Chase Hayes v. Nassco , 695 F. App'x 312 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 15 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHASE HAYES,                                    No. 17-55396
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00004-BEN-
    WVG
    v.
    NASSCO,                                         MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted August 9, 2017**
    Before:      SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Chase Hayes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his action
    alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII and the Americans
    with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 
    152 F.3d 1193
    , 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
    (order). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s Title VII and ADA claims
    related to his layoff because such claims are barred by the applicable statutes of
    limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII complainant must file EEOC
    charge no later than 180 days, or authorized state or local agency charge no later
    than 300 days, after alleged unlawful practice occurred); Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of
    Youth Auth., 
    271 F.3d 812
    , 823 & n.11 (9th Cir. 2001) (same statute of limitations
    for ADA claims).
    The district court properly dismissed Hayes’s Title VII and ADA claims
    related to NASSCO’s rejection of his employment applications because Hayes
    failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was treated less favorably than
    others outside of his protected class, or that he was disabled or perceived as
    disabled within the meaning of the ADA at the time he applied for these positions.
    See Leong v. Potter, 
    347 F.3d 1117
    , 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth prima facie
    case of discrimination under Title VII); Braunling v. Countrywide Home Loans,
    Inc., 
    220 F.3d 1154
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth prima facie case of
    employment discrimination under ADA).
    2                                     17-55396
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   17-55396