Eugene Genchev v. Detroit Diesel Corp , 608 F. App'x 478 ( 2015 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                              JUN 23 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    EUGENE GENCHEV,                                  No. 13-56025
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01021-JAH-NLS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 5, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: M. SMITH and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and LEFKOW,*** Senior
    District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Senior District Judge for the
    U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    Eugene Genchev appeals the district court’s judgment following a jury trial.
    Genchev claims that the district court erred in failing to give a jury instruction that
    would have allowed the jury to award consequential damages under California
    Commercial Code § 2719(2) if it found that Detroit Diesel Corporation’s express
    warranties had failed their essential purpose. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm.
    “Harmless error review applies to jury instructions in civil cases.” Kennedy
    v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 
    268 F.3d 763
    , 770 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Caballero v. City of
    Concord, 
    956 F.2d 204
    , 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (“An error in instructing the jury in a
    civil case requires reversal unless the error is more probably than not harmless.”)).
    Genchev argues that the district court erred in finding that the California
    Commercial Code did not apply to the transaction between Genchev and Detroit
    Diesel. However, we need not reach this argument as the failure to give this jury
    instruction, even if error, was harmless error as the jury ultimately found that
    Detroit Diesel had not breached its express warranties.
    The requested jury instruction would have allowed the jury to award
    consequential damages if they found that Detroit Diesel’s express warranties had
    failed their essential purpose. “If the remedy promised by the seller is so hollow or
    ineffectual as to be meaningless, then the warranty fails of its essential purpose and
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    the customer is not bound by limitations of remedy contained therein.” In re
    MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., 
    46 F. Supp. 3d 936
    , 970 (N. Dist. Cal. 2014)
    (internal citation and quotation marks ommited); accord Milgard Tempering, Inc.
    v. Selas Corp. of Am., 
    902 F.2d 703
    , 707 (9th Cir. 1990); Fiorito Bros., Inc. v.
    Fruehauf Corp., 
    747 F.2d 1309
    , 1312 (9th Cir. 1984).
    The jury found that Detroit Diesel did not breach its express warranties,
    which according to the language of the warranties means that Detroit Diesel
    “correct[ed] any malfunction occurring during the WARRANTY PERIOD
    resulting from defects in material or workmanship.” In light of this finding, it
    would have been impossible for the jury to also find that the warranties failed their
    essential purpose – which was to correct malfunctions. Thus, even if the district
    court erred in not giving the requested jury instruction, this error was harmless as
    the jury found that Detroit Diesel did not breach its express warranties and thus
    would not have found that Detroit Diesel’s express warranties failed their essential
    purpose. See, e.g., Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 
    804 F.2d 1418
    , 1434 (9th Cir.
    1986) (refusal to instruct jury on claim of promissory estoppel was harmless
    because jury found that no promise had been made in considering another claim).
    AFFIRMED.
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