Socal Recovery, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa ( 2023 )


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  •                   FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC, a                  No. 20-55820
    California limited liability company;
    ROGER LAWSON,                              D.C. No.
    8:18-cv-01304-
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,      JVS-PJW
    v.
    OPINION
    CITY OF COSTA MESA, a municipal
    corporation; DOES, 1-100,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    RAW RECOVERY, LLC, a California         No. 20-55870
    limited liability company,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiff-Appellant,     8:18-cv-01080-
    JVS-PJW
    v.
    CITY OF COSTA MESA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    2          SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted July 12, 2022
    Pasadena, California
    Filed January 3, 2023
    Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Mark J. Bennett,
    Circuit Judges, and Gary S. Katzmann, * Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Bennett
    SUMMARY **
    Disability / Housing
    The panel reversed the district court’s summary
    judgment in favor of the City of Costa Mesa in cases in
    which plaintiffs-appellants (“Appellants”), operators of
    sober living homes for persons recovering from drug and
    alcohol addiction, alleged that two new City ordinances and
    the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them
    on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
    *
    The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
    of International Trade, sitting by designation.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA         3
    the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
    California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
    The ordinances, which made it unlawful to operate sober
    living homes without a permit, define sober living homes as
    group homes serving those who are “recovering from a drug
    and/or alcohol addiction and who are considered
    handicapped under state or federal law,” and define group
    homes as “facilit[ies] that [are] being used as a supportive
    living environment for persons who are considered
    handicapped under state or federal law.” Until the
    ordinances were adopted, the City did not regulate sober
    living homes differently from other residences. The
    ordinances required all sober living homes, including
    established homes, to be located more than 650 feet away
    from any other sober living home or any state-licensed drug
    and alcohol treatment center. No existing homes were
    grandfathered—i.e., if two operating sober living homes
    were within 650 feet of each other, one would have to cease
    operating as a sober living home. The ordinances did not
    address the criteria used to determine which home could
    remain, but provided that applicants could request
    reasonable accommodations from permit conditions and
    requirements, like the 650-foot requirement.
    Appellants submitted both permit applications and
    reasonable accommodation requests to the City so they could
    continue to operate their sober living homes, even those that
    were operating within 650 feet of other sober living homes
    or state-licensed drug and alcohol treatment centers. The
    City found that Appellants were operating sober living
    homes but denied some permits and reasonable
    accommodation requests because the homes were operating
    in violation of the new separation requirement. The City
    issued citations to Appellants for operating the sober living
    4         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    homes without approval, and filed state court abatement
    actions against Appellants.
    Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the
    district court found that Appellants did not establish that
    residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled,
    or that the City regarded their residents as disabled.
    The panel held that Appellants and other sober living
    home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of
    the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by
    demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals
    with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized
    evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather,
    they can meet their burden by proffering admissible
    evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure
    that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and
    that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and
    procedures. The panel held that in each action, the district
    court therefore erred by finding that an individualized
    assessment of resident disability was necessary under the
    “actually disabled” prong of the disability definition.
    The panel held that in determining whether Appellants
    can establish disability under the “regarded as disabled”
    prong of the disability definition, the district court erred by
    finding that Appellants must prove the City’s “subjective
    belief” that their residents were disabled. The panel
    explained that under this prong, the analysis turns on how an
    individual is perceived by others.
    The panel noted that Appellants provided the district
    court with evidence of (1) admissions criteria and house
    rules, (2) employee and former resident testimony, (3) public
    fears and stereotypes of their residents that may have
    influenced the City’s perception, and (4) the actual content
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA          5
    of City ordinances, denial letters, resolutions, citations, and
    abatement actions that acknowledged the residents in
    Appellants’ homes were disabled. The panel wrote that this
    type of evidence, if it satisfied the requirements of Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), should have been considered
    by the district court in evaluating whether Appellants
    established triable issues of fact under either or both of the
    “actually disabled” or “regarded as disabled” prongs. The
    panel therefore reversed each of the district court’s grants of
    summary judgment and remanded for the court to consider
    whether the record contains evidence sufficient to establish
    a genuine dispute of material fact on the “actually disabled”
    or “regarded as disabled” prongs of the disability definition.
    COUNSEL
    Christopher Brancart (argued) and Elizabeth Brancart,
    Brancart & Brancart, Pescadero, California; Steven G. Polin,
    Law Offices of Steven G. Polin, Washington, D.C.; Garrett
    Prybylo, Seyfnia & Prybylo LLP, Los Angeles, California;
    Isaac Zyfaty, Much Shelist PC, Newport Beach, California;
    for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Mary-Christine Sungaila (argued) and Efrat M. Cogan,
    Buchalter APC, Irvine, California; Seymour B. Everett,
    Samantha E. Dorey, and Christopher D. Lee, Everett Dorey
    LLP, Irvine, California; Kimberly Hall Barlow and James
    Touchstone, Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, California; for
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Brant S. Levine (argued) and Nicolas Y. Riley, Attorneys;
    Pamela S. Karlan, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
    General; Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General United
    6        SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division,
    Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; Heather Nodler and
    Shira E. Gordon, Trial Attorneys; Jeanine Worden,
    Associate General Counsel for Fair Housing; Sasha
    Samberg-Champion, Deputy General Counsel for
    Enforcement and Fair Housing; Damon Smith, General
    Counsel; Department of Housing and Urban Development,
    Office of General Counsel, Office of Fair Housing,
    Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United States of
    America.
    OPINION
    BENNETT, Circuit Judge:
    In 2014, the City of Costa Mesa (“City”) began
    amending its zoning code to reduce the number and
    concentration of sober living homes in its residential
    neighborhoods. Two of its new ordinances—Ordinances
    14-13 and 15-11 (“Ordinances”)—made it unlawful to
    operate sober living homes without a permit. The
    Ordinances define sober living homes as group homes
    serving those who are “recovering from a drug and/or
    alcohol addiction and who are considered handicapped
    under state or federal law,” and define group homes as
    “facilit[ies] that [are] being used as a supportive living
    environment for persons who are considered handicapped
    under state or federal law.” Costa Mesa, Cal., Mun. Code §
    13-6. Unlike addiction treatment facilities, sober living
    homes do not require a license from the state of California.
    Until the Ordinances were adopted, the City did not regulate
    sober living homes differently from other residences.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                  7
    The Ordinances required all sober living homes,
    including established homes, to be located more than 650
    feet away from any other sober living home or any state-
    licensed drug and alcohol treatment center. No existing
    homes were grandfathered under the Ordinances—i.e., if
    two operating sober living homes were within 650 feet of
    each other, one would have to cease operating as a sober
    living home. The Ordinances did not address the criteria
    used to determine which home could remain. They
    provided, however, that applicants could request reasonable
    accommodations from permit conditions and requirements,
    like the 650-foot requirement.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants SoCal Recovery, LLC (“SoCal”)
    and RAW Recovery, LLC (“RAW”) (together,
    “Appellants”) operate sober living homes in Costa Mesa,
    California, for persons recovering from drug and alcohol
    addiction. Appellants submitted both permit applications
    and reasonable accommodation requests to the City so they
    could continue to operate their sober living homes, even
    those that were operating within 650 feet of other sober
    living homes or state-licensed drug and alcohol treatment
    centers. 1 The City found that Appellants were operating
    sober living homes but denied some permits and reasonable
    accommodation requests because the homes were operating
    in violation of the new separation requirement. 2 The City
    issued citations to Appellants for operating the sober living
    homes without approval. The City also filed state court
    1
    Four sober living homes at issue in this appeal were opened or acquired
    after 2014, but before the applicable Ordinances went into effect.
