United States v. David Ovist , 608 F. App'x 485 ( 2015 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 24 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 13-30256
    Plaintiff - Appellee,                D.C. No. 3:11-cr-0076-BR-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DAVID JOHN OVIST,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 6, 2015
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: W. FLETCHER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges and CURIEL,** District
    Judge.
    David Ovist appeals his convictions for bank fraud and wire fraud in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1343
     and 1344, and the 57 month sentence imposed following his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
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    convictions. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    , and
    affirm.
    1. Before trial, Ovist sought to introduce into evidence civil complaints filed
    by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
    and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York
    alleging fraud by several of the lenders at issue in this case. We generally review
    evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lynch, 
    437 F.3d 902
    , 913
    (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam). However, we review evidentiary rulings that
    preclude presentation of a defense de novo. United States v. Ross, 
    206 F.3d 896
    ,
    898–99 (9th Cir. 2000). A statement is admissible against the prosecution as the
    statement of a party-opponent when it is published by “the relevant and competent
    section of the government.” United States v. Van Griffin, 
    874 F.2d 634
    , 638 (9th Cir.
    1989). However, not “every publication of every branch of government of the
    United States can be treated as a party admission by the United States.” 
    Id.
    The district court properly excluded the civil complaints filed by the three
    federal agencies. First, these complaints were not admissions of a party-opponent
    under Van Griffin because they were mere allegations; none of these agencies can
    state definitively that the fraud occurred or that the underwriting guidelines were not
    followed. See 
    874 F.2d at 638
    . Second, even if the complaints met the Van Griffin
    standard, they were not probative on the issue of the materiality of Ovist’s
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    misrepresentations because the complaints merely alleged that the lenders had
    loosened their lending standards, not that they had abandoned them completely.
    Third, contrary to Ovist’s argument, the district court specifically stated that it
    would consider the admissibility of evidence pertaining to widespread fraud by the
    lenders on specific evidentiary proffers, but Ovist never made such proffers at trial.
    2. The district court did not preclude Ovist from presenting a defense and
    therefore did not abuse its discretion by excluding documents and testimony during
    trial, including insurance binders. District courts may exclude relevant evidence
    whose “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . needlessly
    presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Cumulative evidence
    replicates other admitted evidence.” United States v. Ives, 
    609 F.2d 930
    , 933 (9th
    Cir. 1979). The excluded evidence was cumulative because Ovist was allowed to
    introduce a significant amount of testimony or documents to support each point that
    the cumulative testimony and documents replicated. The district court acted within
    its discretion when it excluded other, cumulative evidence.
    3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by giving a deliberate
    ignorance instruction. A district court’s decision to give a deliberate ignorance, or
    willful blindness, instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Ramos-Atondo, 
    732 F.3d 1113
    , 1118 (9th Cir. 2013). When deciding whether to give
    a deliberate ignorance instruction, “the district court must view the evidence in the
    3
    light most favorable to the party requesting it.” United States v. Heredia, 
    483 F.3d 913
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citations omitted). “In deciding whether to give a
    willful blindness instruction, in addition to an actual knowledge instruction, the
    district court must determine whether the jury could rationally find willful blindness
    even though it has rejected the government’s evidence of actual knowledge. If so,
    the court may also give a [deliberate ignorance] instruction.” Id.. Viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find
    Ovist knew there was a high probability that the loan applications contained false
    representations and that he deliberately acted to avoid learning the truth with regards
    to the falsities. Thus, a deliberate ignorance instruction was warranted.
    4. We review sentences for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 49 (2007); United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
    banc). Procedurally sound sentences are reviewed for substantive reasonableness.
    United States v. Ressam, 
    679 F.3d 1069
    , 1087 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    ). “The touchstone of ‘reasonableness’ is whether the record as a whole
    reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).” 
    Id. at 1089
     (quoting United States v. Tomko, 
    562 F.3d 558
    , 568
    (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)). A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion and adequately explained the bases for the
    disparity between Ovist’s sentence and those of his co-defendants, including Ovist’s
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    co-defendants’ cooperation, lower number of convictions, acceptance of
    responsibility, and smaller role in the fraud. The district court carefully considered
    the § 3553(a) factors and was not, as Ovist argues, punishing him for exercising his
    right to a jury trial, but rather imposing lower sentences on his co-defendants for
    their cooperation and lower number of convictions.
    AFFIRMED.
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