Sharon Hammer v. City of Sun Valley , 700 F. App'x 659 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 11 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHARON R. HAMMER and JAMES R. No. 15-35687
DONOVAL, husband and wife,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 1:13-cv-00211-EJL-REB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF SUN VALLEY; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2017
Portland, Oregon
Before: WATFORD and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and NAVARRO,** Chief
District Judge.
1. The district court properly dismissed the majority of Sharon Hammer’s
(“Hammer”) claims in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) Order because
Hammer executed a contractual release of these claims in exchange for a severance
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
payment. Idaho law holds that when a contract is unambiguous, “the meaning of
the contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of
the contract’s own words.” City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem. Co., 888 P.2d 383,
386 (Idaho 1995). We conclude that the supplemental release that Hammer and
her attorney-husband James Donoval (“Donoval”) drafted and provided to the City
of Sun Valley (the “City”) was unambiguous and therefore waived “any and all
claims for damages arising from a termination without cause” as stated in her
original employment agreement.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to allow Hammer
to convert the 12(c) motion to a summary judgment motion. In the 12(c) motion,
Appellees sought judgment on the pleadings arising from Hammer waiving her
claims pursuant to the supplemental release. In Idaho, if the contract’s terms are
unambiguous, then the determination of the contract’s meaning and legal effect are
questions of law appropriately reviewable in a 12(c) motion. See Wylie v. State,
Idaho Transp. Bd., 253 P.3d 700, 706 (Idaho 2011).
Because we conclude that the terms of the supplemental release were
unambiguous, rendering the interpretation of the contract a matter of law, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hammer’s motion to convert
the 12(c) motion to a summary judgment motion.
3. We reverse the dismissal of Hammer’s unconstitutional bias claim, the
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dismissal of the claims against Nils Ribi and DeWayne Briscoe in their individual
capacity, and the dismissal of Donoval’s claim. We reverse to clarify the grounds
for the district court’s dismissal because we are unable to determine the reasoning
as to why these claims were dismissed.
4. We reverse and remand the dismissal of Hammer’s liberty interest,
stigma plus claim. This Circuit has two differing tests for a liberty interest, stigma
plus claim: the first is identified in Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543 (9th Cir. 1988)
(the “Gebbie test”), and the second in Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476 (9th
Cir. 1996) (the “Campanelli test”). The Gebbie test is less exacting than the
Campanelli test, as Campanelli requires the plaintiff to plead and prove that the
statements at issue were substantially false.
The district court conflated the Gebbie and Campanelli tests, granting
summary judgment based on unclear doctrine. Moreover, the district court
ultimately determined that the statements at issue were substantially false, although
the falsity of what was promulgated about Hammer remained a genuine issue of
material fact. As such, because the district court improperly granted summary
judgment on Hammer’s liberty interest, stigma plus claim, we reverse and remand.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Hammer
to amend her complaint. “Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion
where the district court could reasonably conclude that further amendment would
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be futile.” Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citing Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, 65 F.3d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir. 1995)).
The district court in this case reasonably concluded that further amendment would
be futile based on Hammer’s waiver of her claims, and we therefore affirm.
6. We reverse the district court’s costs entered against Hammer and
Donoval. A district court’s awarding of costs does not constitute an abuse of
discretion unless it is “based on an inaccurate view of the law or a clearly
erroneous finding of fact.” See Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1991).
Because we are reversing and remanding some of Hammer’s claims, we vacate the
entry of costs against Hammer and Donoval.
To conclude, we affirm the district court’s grant of the 12(c) motion; the
denial of Hammer’s motion to convert; and the denial of Hammer’s motion to
amend. We reverse the district court’s judgment of Hammer’s unconstitutional
bias claim; liberty interest, stigma plus claim; the claims against Ribi and Briscoe
in their individual capacities; Donoval’s claim; and the entry of costs.
Hammer sought to augment the record in regards to her liberty interest,
stigma plus claim. Because we are reversing and remanding this claim, Hammer’s
Motion to Augment the Record (Docket Entry 49) is DENIED. Additionally, the
Appellees’ Motion to Strike footnote 3 of Hammer’s amended reply brief (Docket
Entry 55) is GRANTED.
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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
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FILED
Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, No. 15-35687
AUG 11 2017
WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I think the district court correctly dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims, and I
would therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.