Charles Byrd v. Robert McKinney ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 17 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHARLES EDWARD BYRD,                            No.    18-17338
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02661-NVW-
    DMF
    v.
    ROBERT MCKINNEY, Phoenix Police                 MEMORANDUM*
    Department Officer #8046; TIMOTHY
    THIEBAUT, Phoenix Police Department
    Officer #8008,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 11, 2019**
    Before:      WALLACE, CANBY, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Charles Edward Byrd, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
    district court’s order dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging a Fourth
    Amendment violation and use of excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo. Erlin v. United States, 
    364 F.3d 1127
    , 1130
    (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations); Edwards v.
    Marin Park, Inc., 
    356 F.3d 1058
    , 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal under Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Byrd’s action because it is barred by
    the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See TwoRivers v. Lewis, 
    174 F.3d 987
    , 991 (9th Cir. 1999) (statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Arizona is two
    years); see also Mills v. City of Covina, 
    921 F.3d 1161
    , 1166 (9th Cir. 2019)
    (plaintiff had “complete and present causes of action” at the time of search and
    arrest, and claims accrued at that time); Doe v. Roe, 
    955 P.2d 951
    , 964 (Ariz. 1998)
    (unsound mind equitable tolling may not be established by “conclusory averments
    such as assertions that one was unable to manage daily affairs or understand legal
    rights and liabilities” but rather requires plaintiff to set forth “specific facts”).
    Byrd’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                      18-17338