Guy Jones v. Bradshaw Bar Group, Inc. ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUY JONES, No. 15-17512
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01841-JAM-AC
v.
BRADSHAW BAR GROUP, INC., D.B.A. MEMORANDUM*
The Rink; BRUCE D. FITE; CHARLES
FITE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 11, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SANDS,*** District Judge.
Guy Jones filed suit against the Bradshaw Bar Group, Inc., Bruce D. Fite,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable W. Louis Sands, Senior United States District Judge
for the Middle District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
and Charles Fite (collectively, “Bradshaw”), bringing claims for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 et seq., and other California statutes.
The parties submitted a consent decree and proposed order to the district
court. The consent decree resolved all issues between the parties except for the
matter of Jones’s attorneys’ fees. The district court entered the consent decree on
March 10, 2015.
On September 23, 2015, Jones filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The
district court denied the motion as untimely, citing Local Rule 293(a), which
requires attorneys’ fees motions pursuant to statute to be filed no later than twenty-
eight days after the entry of a final judgment. See E.D. Cal. R. 293(a).
Jones argues that the consent decree did not constitute a final judgment as to
the issue of attorneys’ fees because it did not resolve that issue. But our law is
contrary: “A consent decree is considered a final judgment despite the fact that the
district court retains jurisdiction over the case.” Stone v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 854 (9th Cir. 1992). A motion for attorneys’ fees “does
not imply a change in the judgment, but merely seeks what is due because of the
judgment.” White v. N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982) (quoting
Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980)). Here, the consent decree
entirely resolved the merits of the case—leaving only the “collateral” matter of
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attorneys’ fees. See id. at 451. We conclude that the consent decree was a final
judgment and triggered the twenty-eight-day deadline for an attorneys’ fee request
as is set by Local Rule 293(a). See id. at 451–52.
Jones next argues that applying a local rule to bar a request for fees here
undermines the public policy underlying the ADA and the relevant California
statutes. We disagree. While Congress provided for an award of attorneys’ fees
under the ADA, it did not prohibit deadlines for filing such requests. See 42
U.S.C. § 12205. The same is true of the California statutes at issue. See Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 52(b)(3), 54.3(a), 55; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5; Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 19953. And “district courts remain free to adopt local rules establishing
timeliness standards for the filing of claims for attorney’s fees.” White, 455 U.S. at
454. A local rule may bar as untimely a request for attorneys’ fees under the ADA
and the relevant California statutes.
Jones further argues that the district court’s ruling was contrary to the
parties’ understanding and intent, contending that the parties continued to negotiate
attorneys’ fees after the deadline set by Local Rule 293(a) had passed. But the
Eastern District’s Local Rules provide that, outside of a few exceptions that are not
applicable here, extensions of time must be approved by the district court. See
E.D. Cal. R. 144(a). The parties’ conduct alone could not modify the deadline for
filing motions for attorneys’ fees.
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Jones also contends that the parties’ conduct showed that they understood
the consent decree to extend the time to answer. However, “the scope of a consent
decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what
might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” United States v. Armour &
Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). Nowhere does the consent decree by its terms
extend the deadline for filing a motion for attorneys’ fees. In reply, Jones contends
that Defendants would not be prejudiced by the award of attorneys’ fees. But even
if this were assumed to be true, it does not constitute sufficient grounds for
disregarding the Eastern District’s Local Rules.
For the reasons above stated, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for attorneys’ fees as untimely. See Guam Sasaki Corp. v.
Diana’s Inc., 881 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[I]n reviewing rulings of the
district court regarding local practice and local rules, the appropriate standard of
review is abuse of discretion.”).
AFFIRMED.
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