Mildred Thomas v. Carolyn Colvin , 745 F.3d 802 ( 2014 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 13-2602
    MILDRED THOMAS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
    Acting Commissioner of
    Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 1:12-cv-04716 — Sheila M. Finnegan, Magistrate Judge.
    ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 11, 2014
    Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and KANNE, Circuit
    Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Mildred Thomas suffers from a
    number of potentially-disabling impairments, including
    sciatica, angina, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and
    diabetes. The Social Security Administration denied her
    request for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
    2                                                   No. 13-2602
    security income. The district court affirmed on appeal. We
    reverse.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Thomas filed an application for disability insurance benefits
    in December 2009, claiming that she suffered from sciatica,
    diabetes, angina, a trigger thumb in her left hand, and chronic
    obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”). She was also
    morbidly obese, with a body mass index of around 45.
    During the application process, Thomas saw a consultative
    examiner, Dr. M. S. Patil. Dr. Patil noted a reduced range of
    motion in Thomas’s lumbar spine, hips, and knees as well as
    moderate difficulty squatting and getting on and off the
    examining table. Dr. Patil also performed an x-ray of Thomas’s
    lumbar spine, which, although severely limited by Thomas’s
    obesity, appeared to show narrowed disc space. Later that
    month, a state agency doctor, Dr. Thomas Kenney, reviewed
    Thomas’s medical records, including Dr. Patil’s report. Based
    on this information, Dr. Kenney determined that Thomas had
    the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work.
    At the administrative hearing, Thomas testified that her
    primary complaint was severe sciatic nerve pain that traveled
    to her butt, thighs, and knees. She said she could not stand for
    more than fifteen minutes or sit for more than twenty minutes
    at a time. She further stated that she could only walk about half
    a block and that she could not do laundry or vacuum. And she
    suffered from recurrent inflammation in her left thumb. When
    the inflammation was bad, she could not use her left hand at
    all; treatment by injection allowed her to use the hand but she
    No. 13-2602                                                            3
    remained unable to bend her left thumb. Thomas also used her
    inhaler four times a day to control her asthma.
    A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified about Thomas’s
    past relevant work and the jobs available in the regional
    economy. The VE described Thomas’s prior work as a phlebot-
    omist as heavy, semiskilled work because Thomas had to lift
    and move patients in addition to drawing their blood. The VE
    also noted, however, that phlebotomy was typically catego-
    rized as requiring only light exertion.
    The ALJ denied Thomas’s claim in a written opinion. She
    found that Thomas retained the RFC to perform light work,
    despite the fact that she suffered from eight severe impair-
    ments.1 She noted that the objective medical evidence was
    consistent with Thomas’s allegation of degenerative disc
    disease in the lumbar spine, but explained that her treatment
    was “routine and conservative” and thus supported only a
    limitation to light work. The ALJ also considered Thomas’s
    history of diabetes, high cholesterol, hypertension, stable
    angina, asthma, obesity and COPD. She found that none of
    these conditions imposed any limitations greater than that
    imposed by her back pain. She also stated that Thomas was no
    longer experiencing trouble with her trigger thumb. Further,
    the ALJ found Thomas’s complaints of pain incredible because,
    although Thomas described diabetes and sciatica as her
    primary impairments, she was taking diabetes medication and
    had received only minimal sciatica treatment. Similarly, the
    1
    The eight severe impairments the ALJ identified are diabetes, hyperten-
    sion, degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine, high cholesterol,
    asthma, COPD, stable angina, and obesity.
    4                                                         No. 13-2602
    ALJ relied on the fact that the medical record did not show a
    “medical necessity” for Thomas to lay down or to abstain from
    doing laundry to infer that Thomas in fact had a higher RFC
    than her daily activities would indicate.