    2
    Two other reasonable accommodation requests were denied because
    they were not submitted in writing, as required by the Ordinances.
    8          SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    abatement actions against Appellants.
    Appellants sued the City, arguing that the Ordinances
    and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against
    them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act
    (FHA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 3601
     et seq., the Americans with
    Disabilities Act (ADA), 
    42 U.S.C. § 12131
     et seq., and the
    California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal.
    Gov’t Code § 12900 et seq. 3 The City moved for summary
    judgment against Appellants. The district court granted the
    City’s motions, finding that Appellants did not establish that
    residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, 4
    or that the City regarded their residents as disabled. 5
    3
    Appellants withdrew other claims they brought under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
    –1986 and California Government Code §§ 11135, 65008.
    Appellants also brought a retaliation claim under the FHA and a claim
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The district court granted summary judgment
    to the City on both. The district court awarded the City attorneys’ fees
    on all these claims, which it found “were asserted in a frivolous fashion.”
    Using a rough estimate, the district court found 10% of the City’s total
    requested fees were related to the frivolous claims and awarded the City
    $21,935.84 in fees in RAW’s case and $20,923.01 in fees in SoCal’s
    case.
    4
    The district court held that Appellants must prove their “clients have a
    substantial impairment to a major life activity, on a case-by-case basis.”
    SoCal Recovery, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa et al., No. SACV 18-1304,
    
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020), reconsideration
    denied, No. SACV 18-1304, 
    2020 WL 4668145
     (C.D. Cal. July 20,
    2020).
    5
    We grant RAW’s motion to take judicial notice of the City Council
    resolution upholding the denial of the Knox Street home and the state
    court judgment and order in the City’s abatement action against that
    home. We deny as unnecessary Appellants’ motions to take judicial
    notice of City Council and Planning Commission resolutions that are
    already in the record.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                   9
    Because the district court erred by requiring Appellants
    to adduce individualized evidence of actual disability and
    failing to consider evidence that the City regarded the
    residents of the sober living homes as disabled, we reverse
    the district court’s grant of summary judgment in both cases.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Sober Living Home Zoning Regulations
    Through its 2014 and 2015 Ordinances, the City imposed
    new zoning regulations regarding group housing for persons
    with disabilities.     Before the Ordinances, about 94
    unlicensed sober living homes were legally operating in
    residential zones. Appellants argue that between 2014 and
    2017, 73 sober living homes had closed. 6 The City’s website
    indicates that there are 16 approved sober living homes
    today. 7 The City adopted the 650-foot separation restriction
    and other restrictions in an explicit effort to reduce the
    number of sober living homes operating within the City. The
    City was concerned about the “overconcentration” of sober
    living homes in some neighborhoods, which the City
    6
    The source in the record cited by Appellants lists 68 closures, assuming
    each entry is a different property.
    7
    See     City     Approved      Sober     Living/Group      Homes,
    https://app.smartsheet.com/b/publish?EQBCT=f6f1941be3624556ab1b
    03e829df4639 (last visited Aug. 31, 2022); see also Group Homes/Sober
    Living      Information      and      Application,      Costa     Mesa,
    https://www.costamesaca.gov/city-hall/city-departments/development-
    services/community-improvement-division/group-homes-sober-living-
    information (last visited Aug. 31, 2022) (providing information on “City
    approved sober living/group homes,” “Operators that have closed,” and
    “Group homes cited”).
    10         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    believed was “deleterious” to those neighborhoods’
    residential character.
    The 2014 Ordinance, Ordinance 14-13, regulates group
    housing for persons with disabilities in single-family
    districts. Costa Mesa Mun. Code §§ 13-310–312. It defined
    “[s]ober living home” as: “a group home for persons who are
    recovering from a drug and/or alcohol addiction and who are
    considered handicapped under state or federal law.” Id. §
    13-6. “Group home[s],” in turn, are defined as “facilit[ies]
    that [are] being used as a supportive living environment for
    persons who are considered handicapped under state or
    federal law.” Id.
    Ordinance 14-13 made it unlawful to operate a sober
    living home in a single-family district without obtaining a
    special use permit. Id. § 13-311. Group homes in single-
    family districts were limited to six occupants and needed to
    have a “house manager” residing in the home and present on
    a 24-hour basis. Id. § 13-311(a)(2), (a)(4).
    In addition to the group home requirements, sober living
    homes needed to meet certain additional conditions.
    Relevant here, a sober living home could not be “located
    within six hundred fifty (650) feet, as measured from the
    closest property lines, of any other sober living home or a
    state licensed alcoholism or drug abuse recovery or
    treatment facility” (“separation requirement”). Id. § 13-
    311(a)(14)(i). 8 An applicant could seek relief from the
    8
    Other requirements include that all occupants other than the house
    manager are “actively participating in legitimate recovery programs.” §
    13-311(a)(14)(ii). Additionally, “[t]he sober living home’s rules and
    regulations must prohibit the use of any alcohol or any non-prescription
    drugs at the sober living home or by any recovering addict either on or
    off site.” § 13-311(a)(14)(iii).
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                   11
    “strict application” of the permit requirements by requesting
    a reasonable accommodation. Id. § 13-311(a)(15). 9
    The 2015 Ordinance, Ordinance 15-11, applied similar
    zoning regulations as Ordinance 14-13 but to multi-family
    residential districts. Id. §§ 13-322 to 324. The same
    conditions for a special use permit under Ordinance 14-13
    applied to existing group homes with six or fewer residents,
    including the 650-foot separation requirement for sober
    9
    Permit applications are first submitted to the Director of Economic and
    Development Services (“Development Director”), who may make an
    initial determination, or designate another official to do so. Costa Mesa,
    Cal., Mun. Code §§ 13-311, 322; see id. § 13-6 (defining “director” as
    “[t]he director of [economic and] development services of the City of
    Costa Mesa, or his or her designee”). In this case, the Development
    Director designated the City’s Zoning Administrator to make an initial
    decision regarding a subset of sober home applications. An unfavorable
    decision by the Development Director or Zoning Administrator is
    appealable to the City Planning Commission and then to the City
    Council. Id. §§ 13-8 to -11. The application shall include, inter alia, a
    copy of the group home rules and regulations, the relapse policy, and
    “[a]n affirmation by the owner/operator that only residents (other than
    the house manager) who are handicapped as defined by state and federal
    law shall reside at the group home.” Id. § 13-311(a)(1)(viii).
