United States v. Ernesto Haro-Munoz , 552 F. App'x 689 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                   JAN 15 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 12-50461
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:12-cr-02569-LAB-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ERNESTO ALONSO HARO-MUNOZ,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted August 27, 2013
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GOULD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and HUCK, District Judge.**
    Appellant Ernesto Haro-Munoz (Haro-Munoz), who was convicted of
    attempted entry after deportation, challenges the district court’s denial of his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Paul C. Huck, Senior U.S. District Court Judge for the
    Southern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    motion to dismiss the indictment. He collaterally attacks the underlying removal
    as fundamentally unfair. Haro-Munoz contends his due process rights were
    violated because: (1) there was no evidence that he received actual notice of the
    contents of his Form I-860, and (2) agents failed to obtain his signature on the
    Form I-860. He also contends that he suffered prejudice because it was plausible
    that an immigration officer would have granted discretionary relief allowing Haro-
    Munoz to withdraw his application for admission.
    To collaterally attack the underlying removal, Haro-Munoz must
    demonstrate that: (1) he exhausted any available administrative remedies, (2) the
    proceeding at which the removal order was issued improperly deprived him of the
    opportunity for judicial review, and (3) “the entry of the order was fundamentally
    unfair.” United States v. Rojas-Pedroza, 
    716 F.3d 1253
    , 1262 (9th Cir. 2013).1 A
    defendant can meet these requirements by showing that the Immigration Judge
    failed to inform the alien of his apparent eligibility for relief and that the alien had
    plausible grounds for relief. See 
    id. We can
    resolve this case on the second prong of the analysis because it was
    implausible that an immigration officer would have granted discretionary relief
    1
    The Government does not dispute that Haro-Munoz has satisfied the first
    two prongs, and therefore the only element in dispute is whether the underlying
    removal order was fundamentally unfair.
    2
    allowing Haro-Munoz to withdraw his application for admission. As discretionary
    relief was implausible, any alleged due process violation did not result in prejudice
    to Haro-Munoz. See 
    id. at 1263.
    Of the six factors listed in the Inspector’s Field Manual (Field Manual) for
    an immigration officer to consider in evaluating an alien’s request for permission
    to withdraw an application for admission, see United States v. Barajas-Alvarado,
    
    655 F.3d 1077
    , 1090 (9th Cir. 2011), two weigh in favor of Haro-Munoz because
    there were no prior findings of inadmissibility against him and there is a
    compelling humanitarian interest in keeping families united. However, four factors
    weigh against Haro-Munoz. First, Haro-Munoz was caught entering the United
    States by stealth, not innocently through ignorance, misinformation, or bad advice.
    Thus, his immigration violation was serious. Second, Haro-Munoz deliberately
    tried to evade inspection by crossing the Rio Grande River, rather than a port of
    entry, indicating an intent to violate the law. Third, he was neither a youth nor
    elderly at age 36, and does not allege that he was in poor health. Last, Haro-
    Munoz could not easily overcome the grounds of inadmissibility because his
    common-law wife could not file a I-130 Petition for Alien Relative request until he
    first obtained an expungement of his felony drug conviction. See Vasquez de
    Alcantar v. Holder, 
    645 F.3d 1097
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 8 U.S.C. §
    3
    1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 684
    , 688 (9th Cir. 2011)
    (en banc) (discussing expungement of a conviction “for the purpose of a
    disqualification”).
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-50461

Citation Numbers: 552 F. App'x 689

Judges: Gould, Huck, Rawlinson

Filed Date: 1/15/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023