United States v. William Moore , 472 F. App'x 839 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              MAY 08 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 11-10297
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:00-cr-00034-WBS-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    WILLIAM ANTHONY MOORE, AKA
    Whipp,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    William B. Shubb, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted April 18, 2012
    San Francisco, California
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, N.R. SMITH and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    We affirm the judgment revoking William Moore’s supervised release and
    the sentence the district court imposed upon revocation.
    1. Moore’s admission to the sale and possession of controlled substances
    charges at his admit or deny hearing was non-hearsay evidence of his supervised
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    release violation, therefore we need not determine whether the summary in the
    violation petition violated his confrontation rights. See United States v. Verduzco,
    
    330 F.3d 1182
    , 1185–86 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Comito, 
    177 F.3d 1166
    ,
    1170 (9th Cir. 1999).
    2. The violation petition gave Moore sufficient notice of the alleged
    violation of supervised release. The petition notified Moore that the alleged new
    law violation—possession of controlled substances with intent to
    distribute—violated the terms of his supervised release. See United States v.
    Havier, 
    155 F.3d 1090
    , 1092 (9th Cir. 1998).
    3. The district court did not commit procedural error by failing to apply the
    Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) retroactively. The FSA does not operate retroactively
    to reduce the underlying offense from a Class A to a Class B felony. See United
    States v. Baptist, 
    646 F.3d 1225
    , 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The district
    court properly considered the advisory policy statements amended by the FSA and
    then rejected them. See United States v. Tadeo, 
    222 F.3d 623
    , 626 (9th Cir. 2000).
    4. The district court did not commit procedural error by failing to
    adequately explain the sentence. The record shows that the district court properly
    discussed and addressed the sentencing factors enumerated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e).
    See United States v. Hammons, 
    558 F.3d 1100
    , 1104 (9th Cir. 2009).
    5. Finally, we cannot conclude that the 54-month sentence, which was
    within the recommended Guidelines range, was substantively unreasonable on this
    record. See United States v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
    AFFIRMED.