    Reasonable accommodation requests must be filed in writing with the
    Planning Division. Id. § 13-200.62(a)–(b). Applicants shall state “[t]he
    basis for the claim that the individuals are considered disabled under
    state or federal law, and why the accommodation is necessary to provide
    equal opportunity for housing and to make the specific housing available
    to the individuals.” Id. § 13-200.62(b)(2). And the application shall
    include documentation that the applicant is “an individual with a
    disability,” “applying on behalf of one or more individuals with a
    disability,” or “a developer or provider of housing for one or more
    individuals with a disability.” Id. § 13-200.62(b)(4). The Development
    Director’s decision on the request for reasonable accommodation can be
    appealed to the Planning Commission, and then the City Council. Id. §§
    13-7, -8, -10(i)(2)(c), -11(b).
    12       SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    living homes. Id. §§ 13-322, -324(a). Existing group homes
    and sober living homes with seven or more residents needed
    to obtain a conditional use permit within one year, and to
    apply for an operator’s permit within 120 days. Id. §§ 13-
    323, -324(b). A 650-foot separation requirement also
    applied to sober living homes with seven or more residents.
    Id. § 13-323(b). As with Ordinance 14-13, under Ordinance
    15-11, a group home could seek relief from the “strict
    application” of the permit requirements by submitting a
    request for reasonable accommodation exempting it from a
    requirement. Id. §§ 13-322(c), -200.62. Permit applications
    would be reviewed by the Development Director and could
    be appealed to the Planning Commission and City Council.
    Id. §§ 13-7 to -11.
    All permitting requirements in the Ordinances applied to
    both existing sober living homes and proposed sober living
    homes. Since the Ordinances passed, the City has received
    fifty-two reasonable accommodation requests from group
    homes and has granted three, none to Appellants.
    B. SoCal Recovery, LLC
    SoCal operates three sober living homes relevant to this
    appeal. Two of the homes, located on Hudson Avenue and
    Cecil Place, both opened before November 2014, are in
    single-family districts, and provide housing to six or fewer
    residents in recovery. One property, on East 21st Street, is
    in a multi-family residential district, providing housing for
    up to thirty-two residents in recovery. The East 21st Street
    home opened prior to December 2015, before the multi-
    family residential district Ordinance took effect. Each of the
    homes is within 650 feet of another facility covered by the
    Ordinances.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA            13
    SoCal submitted permit applications for all three homes
    and applied for a reasonable accommodation from the 650-
    foot requirement for the 21st Street property. The City’s
    Development        Director      denied     the    reasonable
    accommodation request, citing the 650-foot separation
    requirement and concerns about the overconcentration of
    sober living residences in the area. At a 2016 public hearing,
    SoCal verbally requested reasonable accommodations for
    the Hudson Avenue and Cecil Place homes. The Zoning
    Administrator denied the permit applications because the
    houses violated the 650-foot separation requirement and
    denied the reasonable accommodation requests because they
    were not made in writing.
    SoCal appealed. The Planning Commission upheld the
    denial of the reasonable accommodation request and permit
    application for the 21st Street property. The Planning
    Commission upheld the denials of the permit applications for
    the Hudson Avenue and Cecil Place homes without
    discussing the reasonable accommodations requests. 10 The
    City Council adopted resolutions upholding the decisions of
    the Planning Commission, finding that each of the homes
    violated the separation requirement. The City Council
    “determined that a separation requirement for such facilities
    will still allow for a reasonable market for the purchase and
    operation of sober living homes within the City and still
    result in preferential treatment for sober living homes.”
    Like the Planning Commission, the City Council denied
    the reasonable accommodation request for the 21st Street
    10
    SoCal did not appeal the reasonable accommodation denial for the
    Hudson Avenue and Cecil Place homes to the City Council.
    14        SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    home, finding that waiver of the 650-foot separation
    requirement was “not necessary to allow one or more
    individuals who are recovering from drug and alcohol abuse
    to enjoy the use of a dwelling within the City” even if, “[i]n
    theory, [waiving the requirement] would allow [them] to
    enjoy the use of these dwellings.”
    The City then issued notices of violation to all three
    homes, informing SoCal that they were operating unlicensed
    homes in violation of the Zoning Code and ordering them to
    cease operations within sixty days. The City also brought an
    abatement action in state court, targeting one of the homes.
    SoCal then brought this suit. SoCal alleged that its sober
    living homes were illegally “subject to the discriminatory
    limitation” in the zoning code—the “separation requirement
    limiting the number of Sober Living Homes that may exist”
    in the residential zones. 11
    During discovery, the City requested from SoCal
    documents related to the “disability” status of every one of
    its clients. The records the City requested included “all
    medical records from all health care providers which
    provided any of [SoCal’s] clients any treatment [starting
    from] January 1, 2014,” “all documents that relate to clients’
    medical and health information and histories, and
    information and histories regarding clients’ drug use,” and
    records of all drug tests performed at the facilities. SoCal
    refused to produce those documents, or to have any of its
    employees testify about them, asserting that they were
    11
    SoCal also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which the
    district court denied. We previously affirmed the district court’s
    decision.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA              15
    privileged under HIPAA. 12 The City moved for summary
    judgment, arguing that without individualized evidence,
    SoCal’s statutory disability discrimination claims failed
    because SoCal had not demonstrated a genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether any of its residents were
    “disabled” under the ADA and FEHA, or “handicapped”
    under the FHA.
    On summary judgment, two relevant issues were
    whether Appellants’ residents had an actual disability or
    were regarded as disabled by the City. First, SoCal argued
    that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether any of its
    residents had an “actual disability” based on evidence about
    its admissions policies, rules, and daily operations, as well
    as deposition testimony from SoCal staff. To argue that their
    residents were regarded as disabled by the City, SoCal also
    cited assertions by the City, including in the language of the
    Ordinances, the City’s administrative rulings on the sober
    living homes’ zoning requests, and the state court abatement
    action.
    Second, SoCal argued that a disputed factual issue
    existed as to whether the City regarded its residents as
    disabled, pointing to the City’s statements throughout the
    permit application and reasonable accommodation process,
    as well as the residents’ testimony to the City Council.
    SoCal cited the City’s admission that SoCal “made a
    showing that the [reasonable accommodation] application is
    on behalf of disabled individuals in recovery from drug and
    alcohol substance abuse.” Thus, under the definitions in the
    Ordinances, SoCal stated that it was “required to prove that
    12
    The City did not seek to compel production of the medical records
    SoCal refused to produce.
    16         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    it was making a reasonable accommodation request on
    behalf of disabled individuals.” SoCal argued that the
    Ordinances classified “a disabled household . . . as a Sober
    Living Home” and then subjected it to “discriminatory
    limitation[s] . . . that are not imposed on other groups of
    unrelated non-disabled persons or other groups of disabled
    persons.”
    C. RAW Recovery, LLC
    RAW provides “housing to disabled individuals in
    recovery from drug and alcohol abuse.” Before the 2015
    Ordinance went into effect, RAW provided sober living at
    three homes in multi-family zoning districts in Costa Mesa.
