Lisa Douglass v. Usaa Casualty Insurance, Inc. ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LISA DOUGLASS, No. 16-56451
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02601-R-AGR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE, INC., a
business entity, form unknown, Erroneously
Sued As USAA Casualty Insurance
Company; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Lisa Douglass appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
and dismissal order in her action alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Douglass’s request for oral
argument, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.
Act and the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Gorman v. Wolpoff
& Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment);
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1058-59. We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for TransUnion LLC
(“TransUnion”) and Equifax Information Services LLC (“Equifax”) on Douglass’s
claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i regarding Douglass’s USAA
MasterCard account and a Bank of America credit inquiry because Douglass failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether either consumer reporting
agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information. See Carvalho v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff filing
suit under section 1681i must make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting.”
(citation and internal quotations marks omitted)); Guimond v. Trans Union Credit
Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In order to make out a prima facie
violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer must present evidence tending to show that
a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information.”
(citation omitted)).
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Summary judgment for TransUnion and Equifax on Douglass’s claim under
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) regarding Douglass’s two other USAA accounts was proper
because Douglass failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether either consumer
reporting agency’s procedures in assuring the maximum possible accuracy of
information reported to it were unreasonable. See Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333
(“Liability under § 1681e(b) is predicated on the reasonableness of the credit
reporting agency’s procedures in obtaining credit information.”).
Summary judgment for TransUnion and Equifax on Douglass’s claim under
15 U.S.C. § 1681i regarding Douglass’s two other USAA accounts was proper
because Douglass failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether she disputed the
accuracy of these accounts with either consumer reporting agency. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a)(1)(A) (setting forth requirement that a credit reporting agency shall
conduct a reasonable reinvestigation only after the consumer notifies it that he or
she disputes the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in
the consumer’s file).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for TransUnion and
Equifax on Douglass’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3) because Douglass
failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether either consumer reporting agency had
no “reason to believe” it provided a consumer report to a person or entity without a
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permissible purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3) (enumerating the permissible
purposes for procuring a consumer report).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for TransUnion and
Equifax on Douglass’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g because Douglass failed to
raise a triable dispute as to whether either consumer reporting agency failed to
disclose all information in Douglass’s file upon her request. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681g (describing a consumer reporting agency’s disclosure obligations).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the USAA
defendants on Douglass’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) because Douglass
failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the USAA defendants’ investigation
upon notice from TransUnion and Equifax of Douglass’s dispute was
unreasonable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) (describing a furnisher’s obligation to
conduct an investigation after receiving notice of a dispute with regard to the
completeness and accuracy of any information a furnisher provided to a consumer
reporting agency); Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 (a furnisher’s investigation must be
reasonable).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the USAA
defendants on Douglass’s claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a) because
Douglass failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether any of the USAA
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defendants furnished information to a consumer reporting agency that it knew or
should have known was incomplete or inaccurate. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1785.25(a).
Dismissal of Douglass’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) against Bank of
America was proper because Douglass failed to allege sufficient facts to show that
a consumer reporting agency sent a notice of dispute to Bank of America. See
Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154 (the duties under § 1681s-2(b) arise only after the
furnisher receives notice of the consumer’s dispute from a credit reporting agency).
The district court properly dismissed Douglass’s claim under Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1785.25(a) against Bank of America because Douglass failed to allege sufficient
facts to show that Bank of America knew or should have known it reported any
incomplete or inaccurate information about a credit inquiry. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1785.25(a).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
because amendment would have been futile. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d
981, 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that
denial of leave to amend is appropriate where amendment would be futile).
The district court properly denied Douglass’s motion to remand because the
district court had federal question jurisdiction over Douglass’s federal claims and
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claim that was part of the same case or
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controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1367(a)
(supplemental jurisdiction); id. § 1441 (removal jurisdiction); Ramirez v. Fox
Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review).
We lack jurisdiction to consider the district court’s bill of costs and order
denying Douglass’s motion for disqualification because Douglass failed to file an
amended or separate notice of appeal. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585
(9th Cir. 2007).
Contrary to Douglass’s contention, the district court did address her motions
to set aside its dismissal order and vacate the judgment for Bank of America and
denied both motions.
We reject as unsupported by the record Douglass’s contentions concerning
judicial bias and the denial of due process and equal protection.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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