N.Y. Marine & General Ins. Co. v. Estes Express Lines, Inc. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    APR 17 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NEW YORK MARINE AND GENERAL                      No.   16-56748
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               3:15-cv-02962-CAB-JMA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ESTES EXPRESS LINES, INC.;
    EXFREIGHT ZETA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 13, 2018**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: ROGERS,*** BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable John M. Rogers, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Plaintiff-Appellant N.Y. Marine brought suit for carrier liability under the
    Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, against Defendant-Appellee Estes as
    carrier and Defendant-Appellee Zeta as broker, to recover $84,511.23 that N.Y.
    Marine paid to its insured XPO when a cargo of batteries owned by XPO’s
    customer TransPower suffered damage while carried by Estes. On summary
    judgment, the district court held that neither Estes nor Zeta was liable to N.Y.
    Marine, because the loss claims did not indicate “a specified or determinable
    amount of money.” 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b) (1972). N.Y. Marine appeals.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review questions of
    law de novo. Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to
    any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 56.
    To obtain relief against a carrier under the Carmack Amendment, claimants
    must comply with “[m]inimum filing requirements.” 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(a)–(b);
    Ins. Co. of N. America v. G.I. Trucking Co., 
    1 F.3d 903
    , 905–06 (9th Cir. 1993). A
    claim must, at a minimum, “(1) contain[ ] facts sufficient to identify the baggage or
    shipment (or shipments) of property; (2) assert[ ] liability for alleged loss, damage,
    injury, or delay; and (3) mak[e] claim for the payment of a specified or
    determinable amount of money.” 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b).
    2
    The forms at issue here lack a specified or determinable claim amount,
    which is necessary to alert Estes to the extent of its liability: they state that
    “[e]xtent of damage” is “unknown until cargo is inspected,” and merely note the
    cargo’s total value of $148,055.30. Neither Estes nor Zeta was ever told of the
    results of the January 17 inspection conducted by TransPower and the NYC Transit
    Authority. A few weeks after the claim was submitted, Zeta warned XPO that “the
    amount for the referenced claim” was still missing, and that the claim form needed
    to be updated “to include claim amount.” No update followed. In the absence of a
    “specified or determinable amount” listed on the claim form, and in the absence of
    any other means for Estes to assess the extent of the loss, the forms did not
    reasonably permit Estes to apprise itself of the approximate claim value. Merely
    identifying the upper bound of possible damages with exact damages “TBD” does
    not suffice. 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2.
    Even under our “substantial performance” standard, N.Y. Marine’s claim
    fails. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackie, 
    195 F.2d 641
    , 642–43 (9th Cir. 1952) (finding
    no liability where claimant told carrier that a final inspection was forthcoming and
    that the claim amount would be updated, but ultimately provided no update). And
    unlike wet flour or a cracked sailboat, see Georgia, F. & A. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling
    Co., 
    241 U.S. 190
    , 197–99 (1916), Culver v. Boat Transit, Inc., 
    782 F.2d 1467
    ,
    3
    1468 (9th Cir. 1986), the damage to batteries here was nonobvious: the damage
    was out-of-sight without any apparent means for Estes to inspect them. See G.I.
    
    Trucking, 1 F.3d at 907
    (“[W]hile the letter did not specify an amount of damages,
    that amount was arguably determinable from the other information given in the
    letter or already available to the carrier.”). The district court’s judgment is
    AFFIRMED.
    4