    Two were on adjacent parcels on Jeffrey Drive and one was
    on Knox Street.
    Pursuant to Ordinance 15-11, RAW submitted timely
    conditional use permit applications and reasonable
    accommodation requests for the three homes. In its
    reasonable accommodation requests, RAW sought “waiver
    of the spacing requirements,” so that its contiguous locations
    on Jeffrey Drive could remain open and its Knox Street
    home could be treated as a “single housekeeping unit” and
    thereby be exempted from the Ordinances’ requirements for
    group homes. 13 RAW’s applications and requests were
    13
    The Ordinances specifically exempt “any group home that operates as
    a single housekeeping unit” from regulations concerning group homes.
    Costa Mesa, Cal., Mun. Code § 13-6. Designation as a single
    housekeeping unit “means that the occupants of a dwelling unit have
    established ties and familiarity with each other, jointly use common
    areas, interact with each other, share meals, household activities, and
    expenses and responsibilities; membership in the single housekeeping
    unit is fairly stable as opposed to transient, members have some control
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                   17
    denied; the contiguous Jeffrey Drive homes were denied at
    each stage of the process, whereas the Knox Street home’s
    application denial was more complicated. 14
    RAW joined a federal court action seeking monetary,
    declaratory, and injunctive relief for zoning discrimination
    over who becomes a member of the household, and the residential
    activities of the household are conducted on a nonprofit basis.” Id. Such
    designation exempts a dwelling from, inter alia, the 650-foot
    requirement. See id. § 13-311.
    Notably, the City Council provided in the 2014 Ordinance that “sober
    living homes do not function as a single-family unit nor do they fit the
    City’s zoning definition of a single-family for the following reasons: (1)
    they house extremely transient populations . . .; (2) the residents
    generally have no established ties to each other . . .; (3) neighbors
    generally do not know who or who does not reside in the home; (4) the
    residents have little to no say about who lives or doesn’t live in the
    home,” among others.
    RAW did not specifically argue that its Knox Street home met the
    definition of a “single housekeeping unit,” but did state in its reasonable
    accommodation application that “residents of RAW are not ‘transient’
    by nature and function and interact with each other much in the same
    way as ‘the functional equivalent of a traditional family.’”
    14
    RAW’s Knox Street conditional use permit application, was initially
    denied by the Development Director, then approved by the Planning
    Commission on appeal. Two City Councilmembers called for review
    because they believed the home was within 650 feet of a state-licensed
    facility. Though a City attorney advised that Ordinance 15-11 “would
    not permit the City Council to take into consideration state licensed
    homes that had not applied for use permits, as a basis for finding a 650
    foot separation conflict,” the City Council reviewed the application,
    overturned the Planning Commission, and revoked the permit. The City
    Council cited maintenance and secondary concerns of smoking and
    noise. The City Council passed a resolution reflecting the revocation of
    the permit, citing the separation requirement.
    18         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    on the basis of disability. 15 RAW primarily argued that the
    City’s “draconian permitting requirements” for group homes
    and sober living homes “are discriminatory on [their] face,
    and as applied to Plaintiffs, as well as other applicants
    similarly situated.” RAW asserted that “Ordinance 15-11,
    which requires that all group homes be at least 650 feet
    apart,” is a “tool[] the City uses to enforce its policy of
    discrimination” against people in recovery.
    The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that
    “Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims fail because Plaintiffs
    cannot meet their burden to prove that they are associated
    with individuals that qualify as disabled.” The City alleged
    that RAW “must prove on a case-by-case basis” that all its
    residents are disabled or regarded as disabled and are no
    longer using illegal drugs. 16 Because RAW did not do so,
    the City argued, “all of [its] claims fail.” RAW argued that
    it could prove the disability of its residents through the City’s
    admissions and witness testimony. It argued that “[t]here
    should be no doubt that [RAW’s] patients are statutorily
    handicapped” given they are recovering from drug and/or
    alcohol addiction and they must be sober to live in RAW’s
    homes. RAW also argued that “[t]here is no question that
    the City of Costa Mesa regarded the individuals residing in
    15
    Northbound Treatment Services, which is no longer a party to this
    case, filed the initial complaint, and added RAW as a plaintiff in its first
    amended complaint.
    16
    As with SoCal, the City requested “all medical records from all health
    care providers which provided any of [RAW’s] clients any treatment at
    any time [starting from January 1, 2014] to present,” as well as “all
    documents that relate to clients’ medical and mental health information
    and histories, and information and histories regarding clients’ drug use.”
    RAW refused to produce the records, and the City never sought to
    compel their production.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA         19
    [RAW’s] group homes and sober living homes as disabled”
    because “[i]t is memorialized in every step of the use permit
    application process and reasonable accommodation
    requests.” RAW argued that the City’s permit and
    reasonable accommodation processes required RAW “to put
    forward proof of the disability of the residents,” stating that
    the “City in processing the applications has admitted and
    accepted that Plaintiffs provided housing to a class of
    disabled persons.” Finally, RAW argued that the City
    regarded their residents as disabled because of City resident
    testimony at the City Council hearing indicating “fear of the
    influx of felons coming into the neighborhood, and the
    violence and damage” they would bring.
    D. District Court Proceedings
    The district court issued substantively similar rulings in
    each case, granting summary judgment to the City on
    Appellants’ ADA, FHA, and FEHA claims because
    Appellants had failed to create a genuine dispute of material
    fact as to whether their clients have a “handicap” or
    “disability” under the statutory definition. SoCal, 
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *4–6; Nat’l Therapeutic Servs., Inc. v. City of
    Costa Mesa, No. SACV 18-1080, 
    2020 WL 5005550
    , at *6
    (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2020). Under the FHA and the ADA,
    “disability” is defined as “(1) a physical or mental
    impairment which substantially limits one or more . . . major
    life activities; (2) a record of having such an impairment; or
    (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 3602
    (h); see also 
    id.
     § 12102(1). Though the FHA
    uses the word “handicap” instead of “disability,” “handicap”
    is defined using the same three alternative definitional
    prongs as “disability” under the ADA. Thus, the words
    “handicap” and “disability” are construed to have the same
    meaning. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 
    524 U.S. 624
    , 631 (1998).
    20         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    FEHA defines “mental disability” and “physical disability”
    more specifically and incorporates the ADA’s definition of
    disability if it provides “broader protection or coverage.”
    See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(j), (m), (n). Federal courts
    analyze FEHA claims under the same standard as FHA
    claims. Pac. Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach,
    
    730 F.3d 1142
    , 1156 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013).
    On the “actual disability” prong of the disability
    definition, the district court concluded in each case that
    Appellants were required to provide individualized evidence
    that “their clients,” Nat’l Therapeutic Servs., 
    2020 WL 5005550
    , at *6, “have a physical or mental impairment that
    substantially limits one or more major life activities.”
    SoCal, 
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *5. In each case, the court
    agreed with the City that there is no “per se rule that all
    individuals in a drug rehabilitation program qualify as
    disabled or protected.” 
