United States v. Frank Steffensen , 393 F. App'x 440 ( 2010 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             AUG 25 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-30035
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 4:08-CR-00006-RRB-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    FRANK STEFFENSEN,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Alaska
    Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 29, 2010
    Anchorage, Alaska
    Before: SCHROEDER, O’SCANNLAIN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    A jury convicted Frank Steffensen of knowingly possessing with intent to
    distribute five grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced him
    to 168 months’ imprisonment. Steffensen timely appeals.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of other
    acts committed by Steffensen under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403.
    The government presented sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that
    Steffensen committed the other acts, see United States v. Johnson, 
    132 F.3d 1279
    ,
    1283 (9th Cir. 1997), and his 1993 offense of conviction was “sufficiently similar
    to the charged conduct to render it probative despite the passage of time,” 
    id.
     After
    a careful review of the record, we find unpersuasive Steffensen’s contentions that
    admission of the “other acts” evidence violated Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963), Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
     (1972), or Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 26.2.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Special Agent
    Nyfeler to testify both as a fact witness and as an expert witness. See United States
    v. Anchrum, 
    590 F.3d 795
    , 804 (9th Cir. 2009). The admission of Nyfeler’s
    testimony was not plain error in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), see
    United States v. Gomez-Norena, 
    908 F.2d 497
    , 502 (9th Cir. 1990), and Nyfeler
    did not engage in improper vouching, see United States v. McKenna, 
    327 F.3d 830
    ,
    842 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Improper vouching occurs where the prosecutor places the
    prestige of the government behind a witness . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal
    quotation marks omitted)).
    2
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give Steffensen’s
    Proposed Instruction No. D or by failing to require the jury to return a special
    verdict on the quantity of cocaine base he possessed for his personal use. See
    United States v. Echeverry, 
    759 F.2d 1451
    , 1455 (9th Cir. 1985). Nor did the
    district court abuse its discretion by failing to give Steffensen’s proposed “addict”
    instruction, see United States v. Vgeri, 
    51 F.3d 876
    , 881 (9th Cir. 1995), or by
    instructing the jury that an intent to distribute need not entail a financial motive,
    see United States v. Heredia, 
    483 F.3d 913
    , 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
    Steffensen’s equal protection challenge to the statutory minimum sentence
    prescribed by § 841(b)(1)(B) is foreclosed by United States v. Harding, 
    971 F.2d 410
    , 414 (9th Cir. 1992), and his Eighth Amendment challenge is foreclosed by
    United States v. Norwood, 
    603 F.3d 1063
    , 1071 (9th Cir. 2010). Giving due
    deference to the district court’s consideration of the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), see Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007), we conclude that
    Steffensen’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable.
    The judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    3