Sol Jaffe v. HSBC North America Holdings In , 549 F. App'x 684 ( 2013 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 11 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SOL JAFFE, No. 11-17849
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01839-NVW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS
INCORPORATED; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Sol Jaffe appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging various claims, including under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”), arising from the reporting of negative items on his credit report. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)
(order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jaffe’s claims against defendant HSBC
North America Holdings Inc. because Jaffe failed to allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42
(9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gorman v.
Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (under the FCRA,
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) does not create a private right of action and the duties
under § 1681s-2(b) arise only after the furnisher of financial information receives
notice of the consumer’s dispute from a credit reporting agency). Moreover, Jaffe
was granted leave to amend but declined to do so.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without
prejudice the remaining defendants for improper joinder because Jaffe failed to
establish that his claims against all defendants arose out of the “same transaction,
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); see
also Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jaffe’s motion for
reconsideration because Jaffe failed to establish grounds for such relief. See Sch.
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Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or., v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jaffe’s recusal
motion because Jaffe failed sufficiently to allege that the district judge had a
personal bias or prejudice against him. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555-56 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings” and “expressions of impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” are generally not grounds for
establishing bias or impartiality); Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th
Cir. 2008) (standard of review).
Jaffe’s contentions regarding defendants’ “status” in the case are
unpersuasive.
Jaffe’s motion to dismiss defendant Experian Information Solutions Inc.,
submitted on May 11, 2012, is granted. The joint motion to dismiss defendant
Merrick Bank Corporation, filed on October 9, 2012, is granted. Jaffe’s motion to
dismiss defendant Bank of America, NA, filed on December 10, 2012, is granted.
Jaffe’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his reply brief, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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