    Id. at *4
    ; see also Nat’l Therapeutic
    Servs., 
    2020 WL 5005550
    , at *4. According to the district
    court in SoCal, “[t]hat [Appellants] require[] sobriety for
    [their] residents does not change that [they] must prove
    [their] clients have a substantial impairment to a major life
    activity, on a case-by-case basis.” SoCal, 
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *5.
    In both actions, the district court held that Appellants did
    not meet the “record of disability” prong of the definition
    because they did not produce their residents’ medical records
    and asserted privilege when the City requested those records
    during discovery. 17 
    Id. at *5
    ; Nat’l Therapeutic Servs., 2020
    17
    Appellants did not rely on this prong below to establish that their
    clients were disabled.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                    
    21 WL 5005550
    , at *5. As to the “regarded as” prong of the
    definition, the court’s only proffered reason for granting
    summary judgment was that Appellants’ evidence was
    “either inadmissible, mischaracterize[d] what the City
    required from [Appellants] in the application process, and/or
    [did] not establish the City’s subjective belief of the clients’
    impairments.” 18     Nat’l Therapeutic Servs., 
    2020 WL 5005550
    , at *5; see also SoCal, 
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *6.
    Appellants timely appealed the grants of summary
    judgment. 19
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo. Devereaux v. Abbey, 
    263 F.3d 1070
    , 1074 (9th Cir.
    2001) (en banc). Viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine
    whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
    whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
    substantive law. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 
    363 F.3d 916
    , 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
    18
    The district court did not discuss in either case which evidence was
    inadmissible or why any of the evidence was inadmissible. And it did
    not discuss how Appellants had mischaracterized what the City had
    required of Appellants in the application process.
    19
    SoCal filed a motion for partial reconsideration asking the court to
    reconsider its holding that SoCal had failed to create a material dispute
    of fact as to whether the City “regarded” its residents as disabled. SoCal,
    
    2020 WL 4668145
    , at *1–2. The court denied that motion, reiterating
    that the evidence SoCal presented “did not establish a triable issue of fact
    as to whether the City regarded Plaintiff’s specific clients as disabled.”
    
    Id. at *2
    .
    22       SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    III. DISCUSSION
    Appellants argue that the district court applied the
    wrong legal standard on the questions of what evidence is
    required to establish actual or perceived disability. They
    contend that they should not have been required to provide
    individualized evidence of their clients’ disabilities.
    Appellants also argue that a genuine dispute of material fact
    exists as to whether their residents are “regarded as” disabled
    by the City. We agree that the district court applied incorrect
    legal standards and did not properly consider the summary
    judgment evidence Appellants presented. We therefore
    reverse the district court’s grants of summary judgment on
    the FHA, ADA, and FEHA claims.
    A. Statutory Background
    Under the FHA, it is unlawful “[t]o discriminate against
    any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
    rental of a dwelling” because of a handicap of that person, a
    resident or intended resident, or any person associated with
    that person. 
    42 U.S.C. § 3604
    (f)(2). The statute gives any
    “aggrieved person” the right to sue, and broadly defines an
    “aggrieved person” as anyone who “claims to have been
    injured by a discriminatory housing practice.” 
    Id.
     §§
    3602(i)(1), 3613.
    FEHA makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate [because of
    disability] through public or private land use practices,
    decisions, and authorizations.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12955(l).
    Any “aggrieved person” can sue. Id. § 12989.1. An
    “aggrieved person” is “any person who claims to have been
    injured by a discriminatory housing practice or believes that
    the person will be injured by a discriminatory housing
    practice that is about to occur.” Id. § 12927(g). The FHA
    and FEHA invalidate any state or local law that “purports to
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                23
    require or permit” an action that would be a discriminatory
    housing practice. 
    42 U.S.C. § 3615
    ; Cal. Gov’t Code §
    12955.6.
    Title II of the ADA makes it unlawful for a public entity
    to discriminate through its zoning laws against (1) a person
    with a “disability,” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12132
    , or (2) a person who
    has a “relationship or association” with a person with a
    “disability,” 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.130
    (g). The ADA gives “any
    person alleging discrimination” under the provision the right
    to sue. 
    42 U.S.C. § 12133
    ; see also Barker v. Riverside Cnty.
    Off. of Educ., 
    584 F.3d 821
    , 827 (9th Cir. 2009).
    “Disability” in the ADA (and therefore FEHA) and
    “handicap” in the FHA are defined as: (1) a “physical or
    mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
    [a] person’s major life activities,” (2) “a record of having
    such an impairment,” or (3) “being regarded as having such
    an impairment.” 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 3602
    (h), 12102(1). 20 The
    first definition is often referred to as the “actual disability”
    prong, and the third as the “regarded as” prong.
    B. Actual Disability
    To establish a disability under the “actual disability”
    prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA, a plaintiff must show “a
    physical or mental impairment” that “substantially limits”
    their ability to engage in one or more “major life activities.”
    
    42 U.S.C. §§ 3602
    (h), 12102(1); Pac. Shores Props., 
    730 F.3d at
    1156 n.14 (applying FHA standards to FEHA
    claims). Alcoholism and drug addiction are “impairments”
    20
    Recall that although FEHA defines “mental disability” and “physical
    disability” more specifically than the ADA, it incorporates the ADA’s
    definition of “disability” if the ADA would provide broader protection.
    See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(n).
    24       SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    under the FHA, 
    24 C.F.R. § 100.201
    (a)(2), and the ADA, 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.108
    (b)(2). See also Pac. Shores Props., 
    730 F.3d at 1156
     (“It is well established that persons recovering
    from drug and/or alcohol addiction are disabled under the
    FHA       and    therefore     protected     from     housing
    discrimination.”). The impairment cannot include “current,
    illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 3602
    (h); see also 
    id.
     § 12114(a).
    The district court concluded in both actions that
    Appellants could not establish that any of their residents had
    an “actual disability” because the evidence they adduced,
    including testimony about the admissions policies, house
    rules, and general day-to-day operations of their homes, was
    not sufficiently “individualized” under Toyota Motor
    Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. 
    534 U.S. 184
    ,
    199 (2002), superseded on other grounds by the ADA
    Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-
    325, 
    122 Stat. 3553
    ; see Nat’l Therapeutic Servs., 
    2020 WL 5005550
    , at *5; SoCal, 
    2020 WL 2528002
    , at *5. In Toyota,
    the Supreme Court held that “the ADA requires those
    claiming the Act’s protection to prove a disability by
    offering evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by
    their impairment in terms of their own experience is
    substantial.” 
    534 U.S. at 198
     (cleaned up). Thus, a plaintiff
    must prove the relevant person’s disability status in a “case-
    by-case manner.” 
    Id.
    Appellants contend that an “individualized assessment”
    of every resident’s disability status was unnecessary for their
    zoning discrimination claims to survive summary judgment
    or prevail at trial. We agree. At the outset, Appellants had
    standing to sue. Appellants are not disabled or handicapped,
    but they stated a claim under the FHA because they claimed
    they were “‘aggrieved’ by housing discrimination against
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                       25
    the disabled.” Pac. Shores Props., 
    730 F.3d at
    1157 n.16.21
    They stated a claim under the ADA because they were
    “alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.” 
