Dex Systems, Inc. v. Deutsche Post Ag ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 13 2018
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DEX SYSTEMS, INC., a California                  No.   16-56044
    corporation,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               2:15-cv-03841-JAK-RAO
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    DEUTSCHE POST AG, a German
    corporation; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 16, 2018
    San Francisco, California
    Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LASNIK,** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    DEX Systems, Inc. (DEX) appeals the dismissal of its copyright-
    infringement claims as well as its other related claims.1 The district court
    concluded that DEX failed to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants
    Deutsche Post AG (DPAG), Deutsche Post International B.V. (DPI), and DHL
    Supply Chain (Netherlands) B.V. (DSC). We reverse in part and affirm in part for
    the reasons that follow.
    1. The district court erred in dismissing claims against DSC for lack of
    personal jurisdiction. To evaluate the sufficiency of an alleged intentional
    tortfeasor’s contacts with the forum to establish specific jurisdiction over the
    defendant, this court applies a three-element test. See Axiom Foods, Inc. v.
    Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 
    874 F.3d 1064
    , 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2017). First, the defendant
    must have “‘purposefully direct[ed] his activities’ toward the forum.” 
    Id. at 1068
    (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 
    303 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). Second,
    “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-
    related activities.” Dole Food, 
    303 F.3d at 1111
    . Finally, “the exercise of
    1
    The other claims are Unfair Competition under California law and common
    law Equitable Accounting/Constructive Trust. These claims are premised on the
    facts underlying the infringement claim. Accordingly, our determination that
    personal jurisdiction is proper as to DSC for the intentional infringement claim
    warrants similar reinstatement of personal jurisdiction to entertain these additional
    claims against DSC.
    2
    jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be
    reasonable.” 
    Id.
     “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of
    the test.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 
    374 F.3d 797
    , 802 (9th Cir.
    2004). “If the plaintiff meets that burden, ‘the burden then shifts to the defendant
    to present a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be
    reasonable.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1068-69 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 
    374 F.3d at 802
    ).
    To meet the first element of the Axiom Foods standard, the plaintiff must
    show that the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at
    the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered
    in the forum state.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 
    647 F.3d 1218
    , 1228
    (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 
    606 F.3d 1124
    , 1128 (9th Cir. 2010)). Here, DEX alleges that DSC committed intentional
    copyright infringement. Accordingly, the parties do not dispute the “intentional
    act” prong. See 
    id.
    On de novo review, we find sufficient record evidence to establish that
    DSC’s allegedly infringing conduct was expressly aimed at and occurred in
    California—causing harm DSC knew DEX would suffer in California. Although
    the print requests were sent from outside the forum and the ultimate printing
    3
    occurred outside the forum, the allegedly infringing use of DEX’s software
    occurred in California on DEX’s servers in Camarillo, California.
    Specifically the record establishes the following: (1) DEX’s Camarillo,
    California server had to be engaged and used for the software at issue to function
    and DSC had knowledge of this fact; (2) DSC sent print requests via VPN to
    DEX’s California server causing the software to engage and create output data that
    was sent via the VPN connection to DSC’s printers in Venlo, Netherlands; (3) after
    the expiration of the license agreement, DSC continued to access DEX’s California
    server to activate and use the software on the California server—allegedly
    committing an instance of intentional copyright infringement occurring on the
    California servers.
    Furthermore, that the software was located on DEX’s California server was
    not merely a fortuitous occurrence. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v.
    Woodson, 
    444 U.S. 286
    , 295 (finding no personal jurisdiction where the only
    contact with the forum state amounted to the “fortuitous circumstance that a single
    Audi automobile, sold [outside the forum to non-forum residents], happened to
    suffer an accident while passing through [the forum state]”). Rather, the software
    was located on California servers pursuant to an agreement reached by the parties.
    DSC and DEX actively set up the California-based VPN to facilitate printing
    4
    following technical difficulties with a primary VPN based in Europe. As agreed by
    the parties, DEX’s server, which sent data to and received data from DSC through
    the secondary VPN, was located in California, and both the California-based VPN
    and the Europe-based VPN continued to be used to transmit print data.
    This evidence satisfies the first two elements of the personal jurisdiction
    standard in Axiom Foods (minimum contacts and a claim arising from the
    contacts). The evidence likewise comports with the Supreme Court’s recent
    decision in Walden v. Fiore, 
    134 S. Ct. 1115
     (2014). Where Walden featured an
    alleged tort committed against a forum resident outside the forum state, see 
    id. at 1119-20
    , DSC’s allegedly infringing conduct (illegal use of DEX’s software on the
    California server) occurred in the forum state, cf. 
    id. at 1122
     (noting that “physical
    presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction,” but “physical entry into
    the State—either by the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or
    some other means—is certainly a relevant contact”). Though DSC certainly had
    limited contacts with California, its contacts include the allegedly tortious conduct
    in California that gave rise to DEX’s claims. In such circumstances, limited
    contacts are sufficient to create jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
    
    471 U.S. 462
    , 475 n.18 (1985) (“So long as it creates a ‘substantial connection’
    5
    with the forum, even a single act can support jurisdiction.” (quoting McGee v. Int’l
    Life Ins. Co., 
    355 U.S. 220
    , 223 (1957))).
    Finally, with respect to the reasonableness of jurisdiction, DSC waived any
    argument on this issue, because it did not argue the issue before the district court or
    in its appellate brief. To the extent DSC has any argument, we find it insufficient to
    meet the “compelling case” requirement in Axiom Foods. 874 F.3d at 1068-69
    (quoting Schwarzenegger, 
    374 F.3d at 802
    ). Accordingly, we reverse the district
    court’s dismissal of DEX’s claims against defendant DSC.
    2. With respect to DPAG and DPI, DEX acknowledged at oral argument that
    there is no record evidence to establish that these entities had any contacts with the
    forum state. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all claims
    against DPAG and DPI.
    3. DEX has not articulated how the district court abused its discretion in
    denying DEX’s request to seek jurisdictional discovery from DPAG or DPI.
    REVERSED in part and AFFIRMED in part, both parties to bear their
    own costs on appeal.
    6