Silia Ramirez-Garcia v. Jefferson Sessions ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    APR 16 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SILIA BETZABE RAMIREZ-                 )      Nos. 15-71480
    GARCIA,                                )           15-71809
    )
    Petitioner,               )      Agency No. A097-559-607
    )
    v.                        )      MEMORANDUM*
    )
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,             )
    Attorney General,                      )
    )
    Respondent.               )
    )
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 13, 2018**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and BENITEZ,*** District
    Judge.
    Silia Ramirez-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
    argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Roger T. Benitez, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of her appeal from the
    Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her motion for termination of proceedings,1 her
    application for withholding of removal,2 and her application for Convention
    Against Torture3 (CAT) relief.4 She also petitions for review of the BIA’s
    dismissal of her appeal from the IJ’s denial of her motion for reconsideration.5 We
    deny the petitions in part and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part.
    (1)      Ramirez claims that proceedings should have been terminated on the
    basis that she was entitled to United States citizenship because her father had
    become a citizen. However, in her appeal to the BIA she failed to develop the
    issue in her brief, as a result of which it deemed her appeal abandoned in that
    respect. The record supports that determination. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 
    554 F.3d 1203
    , 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam); Singh v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1152
    , 1157 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider that claim. See
    1
    8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f).
    2
    8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
    3
    United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
    Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No.
    100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, implemented at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18.
    4
    Appeal No. 15-71480. Ramirez does not seek review of the denial of her
    application for asylum.
    5
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), (2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6).
    2
    
    Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1208
    .
    (2)    A determination by the BIA that an alien is not eligible for
    withholding of removal or CAT relief “must be upheld if ‘supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” INS v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481, 
    112 S. Ct. 812
    , 815, 
    117 L. Ed. 2d 38
    (1992);
    see also Tampubolon v. Holder, 
    610 F.3d 1056
    , 1059 (9th Cir. 2010). Its
    determination “can be reversed only if the evidence presented . . . was such that a
    reasonable factfinder would have to” come to the opposite conclusion. Elias-
    
    Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481
    , 112 S. Ct. at 815. When an alien seeks to overturn the
    BIA’s adverse determination, the alien “must show that the evidence [she]
    presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find” in her
    favor. 
    Id. at 483–84,
    112 S. Ct. at 817. The same standard applies to credibility
    determinations. See Lanza v. Ashcroft, 
    389 F.3d 917
    , 933 (9th Cir. 2004); Alvarez-
    Santos v. INS, 
    332 F.3d 1245
    , 1254 (9th Cir. 2003). However, when a
    determination is based upon credibility, “‘a specific, cogent reason for any stated
    disbelief’” must be offered. Guo v. Ashcroft, 
    361 F.3d 1194
    , 1199 (9th Cir. 2004);
    see also Valderrama v. INS, 
    260 F.3d 1083
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
    Here the BIA’s decision regarding Ramirez’s credibility is supported by
    3
    substantial evidence.6 It properly noted the inconsistency in her stories regarding
    her involvement in the drug crime for which she had been convicted.7 It also noted
    the amount of drugs involved and her pecuniary purpose. Thus, the BIA did not
    err when it determined that she had been convicted of a particularly serious crime,8
    especially in light of the “strong presumption that drug trafficking offenses are
    particularly serious crimes.”9 Thus, Ramirez was not eligible for withholding of
    removal.
    Moreover, the evidence in the record does not compel a determination that it
    is more likely than not that Ramirez would be tortured in Mexico. Thus, she is not
    entitled to CAT relief. See Wakkary v. Holder, 
    558 F.3d 1049
    , 1067–68 (9th Cir.
    2009); Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 915
    , 922–23 (9th Cir. 2006); Nahrvani v.
    Gonzales, 
    399 F.3d 1148
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2005).
    6
    We note that in some respects the BIA seems to have adopted the reasoning
    of the IJ and in others it contributed its own reasoning. We have, therefore,
    reviewed both decisions. See Kumar v. Holder, 
    728 F.3d 993
    , 998 (9th Cir. 2013);
    see also Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 
    751 F.3d 1088
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2014); cf. Malhi v.
    INS, 
    336 F.3d 989
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2003).
    7
    The fact that some hearsay was relied upon was not fatal; that evidence was
    reliable and could be considered. See Gu v. Gonzales, 
    454 F.3d 1014
    , 1021 (9th
    Cir. 2006).
    8
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); see also Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 
    594 F.3d 673
    , 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010); In re N–A–M–, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A.
    2007).
    9
    Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 
    500 F.3d 941
    , 949 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
    Rendon v. Mukasey, 
    520 F.3d 967
    , 976 (9th Cir. 2008);
    4
    (3)      The BIA did not err10 when it determined that the IJ had properly
    denied the motion for reconsideration;11 as it indicated, the evidence she pointed to
    did not undermine the adverse determinations properly made by the IJ and the BIA
    in their original decisions.12
    Petition DISMISSED in part, and DENIED in part.
    10
    See Edu v. Holder, 
    624 F.3d 1137
    , 1142 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010); Sembiring v.
    Gonzales, 
    499 F.3d 981
    , 983–85 (9th Cir. 2007); Cano-Merida v. INS, 
    311 F.3d 960
    , 964 (9th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    ,
    1262–63 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
    11
    See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6).
    12
    See Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 990, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2010).
    5