    Id.
     at
    1157 n.17 (parenthetically quoting 
    42 U.S.C. § 12133
    ). 22
    They stated a claim under FEHA because they claim to
    “have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.”
    Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12927(g), 12989.1(a). 23
    The separation requirement prevented Appellants from
    conducting their normal business operations. Thus, they
    21
    “The sole requirement for standing to sue under the FHA is the Article
    III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the
    defendant’s actions he has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.”
    Walker v. City of Lakewood, 
    272 F.3d 1114
    , 1123 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (cleaned up and citation omitted). For purposes of “the FHA. . . a plaintiff
    need not be among the class discriminated against in order to have
    standing. In particular, an organization may have standing to bring suit
    on its own behalf, without relying in a representative capacity on the
    standing of any third parties.” El Dorado Ests. v. City of Fillmore, 
    765 F.3d 1118
    , 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
    22
    An organization has standing to sue under the ADA on its own behalf
    by establishing an “injury in fact if it can demonstrate: (1) frustration of
    its organizational mission; and (2) diversion of its resources to combat
    the particular conduct in question.” Am. Diabetes Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of
    the Army, 
    938 F.3d 1147
    , 1154 (9th Cir. 2019) (brackets omitted)
    (quoting Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 
    358 F.3d 1097
    , 1105 (9th
    Cir. 2004)). Thus, a plaintiff that “has presented evidence that it was
    denied a zoning permit because it cares for and/or associates with
    individuals who have disabilities . . . has standing to bring . . . suit on its
    own behalf.” MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 
    293 F.3d 326
    , 335 (6th
    Cir. 2002).
    23
    Both this court and California courts assess FEHA standing under
    FHA standards. See, e.g., Sisemore v. Master Fin., Inc., 
    151 Cal. App. 4th 1386
    , 1424–26 (2007) (applying FHA standing analysis to FEHA
    claims); Walker, 
    272 F.3d at
    1124–25 (Plaintiff had standing under
    FEHA because it had standing under the FHA).
    26       SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    were aggrieved by the zoning policies. That every resident
    may not have been disabled does not mean Appellants were
    not aggrieved by discrimination against the disabled.
    Appellants should not have been required to prove the actual
    disability of their residents, in “a case-by-case manner,” to
    meet the actual disability prong for their sober living homes.
    Toyota Motor Mfg., 
    534 U.S. at 198
    .
    Appellants’ sober living homes and other dwellings
    intended for occupancy by persons recovering from
    alcoholism and drug addiction are protected from illegal
    discrimination against the disabled without the need for
    Appellants to present individualized evidence of the “actual
    disability” of their residents. The district court therefore
    applied the incorrect legal standard in both actions when it
    concluded that Appellants could not establish “actual
    disability” because they failed to present evidence of their
    residents’ disability status.
    The panel finds persuasive the United States’ amicus
    brief, which argues that sober living homes need not provide
    individualized evidence of their residents’ disabilities to
    establish a cause of action for disability discrimination under
    the FHA or the ADA. Under the FHA, as the United States
    argued, state and local governments are prohibited from
    discriminating on the basis of disability through zoning and
    land use practices. See Pac. Shores Props., 
    730 F.3d at 1157
    . In discussing amendments to the FHA, the House
    Judiciary Committee explained that the FHA ban “is
    intended to prohibit the application of special requirements
    through . . . conditional or special use permits that have the
    effect of limiting the ability of [people with disabilities] to
    live in the residence of their choice in the community.” H.R.
    Rep. No. 100-711, at 24 (1988). And Title II of the ADA
    prohibits local governments from enacting zoning laws that
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                   27
    discriminate based on disability. See Bay Area Addiction
    Rsch. & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 
    179 F.3d 725
    ,
    732 (9th Cir. 1999). 24
    We now hold that Appellants and other sober living
    home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong on a
    collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to
    serve individuals with actual disabilities. As discussed
    above, Appellants need not provide individualized evidence
    of the “actual disability” of their residents. Rather, they can
    meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that
    they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve
    or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they
    adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. We
    have held that plaintiffs may establish an actual disability
    through non-medical evidence. See Rohr v. Salt River
    Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 
    555 F.3d 850
    ,
    858–59 (9th Cir. 2009) (“At the summary judgment stage,
    ‘precedent does not require comparative or medical evidence
    to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
    impairment of a major life activity. . . . Rather, . . . a
    plaintiff’s testimony may suffice to establish a genuine issue
    of material fact.’” (alterations in original) (citation
    omitted)). 25 Indeed, the City conceded at oral argument that
    24
    As the United States aptly pointed out, the City’s argument, taken to
    its logical conclusion, would preclude the owner or operator of any
    proposed facility from surviving summary judgment. By definition, a
    proposed facility has no residents. So no matter how egregious the
    zoning discrimination, under the City’s standard requiring individualized
    proof of disability, no suit by the owner or operator of a proposed home
    for people with disabilities would survive summary judgment.
    25
    When a plaintiff is an organization that serves the disabled, rather than
    a person who is disabled, there is no reason similar evidence should not
    suffice, at least at the summary judgment stage.
    28         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    new homes could satisfy the actual disability standard using
    this type of evidence, i.e., evidence of policies and
    procedures that the group home has a zero-tolerance policy,
    produced through declarations of individuals related to the
    group home. Oral Arg. at 29:45–30:30. There is no reason
    to hold existing homes to a higher standard.
    Thus, Appellants can prove the “actual disability” of
    their current residents and any residents they seek to serve in
    the future through admissions criteria and house rules,
    testimony by employees and current residents, and
    testimony by former residents. 26 Because the district court
    applied an incorrect standard, it failed to consider evidence
    in the record that might support a finding that Appellants
    served or intended to serve individuals with “actual
    disabilities.”
    First, Appellants could show their residents were
    “actually disabled” and their future residents would be
    “actually disabled” using admissions criteria and house
    rules. We have stated that “[p]articipation in a supervised
    drug rehabilitation program, coupled with non-use, meets
    the definition of handicapped,” under the FHA. City of
    Edmonds v. Wash. State Bldg. Code Council, 
    18 F.3d 802
    ,
    804 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 
    42 U.S.C. § 3602
    (h) and United
    States v. S. Mgmt. Corp., 
    955 F.2d 914
    , 922 (4th Cir. 1992)).
    Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Reg’l
    Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown
    (“RECAP”), 
    294 F.3d 35
    , 47–48 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
    a group home’s admissions policies demonstrated that “[a]ll
    of the halfway house’s residents must be substantially
    26
    This list is not exclusive, and Appellants could provide other types of
    evidence demonstrating “actual disability.”
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA              29
    impaired in a major life activity to continue residing there”);
    MX Grp., Inc. v. City of Covington, 
    293 F.3d 326
    , 337 (6th
    Cir. 2002) (holding methadone clinic’s admissions policy
    supported a finding that individual clients were disabled);
    Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 
    49 F.3d 1002
    , 1010 (3d
    Cir. 1995) (observing that “no one would be able to meet a
    nursing home’s admissions requirements in the absence of
    some handicapping condition necessitating nursing home
    care”).
