Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 23 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THE CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY, No. 17-55269
Proposed Intervenor,
D.C. No.
Movant-Appellant, 2:13-cv-08080-DDP-VBK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 6, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: CLIFTON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and HOYT,*** District
Judge.
The Center for Auto Safety (“CAS”), a non-party automobile safety
advocacy organization, appeals the denial of CAS’s motions to unseal certain
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
documents and to intervene solely for that purpose. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s order denying CAS’s motion to unseal.
Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014). Reviewing the order
under the abuse of discretion standard, see Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 712 F.3d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 2013), we affirm.1
I.
Jacqueline Young and other purchasers of certain Dodge Durango and Jeep
Grand Cherokee vehicles (“Young plaintiffs”) brought a class action suit against
Chrysler Group, LLC n/k/a FCA US, LLC (“Chrysler”) for purported defects
found in power systems installed in those vehicles, known as the Totally Integrated
Power Module (“TIPM”). The Young plaintiffs alleged that due to the TIPM
defects, the vehicles did not promptly and reliably start, would stall at high speed,
had fuel pumps that did not turn off, and experienced random, uncontrollable
activity concerning the horn, windshield wipers, and alarm system. The district
court issued a protective order permitting the parties to designate certain
documents in the case “Confidential” in anticipation of a hearing on the Young
plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (“MPI”). Pursuant to this protective
order, only parties to the suit had access to documents related to the MPI.
1
As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we restate
them only as necessary to explain our decision.
2
CAS filed motions to intervene and to unseal certain records. Chrysler
opposed the motions, arguing that “good cause” existed for maintaining the
documents under seal and that CAS’s motions should be denied. After the district
court denied CAS’s motions, CAS appealed. We held that because the MPI was
more than “tangentially related” to the merits of the case, the district court’s order
should be vacated and a “compelling reasons” standard should be applied. Ctr. for
Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2016) (“CAS I”),
cert. denied sub nom. FCA U.S. LLC v. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016).
Therefore, we remanded the case with the instruction that “Chrysler must
demonstrate compelling reasons to keep the documents under seal.” CAS I, 809
F.3d at 1103. CAS now appeals the district court’s decision.2
CAS maintains that we should review de novo the district court’s order
because the district court failed to conduct a balancing test, weigh the public
interest, and acknowledge CAS’s submissions. However, abuse of discretion is the
appropriate standard here. See Oliner, 745 F.3d at 1025 (citing Kamakana v. City
& Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006)). We therefore reject
CAS’s argument that we should employ de novo review; and we assess the
appealed aspects of the district court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard.
2
The parties to the original litigation settled their dispute and the district
court entered a Final Order and Judgment on January 27, 2016.
3
II.
We also reject CAS’s claim that public interest in the documents outweighs
Chrysler’s interest in maintaining them under seal. Certainly, the public’s “right to
inspect and copy public records and documents” including pretrial records and
documents filed in a civil case, establishes a “strong presumption in favor of access
to court records.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135
(9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). That presumption may be overcome when a
party demonstrates sufficiently compelling reasons for keeping a document under
seal. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79. When determining whether the
counter-rationale for overcoming access to records is sufficiently compelling,
courts must consider all relevant factors, including:
the public interest in understanding the judicial process
and whether disclosure of the material could result in
improper use of the material for scandalous or libelous
purposes or infringement upon trade secrets. . . . After
taking all relevant factors into consideration, the district
court must base its decision on a compelling reason and
articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying
on hypothesis or conjecture.
Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court performed a meticulous in camera examination
of the twenty exhibits at issue; weighed relevant competing interests, without being
speculative; and determined that compelling reasons justified Chrysler’s
4
maintaining a category of redacted documents under seal that contained sensitive
trade secret and/or personal contact information. Some of these exhibits
encompassed information concerning the vehicles’ design and development details,
including:3 (1) performance requirements for the cars’ electrical components; (2)
the TIPM system’s engineering performance standard; (3) specific descriptions of
how to construct certain parts; (4) the precise testing requirements the parts
undergo; and (5) specific technical modifications to the TIPM systems. The
district court noted that the documents were the product of Chrysler’s economic
efforts, such that public disclosure could undermine Chrysler’s competitive edge.
After painstakingly applying a balancing test, premised on compelling reasons, the
district court articulated its factual findings in a well-reasoned order.
Invoking the First Amendment, CAS argues now for a reversal. CAS
contends that a federal right to access Chrysler’s records exists. Specifically, CAS
first raised this argument in a footnote in its prior appeal. We need not address it
now, however, because CAS’s merely conclusory mention of such an argument in
a footnote, without more, did not preserve the matter for appellate review. See
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996). Consequently,
we affirm the district court’s conclusion in this respect.
3
CAS argues that the district court did not hold Chrysler to the correct burden, but
we disagree. The district court applied the compelling reasons standard as noted.
5
III.
CAS argues that the district court erred by denying its motion to intervene.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to permissively intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b), we only have jurisdiction if the district court abused its discretion in denying
the motion. See In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712, 720 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations
omitted); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297,
1307–08 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we must conduct a “cart-before-the-horse”
inquiry and first decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
the motion. Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1308. If we find an abuse of discretion, we retain
jurisdiction and reverse. Id. If there was no abuse of discretion, we dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. Id.
Intervention under Rule 24(b) is appropriate where independent grounds for
jurisdiction exist, a timely motion has been filed, and a common question of law
and fact exists between the proposed intervenor’s claim or defense, and the main
action. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992).
No independent jurisdictional basis need be established where, as here, a non-party
intervenor seeks to intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring public access to
court records. Id.
Finding that no outstanding purpose remained for CAS to intervene in the
parties’ lawsuit, the district court denied CAS’s motion to intervene. We
6
determine that CAS’s interest was adequately represented; and conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying CAS’s motion to intervene.
See Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, for
want of jurisdiction, we dismiss that portion of CAS’s appeal relating to permissive
intervention.
AFFIRMED.
7