United States v. Kenneth Gordon , 694 F. App'x 556 ( 2017 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           JUL 24 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.    13-10463
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
    1:11-cr-00479-JMS-1
    v.
    KENNETH SCOTT GORDON,                            MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Hawaii
    J. Michael Seabright, Chief Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 14, 2017**
    Honolulu, Hawaii
    Before: FISHER, PAEZ and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Kenneth Scott Gordon was arrested and convicted for conspiring to
    distribute and possessing with intent to distribute large quantities of
    methamphetamine. The evidence against him largely came from a duffel bag and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    wallet seized from his person at the time of his arrest and the testimony of a co-
    conspirator, Richelle Higa. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The district court
    sentenced him to 164 months, denying Gordon’s request for a minor role
    adjustment. Gordon timely appealed.
    Gordon argues the district court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress
    evidence from the duffel bag and wallet; (2) admitting a 35-second video;
    (3) refusing to apply a minor role downward adjustment; and (4) imposing a
    procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
    First, the district court properly denied Gordon’s motion to suppress
    evidence from the duffel bag and wallet. Law enforcement agents searched the
    duffel bag within seconds of Gordon being handcuffed. It was, therefore, “roughly
    contemporaneous with the arrest” and, thus, lawful. United States v. Camou, 
    773 F.3d 932
    , 938 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United
    States v. Smith, 
    389 F.3d 944
    , 951 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Cook,
    
    808 F.3d 1195
    , 1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding search of a backpack
    after a suspect was handcuffed where there were reasonable security concerns);
    United States v. Nohara, 
    3 F.3d 1239
    , 1243 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding search of a
    bag two to three minutes after the suspect was handcuffed and seated in an
    apartment hallway). Unlike the suspect in Arizona v. Gant, Gordon was “within
    reaching distance” of the duffel bag when it was first searched. 
    556 U.S. 332
    , 351
    2
    (2009). Although a close call, the initial search was lawful. Further, the district
    court’s conclusion that the duffel bag remained in the uninterrupted control of law
    enforcement was not clearly erroneous. Gordon points to no evidence that anyone
    other than law enforcement had access to the duffel bag after he was arrested. As
    to the wallet, Gordon stipulated that officers would testify the wallet was taken
    from his person at the time of his arrest. He also stipulated that the wallet was then
    transported to DEA headquarters. The district court properly relied on these
    stipulations in finding the search of the wallet was lawful. See United States v.
    Passaro, 
    624 F.2d 938
    , 944 (9th Cir. 1980).
    Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a 35-
    second video. A DEA agent testified the video was made on the day of Gordon’s
    arrest, so a reasonable jury could conclude the erroneous time and date stamp was
    due to technical error.
    Third, the district court did not clearly err by concluding Gordon was not
    entitled to a minor role adjustment. That Gordon was far less culpable than the
    leaders of the conspiracy is not dispositive. Rather, the question is whether
    Gordon’s behavior was substantially less culpable than the average participant,
    including the other couriers. Gordon did not show his behavior was substantially
    less culpable than average.
    Fourth, the district court did not procedurally or clearly err by treating the
    3
    $18,020 found in the duffel bag as drug money. The money was found in a
    macadamia candy box, the method used to conceal the proceeds from drug sales.
    Higa was not so incredible that the court could not believe her. In any event, as
    Gordon concedes, the district court’s treatment of the $18,020 as drug money did
    not affect his total offense level. The district court did not clearly err.
    Fifth, Gordon’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court
    properly considered the sentencing factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) and
    concluded a “substantial sentence above the mandatory minimum” was
    appropriate. That reasoning was not “(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without
    support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United
    States v. Hinkson, 
    585 F.3d 1247
    , 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 
    470 U.S. 564
    , 577 (1985)). Indeed, although Gordon’s sentence was lengthy, it was still two
    years shorter than the lowest guidelines range sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    FILED
    United States v. Gordon, No. 13-10463
    JUL 24 2017
    PAEZ, J., concurring:                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    I agree with the majority in full. I write separately only to clarify that I
    would reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, in accordance with Arizona v.
    Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
     (2009) and our decision in United States v. Camou, 
    773 F.3d 932
     (9th Cir. 2014), if not for United States v. Cook, 
    808 F.3d 1195
     (9th Cir.
    2015). On similar facts as here, the court in Cook concluded that the dual purposes
    of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine were sufficiently served to uphold the
    search. Although, in light of Gant and Camou, I would not have concluded the
    same, I view Cook as controlling here.