    Appellants provided this type of evidence to the district
    court in each action. RAW provided its house rules and
    requirements for living in its homes, including its drug
    testing requirements, to the City. RAW requires residents to
    attend a twelve-step program or a “peer recovery group,”
    such as Narcotics Anonymous. Further, “RAW drug tests
    the residents to ensure they are not currently using drugs,
    two to three times per week, administered by the house
    manager.” RAW also submitted evidence in its use-permit
    application that drug use is prohibited at all its properties. 27
    Finally, RAW stated in its reasonable accommodation
    request that its residents are “individuals in recovery from
    alcoholism and substance abuse . . . who cannot live
    independently without the fear or threat of relapse into active
    alcoholism and substance abuse.” 28 The district court did
    27
    RAW submitted the permit application, including its house rules,
    relapse policy, and intake paperwork, as well as its reasonable
    accommodation application, as exhibits in its compendium of evidence
    filed with its memorandum in opposition to the City’s motion for
    summary judgment.
    28
    This statement is corroborated by deposition testimony, taken under
    oath, from RAW personnel, and by the public comments of former
    30        SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    not reach the City’s evidentiary objections under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). We express no view on
    whether RAW’s proffered evidence complied with this
    rule. 29
    SoCal says that it houses only persons in recovery who
    are considered disabled under federal and state laws. SoCal
    proffers evidence of a zero drug and alcohol tolerance
    policy, says that it demands mandatory involvement in
    recovery programs, performs randomized drug tests, and
    requires residents to leave if they relapse. The district court
    could have relied on admissions criteria that satisfied Rule
    56(c) and other relevant evidence to find, in the light most
    favorable to SoCal, that SoCal’s residents are in recovery
    from alcohol or drug addiction. See RECAP, 294 F.3d at 47.
    Courts may also consider employee testimony when
    determining whether a sober living facility houses people
    with actual disabilities. See MX Grp., 
    293 F.3d at 331, 337
    .
    One RAW employee testified on personal knowledge that
    the residents stay at the sober living home “until they’re
    about a year sober,” after which they’re able to “reintegrate[]
    back into society.” RAW’s owner testified in his deposition
    that when a resident’s “mother called concerned” that her
    son had relapsed, the management of the sober living home
    “confronted him,” and when “he admitted to drinking,” the
    owner referred him to detox. He testified that most residents
    are referred to RAW’s homes from treatment centers, where
    residents at a City Planning Commission meeting regarding RAW’s
    permit applications.
    29
    We similarly express no view regarding whether Appellants’ other
    proffered evidence satisfied Rule 56(c).
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA         31
    they had resided for 30 to 90 days (after spending one to two
    weeks in detox). SoCal provided evidence that none of its
    current residents were currently using drugs based on the
    personal knowledge deposition testimony of three staff
    members who testified that: residents move into a SoCal
    residence after completing a 30-, 60-, or 90-day rehab
    program; the average resident stays for six to eight months;
    residents are required to stay sober; the sobriety requirement
    is enforced via regular drug and alcohol testing; and if
    residents break their sobriety, they are immediately sent
    back to rehab.
    Finally, the operators of sober living homes can show
    residents’ disability with former resident testimony. At a
    public hearing for RAW’s permit applications, a former
    resident of a RAW facility who was “in recovery” stated that
    RAW “helped [him] put [his] life back together” after he
    arrived there “broken,” having “lost everything that had
    mattered to [him—] job, house, family.” This statement
    could show that his addiction substantially limited his ability
    to work, maintain housing, and maintain relationships under
    FEHA’s definition of disability. See RECAP, 294 F.3d at
    47; Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12955.3, 12926(j), (m). The former
    resident also spoke about how he and his roommates “had a
    target on [their] backs and . . . wanted to show [this]
    communit[y] that [they] could be a part of it.” A former
    SoCal resident testified that without sober living, he was
    certain he would relapse. It was therefore “really important
    for [him] to be [around] other people who [had] the same
    mindset or the same goals.” He testified that when he was
    using drugs, he could not hold down a job or have a normal
    life, and was at constant risk of overdosing.
    In both actions. the district court applied the wrong legal
    standard to determine whether SoCal and RAW met their
    32         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    burden of demonstrating a triable issue of fact as to whether
    their residents were “actually disabled” under the ADA or
    FHA. The court unnecessarily limited its inquiry to
    individualized medical evidence of the disability of current
    residents, which Appellants chose not to provide. 30 Instead,
    the court ought to have considered all the relevant evidence
    complying with Rule 56(c) and showing that Appellants
    served and intended to serve individuals with actual
    disabilities. We therefore reverse the grant of summary
    judgment and remand for the district court to evaluate the
    evidence in accord with Rule 56(c) and to apply the
    appropriate legal standards. 31
    C. “Regarded As” Disabled
    “In 2008, Congress enacted the [ADAAA], which
    broadened the definition of disability under the [ADA].”
    Nunies v. HIE Holdings, Inc., 
    908 F.3d 428
    , 430 (9th Cir.
    2018). “An individual meets the requirement of ‘being
    regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual
    establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action
    prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or
    perceived physical or mental impairment.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (3)(A). After the ADA was amended, Appellants no
    longer needed to show that the City subjectively believed
    30
    We do not reach whether Appellants’ refusal to produce records or
    other information (whether as requested or redacted) was justified or
    appropriate.
    31
    If Appellants can proceed past summary judgment, they need to prove,
    among other things, discrimination on the merits of their disparate
    treatment, disparate impact, or reasonable accommodation claims. See
    Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 
    518 F.3d 1109
    , 1114–19 (9th Cir. 2008)
    (providing the elements of each claim). The merits of these claims were
    not at issue before the district court and are not at issue on appeal.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA         33
    that Appellants (or those they served) were substantially
    limited in a major life activity or disabled, in order to meet
    the “regarded as” prong of the disability definition. See
    Nunies, 
    908 F.3d at 434
    ; see also 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.108
    (f)(1)
    (providing that the “regarded as” prong does not require
    showing that “the public entity” perceived the “actual or
    perceived impairment” as substantially limiting a major life
    activity). To establish disability under the “regarded as
    disabled” prong, Appellants need to show that the City
    perceived their “clients as being disabled and discriminated
    against them on that basis.” MX Grp., 
    293 F.3d at 340
    . The
    analysis turns on how an individual is perceived by others.
    See 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (1)(C); 
    24 C.F.R. § 100.201
    (d); 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.108
    (f)(1). This question is fact-dependent and
    is adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.
    Here, the district court erred by applying the pre-
    ADAAA standard. As Appellants and the United States
    argue, Appellants need not show that the City subjectively
    believed that all the residents (or even some specific
    residents) of Appellants’ sober living homes were disabled.
    The district court’s holding to the contrary is error.
