Miroslav Fejfar v. United States ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 30 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MIROSLAV FEJFAR, No. 17-35987
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-00191-MC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 15, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, and ZILLY,**
District Judge.
Petitioner Miroslav Fejfar challenges the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the parties are familiar with the factual
and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We review the district court’s denial
of a habeas petition challenging certification of an extradition order de novo.
McKnight v. Torres, 563 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2009). We review the denial of a
stay for abuse of discretion. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009).
By letter dated December 1, 2016 the Ministry of Justice of the Czech
Republic informed the United States Department of Justice that Fejfar has already
challenged the validity of the 2006 order before courts in the Czech Republic,
including the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court of the Czech
Republic held that Fejfar’s sentence was not statute-barred for lapse of time.
Judicial inquiry into foreign criminal procedural issues is limited in the extradition
context. See, e.g., Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d
1198, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 187 (1902). The district
and magistrate judges rejected Fejfar’s claims after a thorough analysis of the
validity of the 2006 order. We see no error in their conclusion, particularly given
the narrowly circumscribed nature of our review.
Given the circumstances of this case, the BIA’s decision to administratively
close Fejfar’s immigration case pending the outcome of his extradition proceedings
does not violate Fejfar’s due process or First Amendment rights. Cf. Barapind v.
Reno, 225 F.3d 1100,1106-08 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the Attorney General’s
2
recent decision in In re Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. May 17, 2018), Fejfar
may seek to reopen his administratively closed immigration proceedings for re-
calendaring. However, given the context of the case, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a stay of extradition proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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