were] required, appellant’s notice of
    appeal was timely.”
    II.
    Section 2255 proceedings are governed by procedural
    rules developed by the Supreme Court and adopted by
    Congress. See generally Rules Governing Section 2255
    Proceedings for the United States District Courts. Those
    rules set the time for the losing party to appeal from the
    district court’s disposition of § 2255 motions. Rule 11 of the
    Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United
    States District Courts (“Rule 11”) states that “Federal Rule
    KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES                            5
    of Appellate Procedure 4(a) governs the time to appeal an
    order entered under these rules.” Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 4(a), in turn, states that a notice of appeal must be
    filed “within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order
    appealed from” when the United States is a party, Fed. R.
    App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), and that a judgment or order is entered
    for purposes of Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance
    with Rule 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Fed.
    R. App. P. 4(a)(7). 1 Under Rule 58, an order that is
    dispositive of the proceedings is usually insufficient to enter
    judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). Instead, judgment must be
    expressly entered in a “separate document,” except when the
    district court decides certain listed motions—which do not
    include § 2255 motions. 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), (c)(2)(A). If
    a separate document is required, and one is not filed,
    judgment is entered automatically 150 days after the court
    enters an order disposing of a case. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    58(c)(2)(B).
    Integral to the time for appeal in Rule 4, therefore, is the
    event that starts the time in which a party can appeal—
    specifically, either the filing of a separate document entering
    1
    Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 also provides that the entry
    of judgments or orders must comply with Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 79(a), which, in turn, offers guidance to district court clerks
    on how to enter judgments and orders on the docket. Fed. R. App. P.
    4(a)(7).
    2
    Precisely what constitutes a “separate document” is not at issue
    here. There is no dispute that, if Rule 58’s separate document
    requirement applies, the order denying Kingsbury’s § 2255 motion was
    not a separate document within the meaning of that rule because it
    contained substantial discussion of the law and facts. See Vernon v.
    Heckler, 
    811 F.2d 1274
    , 1276 (9th Cir. 1987).
    6                KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES
    judgment or the passage of 150 days. See United States v.
    Johnson, 
    254 F.3d 279
    , 284 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Nothing in
    the language of Rule 11 . . . suggests that courts should apply
    Rule 4(a)’s time limit without also applying its criterion for
    determining when that limit begins to run.”). Taken
    together, these rules suggest that Rule 58’s separate
    document requirement applies to § 2255 proceedings. 3
    The advisory committee notes accompanying Rule 11
    further support this conclusion. Those notes cite United
    States v. Hayman, 
    342 U.S. 205
     (1952), for the proposition
    that appeals from orders denying § 2255 motions “are
    governed by the civil rules applicable to appeals from final
    judgments in habeas corpus actions”—writ actions that are
    available, for example, to challenge state custody under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     but that have been almost entirely supplanted
    by the motions mechanism of 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     in challenges
    to federal custody. See Rule 11, advisory committee’s note
    to 1979 amendment (quoting Hayman, 
    342 U.S. at
    209 n.4).
    Those civil rules applicable to appeals from district courts’
    resolution of habeas corpus petitions include the separate
    document requirement of Rule 58. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
    Idaho, 
    814 F.2d 1404
    , 1405–06 (9th Cir. 1987).
    Requiring entry of judgment in a separate document
    under Rule 58 to start the clock on the 60-day time to appeal
    is also consistent with the rule’s goal to demarcate the time
    3
    As mentioned above, the parties here are in agreement that Rule
    58’s separate document requirement applies to § 2255 proceedings.
    Indeed, since at least 2001, the Government appears to have “taken the
    position that Rule 58 applies” in this circumstance. See Johnson,
    
    254 F.3d at
    283 n.2. But the parties’ agreement does not eliminate the
    need to independently assess whether we have jurisdiction. See WMX
    Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 
    104 F.3d 1133
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
    KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES                            7
    to appeal more clearly. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, advisory
    committee’s note to 1963 amendment (describing the rule as
    “eliminat[ing] [prior] uncertainties by requiring that there be
    a judgment set out on a separate document”). Many
    defendants—like Kingsbury here—proceed pro se on
    collateral review and particularly benefit from greater clarity
    on procedural requirements. 4 Cf. Rand v. Rowland, 
    154 F.3d 952
    , 958 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (interpreting the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure as mandating notice to pro se
    prisoner litigants regarding the requirements of the summary
    judgment rule because that reading “effectuates the purpose
    of the Federal Rules to eliminate ‘procedural booby traps’
    which could prevent ‘unsophisticated litigants from ever
    having their day in court’” (quoting Surowitz v. Hilton
    Hotels Corp., 
    383 U.S. 363
    , 373 (1966))).