    Sober living homes, by the City’s own definition, serve
    people with disabilities: “Sober living home[s]” are “group
    home[s] for persons who are recovering from a drug and/or
    alcohol addiction and who are considered handicapped
    under state or federal law.” Costa Mesa, Cal., Mun. Code §
    13-6 (emphasis added). This is evidence that the district
    court must consider in deciding whether there is a triable
    issue of fact as to whether the City regarded the residents (or
    potential residents) of the sober living homes as disabled or
    handicapped, as the terms are used in the FHA and the ADA.
    There is additional evidence that the district court must
    34        SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    also consider, if the district court finds it presented in accord
    with Rule 56(c). First, language in the permit denial letters
    and resolutions concerning whether the City regarded
    Appellants as serving people with disabilities in their sober
    living homes. For example, the Development Director’s
    initial denial of RAW’s reasonable accommodation requests
    stated: “I accept for purposes of your request that you are
    making this request on behalf of individuals who are
    considered disabled under state and federal law.” Similarly,
    the Planning Commission stated that RAW “currently
    operates a sober living facility” at each Jeffrey Drive
    location and the Knox Street home. The Planning
    Commission was concerned that granting the permit for the
    Jeffrey Drive homes would have been “materially
    detrimental to other properties within the area,” “to the
    health, safety and general welfare of the public,” and “to the
    residential character of the City’s neighborhoods” because
    “[t]he operation of a group home on contiguous parcels
    would result in the overconcentration of such facilities in
    [the] neighborhood.” The City Council’s resolution denying
    the permit for the Knox Street location found that “[t]he
    facility will contribute to the overconcentration of drug and
    alcohol treatment facilities and sober living homes in this
    neighborhood, which could lead to negative impacts in the
    neighborhood.” The Planning Commission also rejected
    SoCal’s permit applications for its Cecil, Hudson, and 21st
    Street residences through formal resolutions, each of which
    made a formal finding that the residence was a “sober living
    home” as defined by statute. To the extent this evidence is
    admissible, the City’s recognition of Appellants’ facilities as
    “sober living homes” seems to admit under the City’s own
    definition that residents are “considered handicapped under
    state or federal law.” Costa Mesa, Cal., Mun. Code § 13-6.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA                35
    Further, the City cited and fined Appellants for operating
    sober living homes without approval. The City issued
    notices of violation to all three of SoCal’s homes on the
    grounds that they were “sober living homes” operating
    without a permit. SoCal also received citations for violating
    the Ordinances. The City filed an abatement action against
    SoCal on the ground that it was operating a “sober living
    home” without a permit at the Hudson Street property. In its
    abatement complaint, the City repeatedly alleged that the
    Hudson Street residence was a “sober living group home.”
    The City issued citations to RAW’s residences for
    “operation of a sober living / group home without [City]
    approval,” and sued RAW in state court to enjoin and abate
    “operation of an unlawful sober living group home.” The
    state trial judge found that RAW was “operating a sober
    living home” or “allowing the operation of a sober living
    home” at its Knox Street location. 32
    On summary judgment, the district court can also
    consider appropriate evidence as to whether the City’s
    actions were based on unfounded fears and stereotypes,
    since the “regarded as” prong concerns how people with
    disabilities are perceived by others. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (1)(C); 
    24 C.F.R. § 100.201
    (d); 
    28 C.F.R. § 35.108
    (f)(1). Here, the City may have been influenced by
    the way others wrote and spoke about those with disabilities
    at public hearings. Congress added the “regarded as” prong
    because of its concern that “society’s accumulated myths
    32
    We may take judicial notice of the state court’s findings in the
    abatement action, as a matter of public record that is not subject to
    reasonable dispute. See Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 
    12 F.4th 960
    ,
    964 n.3 (9th Cir. 2021); Colony Cove Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 
    640 F.3d 948
    , 954 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011).
    36       SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as
    are the physical limitations that flow from actual
    impairment.” Rodriguez v. Vill. Green Realty, Inc., 
    788 F.3d 31
    , 50 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting Sch. Bd. of
    Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 
    480 U.S. 273
    , 284 (1987)). The oral
    testimony given at public hearings and written statements
    submitted to the City by residents opposing the permit
    applications for Appellants’ sober living homes reflect
    stereotypes about the homes’ residents. Some described the
    residents of sober living homes as “capable of mayhem and
    violence,” and as the cause of “[c]rime and homelessness.”
    One person shared that single women are “uncomfortable”
    with residents of a sober living home residing so close to
    their homes. The City referenced some of these stereotypes
    in its decisions denying Appellants’ permit applications.
    The Sixth Circuit, see MX Grp., 
    293 F.3d at 342
    , and the
    Fourth Circuit, see S. Mgmt. Corp., 
    955 F.2d at 919
    , decided
    that this type of public speech about sober living home
    residents was evidence that the government regarded the
    population under discussion as disabled. We agree that this
    type of evidence, if appropriately presented and to the extent
    it appears in the City Council’s stated reasons for adopting
    the Ordinances or denying permits and reasonable
    accommodation requests, should be considered in the
    “regarded as disabled” analysis.
    This type of evidence, if it can be considered under Rule
    56(c), should have been examined by the district court in
    analyzing whether, in the light most favorable to Appellants,
    the City regarded Appellants’ residents as disabled. We
    therefore reverse each district court decision and remand for
    the court to consider whether Appellants established a
    genuine dispute of material fact on this prong.
    SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA         37
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE and
    REMAND to the district court. In each action, the district
    court erred by finding that an individualized assessment of
    resident disability was necessary under the “actually
    disabled” prong of the disability definition, and that
    Appellants must prove the City’s “subjective belief” that
    their residents were disabled under the “regarded as” prong.
    In the context of zoning discrimination against a home that
    aims to serve people with disabilities, we hold that courts
    must look at the evidence showing that the home serves or
    intends to serve individuals with actual disabilities on a
    collective basis, including the home’s policies and the
    standards the municipality uses to evaluate the residence.
    Appellants provided the district court with evidence of (1)
    admissions criteria and house rules, (2) employee and former
    resident testimony, (3) public fears and stereotypes of their
    residents that may have influenced the City’s perception, and
    (4) the actual content of City ordinances, denial letters,
    resolutions, citations, and abatement actions that
    acknowledged the residents in Appellants’ homes were
    disabled. This type of evidence, if it satisfied the
    requirements of Rule 56(c), should have been considered by
    the district court in evaluating whether Appellants
    established triable issues of fact under either or both of the
    “actually disabled” or “regarded as disabled” prongs. We
    reverse each of the district court’s grants of summary
    judgment and remand for the court to consider whether the
    record contains evidence sufficient to establish a genuine
    dispute of material fact on the “actually disabled” or
    38         SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA
    “regarded as disabled” prongs of the disability definition. 33
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    33
    In light of this disposition and given the City’s concession at oral
    argument, we also vacate and remand the awards of attorneys’ fees and
    costs, without prejudice. See Green v. Mercy Hous., Inc., 
    991 F.3d 1056
    ,
    1057–58 (9th Cir. 2021); Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 
    683 F.3d 1177
    , 1189 (9th Cir. 2012).