    The Appeals Council denied review of Thomas’s claim, and
    she appealed to the district court. The district court affirmed
    the ALJ’s decision.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal in a disability benefits case, we review the
    district court’s decision de novo, resulting in direct review of the
    ALJ’s decision. Elder v. Astrue, 
    529 F.3d 408
    , 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
    This direct review is also deferential; we will uphold the ALJ’s
    decision so long as it is supported by “substantial evidence”
    and the ALJ built an “accurate and logical bridge” between the
    evidence and her conclusion. Simila v. Astrue, 
    573 F.3d 503
    , 513
    (7th Cir. 2009). This deference is lessened, however, where the
    ALJ’s findings rest on an error of fact or logic. Schomas v.
    Colvin, 
    732 F.3d 702
    , 708 (7th Cir. 2013).
    A. The ALJ improperly discredited Thomas’s testimony
    The ALJ found Thomas’s testimony about the severity of
    her symptoms incredible, noting that (1) although she testified
    that sciatica and diabetes were her main problems, she had
    received effective treatment for the diabetes and minimal
    treatment for sciatica; (2) the medical records showed that she
    had a normal gait, neurological testing and her Romberg sign2
    2
    The Romberg sign refers to swaying or falling over when standing with
    eyes closed and ankles touching. It is seen in tabes dorsalis and other
    (continued...)
    No. 13-2602                                                                 5
    were normal, and she had only mild degenerative arthopathy;
    (3) the medical records did not support reaching difficulties
    with her shoulders; and (4) her medical records did not show
    a medical necessity for laying down during the day or limita-
    tions on sitting and standing.
    First, the ALJ reasoned that because Thomas testified that
    sciatic nerve pain and diabetes were her main problems, and
    those problems were being treated, Thomas had greater overall
    functioning capacity than she described. It is true that her
    diabetes appeared to be under control and was not severely
    limiting her daily activities. But Thomas testified primarily that
    the sciatic nerve pain prevented her from walking more than
    half a block and doing laundry and required her to lie down
    for large portions of the day. The ALJ thought that because
    Thomas had only minimal treatment for this pain, it could not
    be as severe as Thomas alleged. But the treatment records are
    replete with notes that the pain medication was not helping.
    And sciatica is not always susceptible to more severe treat-
    ments; in some cases, the cause cannot be identified. The Merck
    Manual of Medical Information 571 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds., 2d
    home ed. 2003).
    The ALJ also appears to have ignored the medical evidence
    that supported Thomas’s complaints of pain. An ALJ need not
    mention every piece of medical evidence in her opinion, but
    she cannot ignore a line of evidence contrary to her conclusion.
    Arnett v. Astrue, 
    676 F.3d 586
    , 592 (7th Cir. 2012). While she
    2
    (...continued)
    diseases of the nervous system. Sign, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary
    (32d ed. 2012).
    6                                                  No. 13-2602
    noted that Thomas’s gait and neurological exams were normal,
    she ignored evidence that Thomas had difficulty getting on
    and off the examining table and had limited ranges of motion
    in her hips and knees. And elsewhere in the opinion, the ALJ
    characterized Thomas’s x-rays as normal; in fact, they showed
    transitional vertebra, narrowed disc space, and sclerosis.
    The ALJ further noted that the medical evidence did not
    support that Thomas had any shoulder problems that would
    limit her ability to reach overhead. But Thomas had been
    diagnosed with fibromyalgia, a condition whose primary
    symptom is pain and stiffness in the muscles and joints.
    Fibromyalgia, Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (32d ed.
    2012).
    Finally, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not
    support Thomas’s allegations of pain, noting that there was no
    “medical necessity” for Thomas to lie down during the day.
    But a lack of medical evidence supporting the severity of a
    claimant’s symptoms is insufficient, standing alone, to dis-
    credit her testimony. Villano v. Astrue, 
    556 F.3d 558
    , 562 (7th
    Cir. 2009). Because all of the other reasons given by the ALJ
    were illogical or otherwise flawed, this reason cannot alone
    support the finding that Thomas was incredible.
    B. The ALJ assessed Thomas’s RFC improperly by failing to
    consider the combined effect of her ailments
    A disability claimant’s RFC describes the maximum she can
    do in a work setting despite her mental and physical limita-
    tions. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1545
    (a). When determining an individ-
    ual’s RFC, the ALJ must consider all limitations that arise from
    No. 13-2602                                                   7
    medically determinable impairments. Arnett, 
    676 F.3d at 592
    ;
    Villano, 
    556 F.3d at 563
    .
