Lawrence Hash v. Samer Kanaan ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 23 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LAWRENCE GEORGE HASH,                           No.    18-16732
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01663-SK
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SAMER A. KANAAN; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Sallie Kim, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
    Submitted July 15, 2019***
    Before:      SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    California state prisoner Lawrence George Hash appeals pro from the
    district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging deliberate indifference to
    his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
    affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hash failed
    to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were
    deliberately indifferent in the treatment of Hash’s gastrointestinal problems. See
    
    id. at 1057-60
     (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows
    of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health; a difference of opinion
    concerning the course of treatment, medical malpractice, and negligence in
    diagnosing or treating a medical condition do not amount to deliberate
    indifference).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hash’s motion to
    continue summary judgment in order to conduct additional discovery, because
    Hash failed to demonstrate how additional discovery would have precluded
    summary judgment. See Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg.
    Corp., 
    525 F.3d 822
    , 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and
    explaining that the burden is on the party seeking a continuance in order to conduct
    additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought
    would preclude summary judgment).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hash’s requests for
    appointment of counsel because Hash failed to demonstrate exceptional
    2                                    18-16732
    circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 
    560 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
    forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for
    appointment of counsel).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hash’s request for
    appointment of an expert because such an appointment was not necessary for the
    court to make its determination. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term
    Disability Plan, 
    180 F.3d 1065
    , 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
    review and noting that district court has discretion to appoint an expert where such
    an appointment is necessary).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering the expert
    declarations submitted by defendants in support of their motions for summary
    judgment. See Primiano v. Cook, 
    598 F.3d 558
    , 563, 566-67 (9th Cir. 2010)
    (setting forth standard of review and requirements for admitting expert testimony).
    Hash’s contentions that defendants waived affirmative defenses and violated
    his due process rights, the district court failed to consider defendants’ admissions,
    and defendants Kanaan and Vaziri’s motions for summary judgment were barred
    by collateral estoppel and res judicata, are unpersuasive.
    We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, including
    Hash’s arguments about Rand notice. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985
    n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    3                                    18-16732
    Hash’s motion to file an oversized reply brief (Docket Entry No. 48) is
    granted. Hash’s motion to file multiple reply briefs (Docket Entry No. 51) is
    granted. The Clerk shall file the reply briefs submitted at Docket Entry Nos. 45,
    46, and 47.
    AFFRIMED.
    4                                   18-16732