United States v. Rey Villarreal-Martinez , 707 F. App'x 465 ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 15 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10271
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:15-cr-02144-RM-JR-2
v.
REY DAVID VILLARREAL- MEMORANDUM*
MARTINEZ, AKA Rey David Villareal-
Martinez,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SANDS, Senior District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable W. Louis Sands, Senior United States District Judge
for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
Rey David Villarreal-Martinez appeals from the district court’s denial of his
motion for a judgment of acquittal, following a jury trial. The jury found
Villarreal-Martinez guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute less
than fifty kilograms of marijuana. We review the district court’s decision de novo,
United States v. Hernandez, 105 F.3d 1330, 1332 (9th Cir. 1997), and affirm.
To obtain a conviction, the government had to prove “(1) there was an
agreement between two or more people to commit the crime of possessing
marijuana with the intent to distribute it; and (2) [Villarreal-Martinez] joined in the
agreement, knowing that it had an unlawful purpose and intending to help
accomplish it.” United States v. Niebla-Torres, 847 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir.
2017). As did the defendant in Niebla-Torres, Villarreal-Martinez argues that the
government violated the corpus delicti rule when it relied on his confession to
convict him. To determine whether the corpus delicti rule is satisfied, we assess
“whether there is independent evidence that the crime[] actually occurred and
whether the prosecution has demonstrated the trustworthiness of the defendant’s
admissions.” United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 593 (9th Cir. 1992).
In Niebla-Torres, the court considered a similar set of facts and held that the
government had satisfied its burden of offering “substantial independent evidence”
that the defendant “knowingly entered into an agreement to assist marijuana
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traffickers . . . .” 847 F.3d at 1056, 1057. The defendant in that case was arrested
“in close proximity to his co-defendant . . . on a remote mountaintop in an area
known to be frequented by marijuana smugglers and their mountaintop scouts.”
Id. at 1056–57. He was found with “hand-held radios, cellular telephones, and
binoculars,” which an expert witness testified are typically used by scouts. Id. at
1057. The defendant was “dressed in camouflage,” and the arresting agent
“testified that he saw two people hiding together on the mountain for several days
before the arrest.” Id. The court in Niebla-Torres also pointed to agent testimony
that “drug-trafficking organizations control the majority, if not all, of the
smuggling routes” in the area, and “they typically traffic marijuana.” Id.
The government here, too, offered substantial independent evidence that
Villarreal-Martinez knowingly entered into an agreement to assist marijuana
traffickers. Federal agents arrested Villarreal-Martinez and his brother after
spotting them through an infrared camera on a mountaintop in an area known for
marijuana smuggling. The agents found a hand-held radio, cell phones, and
binoculars, as well as radio batteries, radio chargers, and solar panels, and an
expert witness testified to the use of such items in marijuana-smuggling operations.
Villarreal-Martinez and his co-defendant brother were found hiding under
camouflage blankets and clothing, and photos taken from the cell phone found on
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Villarreal-Martinez’s person indicate that he had been on the mountain for at least
three days before his arrest. An agent at Villarreal-Martinez’s trial testified to the
fact that “this particular desert corridor is controlled by [the Sinaloa] cartel” and
that the cartel smuggles almost exclusively marijuana. The government
additionally offered evidence corroborating Villarreal-Martinez’s statements about
his knowledge of marijuana-trafficking operations—for example, how someone
becomes a scout, how scouting works, and how scouts are paid.
Though no evidence was presented in this case indicating that Villarreal-
Martinez may have been previously involved in drug-trafficking operations, we do
not believe that such evidence is necessary for the government to meet its burden.
As in Niebla-Torres, “[t]he remote geographic area, the communications
equipment, and the expert witness’s testimony are circumstantial evidence of the
agreement that was at the heart of this drug-distribution conspiracy.” Id.
Therefore, the government met its burden under the first prong of the corpus delicti
rule.
The government also met its burden under the second prong of the corpus
delicti rule, which is satisfied by “independent evidence tending to establish the
trustworthiness of the admissions, unless the confession is, by virtue of special
circumstances, inherently reliable.” Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 592. “[A]
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confession [that] is recorded, voluntary, and the result of an interrogation that is
conducted in a manner consistent with the constitutional protections afforded the
accused supports a determination that it is ‘inherently reliable’ . . . .” United States
v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 925 (9th Cir. 2015). Villarreal-Martinez’s
confession was videotaped, voluntary, and given only after he waived his Miranda
rights. The form advising Villarreal-Martinez of his Miranda rights stated that his
confession would be used against him “in the court of law or in any immigration or
administrative proceedings.” He stated that he gave his confession “without any
pressure” and that he felt “relaxed really.” Even if he believed that his confession
would be used against him only in administrative proceedings, as he now argues,
that does not compel a finding that his confession was involuntary. See Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that “coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’”).
Because the government satisfied the corpus delicti rule, the district court
properly denied Villarreal-Martinez’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
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