Jason Browne v. Renee Baker , 545 F. App'x 674 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                              FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               NOV 21 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JASON EVAN BROWNE,                     )     No. 10-17650
    )
    Petitioner - Appellant,          )     D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00290-RCJ-RAM
    )
    v.                               )     MEMORANDUM*
    )
    RENEE BAKER; NEVADA                    )
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,                      )
    )
    Respondents - Appellees.         )
    )
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Robert Clive Jones, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 4, 2013**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: FARRIS, FERNANDEZ, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    Jason Evan Browne appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a
    writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
    argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    (1)      Browne first argues that his right to due process under the Fourteenth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when the jury was
    improperly instructed on the deliberation element of first degree murder. See Nev.
    Rev. Stat. § 200.030(1)(a). We disagree. The Nevada Supreme Court determined
    that the instruction regarding deliberation was no longer proper, but that the new
    instructional requirements would not apply to defendants whose cases were final
    when the new requirements were adopted. See Nika v. State, 
    124 Nev. 1272
    ,
    1287–88, 
    198 P.3d 839
    , 850 (2008). We ultimately agreed with the Nevada
    Supreme Court’s determination. See Babb v. Lozowksy, 
    719 F.3d 1019
    , 1028–30
    (9th Cir. 2013). Browne has waived1 any argument that his conviction was not
    final before 2000 when the law of Nevada changed.2 In any event, we agree with
    the district court that on the facts of this case any error in failing to apply the new
    instructional requirements was harmless. See Fry v. Pliler, 
    551 U.S. 112
    , 116, 
    127 S. Ct. 2321
    , 2325, 
    168 L. Ed. 2d 16
    (2007); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    ,
    637–38, 
    113 S. Ct. 1710
    , 1722, 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 353
    (1993). Therefore, the district
    court did not err.
    1
    Arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived. See Brooks v. City
    of San Mateo, 
    229 F.3d 917
    , 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Greenwood v. FAA,
    
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994).
    2
    See Byford v. State, 
    116 Nev. 215
    , 235–36, 
    994 P.2d 700
    , 713 (2000).
    2
    (2)    Browne next asserts that his right to confrontation under the Sixth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when evidence
    regarding statements by his victim were admitted at his trial. However, on this
    record we are unable to say that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably
    determined3 that certain statements were not hearsay at all,4 and to the extent that
    Browne’s right to confrontation was violated by admission of any of the
    statements, the error was harmless.5 Again, the district court did not err.
    (3)    Finally, Browne asserts that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably
    determined that his counsel were not ineffective when they failed to present
    evidence of his psychological and mental infirmities to the jury at the guilt phase
    of his trial. Not so. Especially when we give the double deference6 we owe in this
    area, we are unable to say that it was unreasonable to hold that counsels’ tactical
    3
    See Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 75, 
    123 S. Ct. 1166
    , 1174, 
    155 L. Ed. 2d
    144 (2003); see also Williams v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 405–06, 
    120 S. Ct. 1495
    , 1519–20, 
    146 L. Ed. 2d 389
    (2000).
    4
    See Tennessee v. Street, 
    471 U.S. 409
    , 413–14, 
    105 S. Ct. 2078
    , 2081–82,
    
    85 L. Ed. 2d 425
    (1985); Winzer v. Hall, 
    494 F.3d 1192
    , 1194, 1198–99 (9th Cir.
    2007); Shults v. State, 
    96 Nev. 742
    , 747–48, 
    616 P.2d 388
    , 392 (1980).
    5
    See 
    Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623
    , 
    637–38, 113 S. Ct. at 1713
    –14, 1721–22;
    
    Babb, 719 F.3d at 1033
    .
    6
    See Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, __, 
    131 S. Ct. 1388
    , 1403, 
    179 L. Ed. 557
    (2011).
    3
    decision “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”7 or, for that matter,
    that “there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would
    have been different”8 if the evidence had been presented.
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2064, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984).
    8
    
    Id. at 694,
    104 S. Ct. at 2068.
    4