Keith Nash v. Garry Lucas , 710 F. App'x 332 ( 2018 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       JAN 29 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    KEITH L. NASH,                                  No. 17-35537
    Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 3:14-cv-05851-RBL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    GARRY E. LUCAS,
    Defendant,
    and
    RICHARD J. BISHOP, sued in his
    individual and official capacity; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 16, 2018**
    Before:      REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Keith L. Nash appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging denial of access to the courts while he was a
    pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de
    novo. Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 
    632 F.3d 607
    , 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We may
    affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    ,
    1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nash’s claim
    regarding the denial of a public notary because Nash failed to raise a genuine
    dispute of material fact as to whether defendants deprived him of an opportunity to
    challenge his sentence or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 355 (1996) (prison officials must provide an inmate the tools to challenge his
    sentence or conditions of confinement, but the loss of any other litigating capacity
    is constitutional).
    Summary judgment on Nash’s claim regarding the denial of access to the
    law library and legal supplies was proper because Nash was represented by court-
    appointed counsel in his state court proceeding at the time of the alleged
    deprivations. See Storseth v. Spellman, 
    654 F.2d 1349
    , 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)
    (availability of court-appointed counsel satisfies the constitutional obligation to
    provide meaningful access to the courts).
    2                                   17-35537
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nash’s motion for
    reconsideration because Nash failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist.
    No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993)
    (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).
    We reject as meritless Nash’s contentions regarding the district court’s
    treatment of his complaint and denial of his motions to file a surreply, for an
    extension of time, to compel, and to amend his complaint.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       17-35537