City & County of San Francisco v. United States Postal Service , 546 F. App'x 697 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               NOV 27 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CITY AND COUNTY OF            )              No. 12-15473
    SAN FRANCISCO,                )
    )              D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01964-RS
    Plaintiff,               )
    )              MEMORANDUM*
    and                      )
    )
    CENTRAL CITY SRO              )
    COLLABORATIVE; SAN            )
    FRANCISCO TENANTS UNION; )
    HOUSING RIGHTS COMMITTEE )
    OF SAN FRANCISCO,             )
    )
    Plaintiffs - Appellants, )
    )
    v.                       )
    )
    UNITED STATES POSTAL          )
    SERVICE; JOHN E. POTTER;      )
    MICHAEL DALEY,                )
    )
    Defendants - Appellees.  )
    )
    CITY AND COUNTY OF            )              No. 12-15490
    SAN FRANCISCO,                )
    )              D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01964-RS
    Plaintiff - Appellant,   )
    )
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    and                    )
    )
    CENTRAL CITY SRO             )
    COLLABORATIVE; SAN           )
    FRANCISCO TENANTS UNION; )
    HOUSING RIGHTS COMMITTEE )
    OF SAN FRANCISCO,            )
    )
    Plaintiffs,             )
    )
    v.                      )
    )
    UNITED STATES POSTAL         )
    SERVICE; JOHN E. POTTER;     )
    MICHAEL DALEY,               )
    )
    Defendants - Appellees. )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    The City and County of San Francisco, Central City SRO Collaborative, San
    Francisco Tenants Union, and Housing Rights Committee of San Francisco1 appeal
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States Postal
    1
    Because all of the Appellants seek relief for the tenants, unless otherwise
    noted we will hereafter refer to Appellants collectively as “the City.”
    2
    Service (USPS) on their claims that the USPS’s use of single-point delivery of mail
    violated the right of tenants of single room occupancy (SRO) hotels to equal
    protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution and their right to freedom of speech under the First
    Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm.
    (1)    The City first asserts that USPS violated SRO hotel tenants’ equal
    protection rights when it delivered their mail using single-point delivery rather than
    centralized delivery. The former is the method generally used for hotels, and the
    latter is generally used for apartment houses and single family houses. The City
    asserts that the failure to treat SRO hotel tenants the same as apartment house
    tenants violates the formers’ right to equal protection. We disagree. Equal
    protection requires that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
    City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 
    473 U.S. 432
    , 439, 
    105 S. Ct. 3249
    ,
    3254, 
    87 L. Ed. 2d 313
    (1985). That said, as the parties agree, rational basis
    review applies in this case, which means that the distinction made here “is
    presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn . . . is
    rationally related to a legitimate [government] interest.” 
    Id. at 440,
    105 S. Ct. at
    3254; see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 
    546 F.3d 580
    , 589 n. 4 (9th Cir.
    2008). That standard is satisfied if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of
    3
    facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach
    Commc’ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 313, 
    113 S. Ct. 2096
    , 2101, 
    124 L. Ed. 2d 211
    (1993). We agree with the district court that on this record it was rational for the
    USPS to draw a distinction between SRO hotels and apartment houses based upon
    the very design of the former as entities which, like regular hotels, allow for much
    more transience. The USPS could rationally predict that if SROs were treated like
    apartment houses, the effect would be detrimental to the efficiency and economics
    of postal operations. The economic character of the effect does not doom it as
    irrational. See Currier v. Potter, 
    379 F.3d 716
    , 731–32 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather,
    USPS’s use of single-point delivery service “is a rational response to the
    inefficiencies and increased costs that would result from” use of centralized
    delivery service for SRO hotels. 
    Id. at 732.
    That distinction did not become
    irrational because the USPS “grandfathered” and thus continued centralized
    delivery service to the SRO hotels that had (contrary to USPS policies) been
    receiving that service for over 90 days. That ameliorative approach was in accord
    with USPS policies,2 took account of reliance interests,3 and while it made the
    basic decision more incremental, government is not limited to all or nothing
    2
    See United States Postal Operations Manual § 631.7 (July 2002).
    3
    See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 
    427 U.S. 297
    , 305, 
    96 S. Ct. 2513
    ,
    2518, 
    49 L. Ed. 2d 511
    (1976).
    4
    solutions.4 Moreover, while the City points to some factual disputes, we agree
    with the district court that none of those are sufficient to undermine or affect the
    rational basis of the USPS’s classification of SROs. In short, the district court
    properly determined that the record would not support a determination that the
    USPS had violated the SRO hotel tenants’ equal protection rights.
    (2)      The City next asserts that the USPS violated the SRO hotel tenants’
    free speech rights when it declared that it would use the single-point delivery
    service approach. Again, we disagree. Again, our decision in Currier,5 is
    instructive; it sets out the relevant test.6 We agree with the district court that the
    forum at issue here is centralized delivery, which is the portion of the mail delivery
    system to which access is sought, as opposed to the mail delivery system as a
    whole. See 
    Currier, 379 F.3d at 727
    –28; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
    of Univ. of Va., 
    515 U.S. 819
    , 830, 
    115 S. Ct. 2510
    , 2517, 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 700
    (1995). That, as the district court and the parties agree, is a nonpublic forum. See
    
    Currier, 379 F.3d at 729
    –30. There is no claim that any restrictions imposed by
    4
    See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 
    348 U.S. 483
    , 489, 
    75 S. Ct. 461
    , 465, 99. L. Ed. 563 (1955); 
    Currier, 379 F.3d at 732
    .
    
    5 379 F.3d at 726
    –31.
    6
    See id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 
    473 U.S. 788
    , 797, 
    105 S. Ct. 3439
    , 3446, 
    87 L. Ed. 2d
    . 567 (1985).
    5
    USPS’s use of single-point delivery are not both content neutral and viewpoint
    neutral. See 
    id. at 730;
    see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’
    Ass’n, 
    460 U.S. 37
    , 46, 
    103 S. Ct. 948
    , 955, 
    74 L. Ed. 2d 794
    (1983). Moreover,
    the limitations are otherwise reasonable for essentially the same reasons that they
    are rational. See 
    Currier, 379 F.3d at 730
    ; see also Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter
    v. Reed, 
    648 F.3d 790
    , 798–99 (9th Cir. 2011). In fine, the USPS did not violate
    the First Amendment rights of the SRO hotel tenants.
    AFFIRMED.
    6