    4
    We recognize that § 2255 motions are similar in some ways to
    motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, and that the time to
    appeal from the disposition of Rule 60 motions runs from the entry of
    the order, not from the filing of a separate document entering judgment.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(5). But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 lists
    the five types of orders after which no separate document is required to
    start the time to appeal. Orders on Rule 60 motions are listed. Orders
    on § 2255 motions are not. And Rule 11 did not say anything to
    effectively add them to that list. Holding that motions similar to those
    listed are included by implication, in the absence of any indication that
    the list was intended to be non-exclusive, would create exactly the sort
    of murkiness about the time to appeal that Rule 58 was intended to avoid.
    See United States v. Indrelunas, 
    411 U.S. 216
    , 221–22 (1973) (per
    curiam) (explaining that “the separate document provision of Rule 58 is
    . . . a mechanical change that must be mechanically applied in order to
    avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered”
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), abrogated in part on
    other grounds by Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis, 
    435 U.S. 381
    , 386 n.7 (1978)
    (per curiam).
    8                KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES
    The majority of circuits to have considered the question
    agree that Rule 58’s separate document requirement applies
    to § 2255 proceedings. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
    D.C. Circuits have all reached this conclusion. 5 See Gillis v.
    United States, 
    729 F.3d 641
    , 643 (6th Cir. 2013); Jeffries v.
    United States, 
    721 F.3d 1008
    , 1012–13 (8th Cir. 2013);
    United States v. Fiorelli, 
    337 F.3d 282
    , 285–87 (3d Cir.
    2003); Johnson, 
    254 F.3d at
    283–85; Sassoon v. United
    States, 
    549 F.2d 983
    , 984 (5th Cir. 1977).
    Only the Second Circuit has held otherwise, grounding
    its reasoning in the observation that “a motion under § 2255
    is a further step in the movant’s criminal case and not a
    separate civil action.” Williams v. United States, 
    984 F.2d 28
    , 30 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Rule 11, advisory
    committee’s note to 1979 amendment). It is true that Rule
    58 is a civil rule and that § 2255 proceedings have some
    procedural characteristics that might appear to weigh against
    application of the civil rules. But given the specific wording
    of the applicable rules, which indicate that the civil
    requirements for the time to appeal apply here, we do not
    need to reach a conclusion about the civil or criminal nature
    of § 2255 proceedings generally.
    We therefore join the majority of our sister circuits in
    holding that Rule 58’s separate document requirement
    applies to § 2255 proceedings. If a separate document
    entering judgment is filed with the order resolving a § 2255
    5
    The Seventh Circuit at one point seemed to have held that Rule
    58’s separate document requirement applied to § 2255 appeals. See
    Hope v. United States, 
    43 F.3d 1140
    , 1142 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1994); see
    also Morales v. Bezy, 
    499 F.3d 668
    , 671 (7th Cir. 2007). But the Seventh
    Circuit has since stated that it has not decided the question,
    notwithstanding Hope. See Lawuary v. United States, 
    669 F.3d 864
    , 866
    (7th Cir. 2012).
    KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES                          9
    motion, the losing party has 60 days to file a notice of appeal.
    Otherwise, it has 60 days from when judgment is
    automatically entered 150 days after the filing of the order,
    for a total of 210 days.
    III.
    As described above, the district court did not file a
    separate document entering judgment under Rule 58 after
    denying Kingsbury’s § 2255 motion. If a separate document
    were not required, the notice of appeal Kingsbury filed
    64 days after the order denying his § 2255 motion would
    have been 4 days late, and we would have been deprived of
    appellate jurisdiction. See Fed R. App. P. 4(a). 6
    But because Rule 58’s separate document requirement
    applies, final judgment was entered as of 150 days after the
    district court denied the § 2255 motion. Fed R. Civ. P.
    58(c)(2)(B). Kingsbury filed his notice of appeal during
    those 150 days, so his notice was timely. See Fed. R. App.
    P. 4(a)(2) (“A notice of appeal filed after the court
    announces a decision or order—but before the entry of the
    judgment or order—is treated as filed on the date of and after
    the entry.”); FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv’rs Mortg. Ins. Co.,
    
    498 U.S. 269
    , 273 (1991) (observing that Federal Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2) “recognizes that, unlike a tardy
    notice of appeal, certain premature notices do not prejudice
    6
    The time to appeal in Rule 4(a) is set by statute. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2107
    (a)–(b). As statutory time limits, Rule 4(a)’s deadlines are
    jurisdictional. See Bowles v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 212–13 (2007). We
    have held that Rule 4(a)’s deadlines are jurisdictional in § 2255
    proceedings. See United States v. Hayat, 
    710 F.3d 875
    , 903 (9th Cir.
    2013) (holding that we “lack[ed] jurisdiction to review the district
    court’s dismissal of [a defendant’s] § 2255 motion” when he “did not
    timely file a notice of appeal”).
    10            KINGSBURY V. UNITED STATES
    the appellee and that the technical defect of prematurity
    therefore should not be allowed to extinguish an otherwise
    proper appeal”).
    IV.
    For the forgoing reasons, we have jurisdiction over
    Kingsbury’s appeal.
    We GRANT in part Kingsbury’s request for a
    certificate of appealability and set a briefing schedule in a
    concurrently filed order.