Century Tile, Inc. v. Hirsch Glass Company , 467 F. App'x 651 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             JAN 26 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CENTURY TILE, INC., a California                 No. 10-56084
    corporation, DBA Malaga Cove Tile, DBA
    Stone & Pewter Accents; CARL                     D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01993-GW-PLA
    STEADLY, an individual,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,           MEMORANDUM *
    v.
    HIRSCH GLASS COMPANY, a New
    Jersey corporation; PARAGON
    INDUSTRIES, INC., a California
    corporation, DBA Bedrosian Tile &
    Marble; ALYSEDWARDS TILE &
    STONE, an unknown California entity,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    CENTURY TILE, INC., a California                 No. 10-56389
    corporation, DBA Malaga Cove Tile, DBA
    Stone & Pewter Accents; CARL
    STEADLY, an individual,                          D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01993-GW-PLA
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    HIRSCH GLASS COMPANY, a New
    Jersey corporation; PARAGON
    INDUSTRIES, INC., a California
    corporation, DBA Bedrosian Tile &
    Marble; ALYSEDWARDS TILE &
    STONE, an unknown California entity,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 13, 2012
    Pasadena, California
    Before:        W. FLETCHER and FISHER, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,
    District Judge.**
    Plaintiffs-Appellants are Carl Steadly, who owns the copyrights at issue, and
    his exclusive licensee Century Tile (collectively “Steadly”). Defendants-Appellees
    are Hirsch Glass Co. and Paragon Industries (collectively “Hirsch”). Steadly and
    Hirsch compete in the design, manufacture, and sale of glass tile mosaics. Steadly
    sued Hirsch to enforce several copyrights to glass tile mosaics that he registered
    with the Copyright Office. He also alleged a trademark claim under the Lanham
    Act.
    **
    The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for Northern Ohio, sitting by designation.
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    The district court entered judgment in favor of Hirsch on the trademark and
    copyright claims, but it denied Hirsch’s motion for attorney’s fees. Steadly
    appeals the judgment on the copyright claim. Hirsch cross-appeals the denial of
    attorney’s fees.
    Steadly claims that the mosaic designs possess copyrightable “color
    expressions” consisting of color blends, color streaking, and the appearance of
    random arrangements to evoke a “natural effect.” Hirsch contends that any
    copyright protection of Steadly’s designs is thin and so requires “virtual identity”
    to raise a claim of infringement.
    We agree with the district court’s analysis of the copyright claim. First,
    Steadly enjoys a presumption of validity because he filed suit within five years of
    registering his copyright. Second, Steadly’s designs substantially comprise
    uncopyrightable elements (including coloring, color blends, streaking, and the
    appearance of randomness). Thus, protection over his designs is thin. See Satava
    v. Lowry, 
    323 F.3d 805
    , 811-13 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding copyright protection to a
    work is thin if originality expressed in combination of uncopyrightable elements is
    not sufficiently substantial). Third, Hirsch’s designs are not “virtually identical” to
    Steadly’s because the streaking effect, color blends, and appearance of randomness
    3
    in Hirsch’s designs are different for the persuasive reasons given by the district
    court.
    We reject Hirsch’s cross-appeal of the attorney’s fees orders. We review a
    district court’s order on attorney’s fees under the Copyright and Lanham Acts for
    abuse of discretion. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 
    323 F.3d 763
    , 766 (9th Cir.
    2003) (Copyright Act); Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper Indus., 
    352 F.3d 1210
    ,
    1216 (9th Cir. 2003) (Lanham Act).
    As to the attorney’s fees order under the Copyright Act, the district court
    correctly identified the multifactor test that we have endorsed and reasonably
    applied it. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 
    488 F.3d 1102
    , 1120 (9th Cir.
    2007); Ets-Hokin, 
    323 F.3d at 766
    . Contrary to Hirsch’s contention, the district
    court considered the fact that Steadly enjoyed a presumption of validity under the
    Copyright Act as one among many reasons to deny attorney’s fees.
    As to the attorney’s fees order under the Lanham Act, we note the “uphill
    battle” that Hirsch faces on appeal. Gracie v. Gracie, 
    217 F.3d 1060
    , 1071 (9th
    Cir. 2000). “First, the remedy is available only in ‘exceptional cases.’ Second, the
    statute provides that the court ‘may’ award fees; it does not require them. Finally,
    the Senate Report expressly commends this decision to the discretion of the [trial]
    court.” Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn, Inc., 
    793 F.2d 1132
    , 1134 (9th Cir.
    4
    1986). The district court acted within its discretion in denying attorney’s fees.
    Steadly’s claim, though meritless, was not vexatious, unjustifiable, or based on
    false evidence. Compare Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 
    611 F.3d 601
    , 615-
    16 (9th Cir. 2010); Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 
    636 F.3d 501
    , 510-11 (9th Cir. 2011).
    AFFIRMED.
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