    The ALJ found that Thomas had the RFC to perform light
    work, so long as Thomas avoided concentrated exposure to
    “dust, fumes, and gases.” In making this determination, the
    ALJ considered each category of Thomas’s impairments
    seriatim, finding that no single category would prevent Thomas
    from doing the slightly-restricted light work indicated in the
    final RFC. But the ALJ did not consider how Thomas’s back
    and leg pain, combined with her respiratory symptoms, would
    impact her ability to work. This combination of impairments
    could impose greater restrictions than any of Thomas’s
    impairments taken singly. For instance, the fact that Thomas
    had to use her inhaler four times a day, even without greater-
    than-normal exposure to dust or other irritants, would com-
    pound the restrictions imposed by her back and leg pain.
    Without any evidence that the ALJ considered Thomas’s
    impairments in concert, we cannot say that the ALJ built the
    required “accurate and logical bridge” between the evidence
    and her conclusion. Simila, 
    573 F.3d at 513
     (7th Cir. 2009).
    Similarly, the ALJ did not consider the impairments that
    she had previously ruled singly non-severe, which included
    Thomas’s fibromyalgia, sciatica, left thumb inflammation, and
    history of arthritis. These, too, should have been considered in
    concert with Thomas’s other impairments to determine their
    collective effect on her ability to work. And the ALJ made a
    blatant factual error when she stated that Thomas’s thumb no
    longer bothered her. In fact, Thomas testified at the hearing
    that she could not bend her left thumb.
    8                                                    No. 13-2602
    We cannot find that these errors were harmless. It seems to
    us that taking all of Thomas’s impairments together would
    result in a more restricted RFC than the ALJ formulated. And
    the ability to use her left hand was integral to Thomas’s past
    work as a phlebotomist, and thus her claim. As the VE testi-
    fied, if Thomas were limited to “occasional grasping” with her
    left, non-dominant hand, she could not work as a phleboto-
    mist, even at a light exertional level. If Thomas could not do
    her past work, she would have been considered disabled and
    thus eligible for benefits. 20 C.F.R. app. 2 § 404(p) (a person
    over age fifty-five who lacks transferable skills and cannot do
    previous relevant work is considered disabled).
    C. The ALJ was not required to order a pulmonary function test
    Thomas additionally argues that the ALJ erred by failing to
    order a pulmonary function test, which Thomas requested in
    a pre-hearing memorandum. An ALJ is under an obligation to
    develop a “full and fair record,” Smith v. Apfel, 
    231 F.3d 433
    ,
    437 (7th Cir. 2000), but this obligation is not limitless. And in
    this case, it is not clear what the pulmonary function test
    would have added to the record. Although it is clear that
    Thomas suffered from some pulmonary disorders, it is not
    obvious that the existing medical evidence of those disorders
    was so scant that the ALJ should have ordered additional
    testing to determine their severity.
    D. The ALJ did not err by failing to obtain the medical source
    statement from Dr. Patil.
    Last, Thomas asserts that the ALJ erred by declining to
    order a medical source statement from Dr. Patil, the consulta-
    tive examiner. A medical source statement is a statement from
    No. 13-2602                                                    9
    a treating or examining physician that explains what a claimant
    can do despite her impairments. Illinois has never required
    such statements, and the completeness of an administrative
    record is generally committed to the ALJ’s discretion. See Nelms
    v. Astrue, 
    553 F.3d 1093
    , 1098 (7th Cir. 2009) (generally uphold-
    ing ALJ’s determination that record was adequate). We do not
    see any reason to impose such a requirement in this case,
    particularly considering that the determination of a claimant’s
    RFC is a matter for the ALJ alone—not a treating or examining
    doctor—to decide. 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(d) (the final responsibil-
    ity for determining your RFC is reserved to the commissioner).
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision of the
    district court and REMAND to the Social Security Administra-
    tion for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-2602

Citation Numbers: 745 F.3d 802

Judges: Kanne

Filed Date: 3/11/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023