Mahendra Singh v. Rockwell Automation Inc , 466 F. App'x 589 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 12 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MAHENDRA PRATAP SINGH,                           No. 11-35250
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00597-TSZ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC, a
    foreign corporation registered and doing
    business in the State of Washington;
    BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
    foreign corporation registered and doing
    business in the State of Washington,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Thomas S. Zilly, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 9, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GRABER, FISHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    Rockwell Automation, Inc., and Baldor Electric Company terminated the
    employment of Plaintiff Mahendra Pratap Singh as a business development
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    executive. Plaintiff challenged that decision in a lawsuit, but the district court
    compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and the arbitrator
    dismissed Plaintiff’s claims on the merits. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s
    orders confirming the arbitration award and compelling arbitration in the first
    place, and we review de novo. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise
    Corp., 
    622 F.3d 996
    , 1000 (9th Cir. 2010); Aramark Facility Servs. v. SEIU, Local
    1877, 
    530 F.3d 817
    , 822 (9th Cir. 2008). We now affirm.
    1. We affirm the district court’s order compelling arbitration because the
    arbitration provision is not unconscionable under Washington law,1 either
    procedurally or substantively.
    2. The issue of systemic bias—like other issues—had to be raised before the
    arbitrator but was not. Even assuming that the issue was properly preserved, and
    properly presented to the district court, the claim was not proved.
    3. Plaintiff did not meet any of the statutory standards for refusing to
    enforce a binding arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Comedy Club, Inc. v.
    Improv West Assocs., 
    553 F.3d 1277
    , 1290 (9th Cir. 2009) ("We have stated that
    for an arbitrator’s award to be in manifest disregard of the law, ‘[i]t must be clear
    1
    The parties do not object to the district court’s decision to apply
    Washington law on this question.
    2
    from the record that the arbitrator[ ] recognized the applicable law and then
    ignored it.’" (alterations in original) (quoting Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec.
    Ins. Co., 
    44 F.3d 826
    , 832 (9th Cir. 1995))).
    4. We need not reach any issues related to the Convention on the
    Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
    U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 ("the Convention"), implemented by 9 U.S.C.
    §§ 201–208. Plaintiff failed to raise his objections to the Convention’s
    applicability in his opening brief; regardless, its applicability would not change the
    outcome in any respect.
    AFFIRMED.
    3