Chris Hicks v. Progressive Casualty Ins. , 686 F. App'x 417 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 3 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CHRIS WYATT HICKS,                              No.    15-55953
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:14-cv-06316-PA-SH
    v.
    PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY                            MEMORANDUM *
    INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 7, 2017
    Pasadena, California
    Before: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Wyatt Hicks appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
    Progressive Casualty Insurance Company in his suit for bad faith insurance denial.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see Attorneys
    Liab. Prot. Soc’y, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., 
    838 F.3d 976
    , 980 (9th Cir.
    2016), we reverse and remand.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    An insurer “must give at least as much consideration to the interests of the
    insured as it gives to its own interests.” Wilson v. 21st Cent. Ins., 
    171 P.3d 1082
    ,
    1087 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
    721 P.2d 41
    , 44
    (Cal. 1986)). While the insurer “has no obligation . . . to pay every claim its
    insured makes, the insurer cannot deny the claim ‘without fully investigating the
    grounds for its denial.’” 
    Id. (quoting Frommoethelydo,
    721 P.2d at 44). “[D]enial
    of a claim on a basis unfounded in the facts known to the insurer, or contradicted
    by those facts, may be deemed unreasonable.” 
    Id. “The insurer
    may not just focus
    on those facts which justify denial of the claim.” 
    Id. (quoting Mariscal
    v. Old
    Republic Life Ins., 
    50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224
    , 227 (Ct. App. 1996)).
    Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hicks, Progressive
    performed an inadequate and biased investigation into the accident—one that was
    designed to protect its own interests without any regard for Hicks’s interests.
    Progressive immediately formed an opinion that Hicks’s injury was caused by an
    earlier accident and never seriously considered any other possibility. It based its
    opinion on conversations with representatives of Safeway Insurance Company and
    Karl Kantarjian—parties who had an obvious interest in minimizing Hicks’s injury
    from the collision with Kantarjian—and failed to account for the substantial
    evidence that any prior injury had no bearing on the present case.
    2
    It was uncontroverted that any prior injury to Hicks’s back or lower spine
    had healed years before the Kantarjian collison, and there was no evidence that
    Hicks’s constant pain years after the Kantarjian collision was attributable to the
    earlier accident. The “genuine dispute” doctrine does not apply here “where the
    evidence shows ‘the insurer dishonestly selected its experts[,] the insurer’s experts
    were unreasonable[,] [or] the insurer failed to conduct a thorough investigation.’”
    McCoy v. Progressive W. Ins., 
    90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74
    , 80 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
    Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins., 
    108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776
    , 785 (Ct. App. 2001)).
    “The size of the arbitration award, if it substantially exceeds the insurer’s
    offer, although not conclusive, furnishes an inference that the value of the claim is
    the equivalent of the amount of the award . . . .” 2 Robert C. Clifford & Paul A.
    Eisler, California Uninsured Motorist Law § 24.11 (2016) (citing Crisci v. Sec. Ins.
    Co. of New Haven, Conn., 
    426 P.2d 173
    , 177 (Cal. 1967)); see also Brehm v. 21st
    Cent. Ins., 
    83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 410
    , 421 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that insurer’s
    “unreasonably low” settlement offer “in light of the medical evidence in its
    possession at that time” was evidence of bad faith). Although Progressive offered
    to settle for $5,500 to avoid certain arbitration costs, it did not value Hicks’s claim
    at $105,500. Rather, it took the position that Hicks’s claim was worth at most
    3
    $57,000 when the undisputed facts showed it was worth between $175,000 (by
    Progressive’s own estimate) and $200,000 (by the arbitrator’s).
    Throughout its investigation, Progressive sought to portray Hicks and his
    mother as liars. During arbitration, Progressive’s attorney attempted to undermine
    Hicks’s mother’s credibility by asking her whether she “[did] pornography.” This
    is evidence of Progressive’s bias towards its insured. See 11 John K. DiMugnoa &
    Paul E.B. Glad, California Insurance Law Handbook § 143 (2016) (“An insurer’s
    duty of good faith and fair dealing continues after litigation commences. Thus,
    ‘various litigation tactics . . . and other conduct’ are admissible to show that the
    insurer breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” (quoting White v. W.
    Title Ins., 
    710 P.2d 309
    , 317 n.9 (Cal. 1985))). Contrary to the district court’s
    assertion, evidence of bad faith litigation tactics to show bias is not barred by
    California Civil Code section 47(b). See Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg,
    Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc., 
    728 P.2d 1202
    , 1208–09 (Cal. 1986); see also
    
    White, 710 P.2d at 318
    .
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-55953

Citation Numbers: 686 F. App'x 417

Filed Date: 4/3/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023