Stephen Yagman v. Joseph Edmondson ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 18 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN YAGMAN, No. 16-56911
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-07210-DSF-SS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOSEPH CURTIS EDMONDSON;
MICHAEL J. COLELLO,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Yagman appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
and dismissal order in his action alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 360 (9th Cir. 2005) (summary judgment); Vess v.
Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003) (grant of an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike). We affirm.
The district court properly granted Colello’s motion to strike Yagman’s state
law claims pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute because Colello met his
prima facie burden of showing that each cause of action arose out of protected
activity and Yagman failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the
merits. See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1110 (two-step analysis under California’s anti-
SLAPP statute).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Yagman’s RICO
claim because it is time-barred. See Living Designs, Inc., 431 F.3d at 365 (four-
year statute of limitations period for civil RICO claims begins to run when a
plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that is the basis for the action);
Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing “separate
accrual rule” in the RICO context). Contrary to Yagman’s contention, his RICO
claim did not accrue in April 2015 when Colello received property from the
bankruptcy estate.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
2 16-56911
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Yagman’s request for costs on appeal, set forth in his opening brief, is
denied. Colello’s request for costs on appeal, set forth in his answering brief, is
denied without prejudice to filing a timely bill of costs. See Fed. R. App. P. 39.
AFFIRMED.
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