JANICE ALTMAN V. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANICE ALTMAN; RYAN GOODRICH; No. 21-15602
ALBERT LEE SWANN; ROMAN
KAPLAN; YAN TRAYTEL; DMITRI D.C. No. 4:20-cv-02180-JST
DANILEVSKY; GREG DAVID; CITY
ARMS EAST LLC; CITY ARMS LLC;
CUCKOO COLLECTIBLES LLC, DBA MEMORANDUM*
Eddy’s Shooting Sports; SECOND
AMENDMENT FOUNDATION;
CALIFORNIA GUN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION; NATIONAL RIFLE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.;
CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES, INC.;
FIREARMS POLICY COALITION, INC.;
SCOTT CHALMERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; LAURIE
SMITH; JEFFREY ROSEN; SARA H.
CODY; CITY OF SAN JOSE; SAM
LICCARDO; EDGARDO GARCIA; CITY
OF MOUNTAIN VIEW; MAX BOSEL;
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO; CARLOS
BOLANOS; SCOTT MORROW; CITY OF
PACIFICA; DANIEL STEIDLE; COUNTY
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
OF CONTRA COSTA; DAVID
LIVINGSTON; CHRIS FARNITANO;
CITY OF PLEASANT HILL; BRYAN
HILL,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
COUNTY OF ALAMEDA; GREGORY J.
AHERN; NICHOLAS MOSS,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,** District Judge.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge PAEZ.
**
The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the
District of Montana, sitting by designation.
A group of individuals, firearm retailers, and gun-advocacy groups
(collectively, “Altman”) petition for review of the district court’s judgment
dismissing their claims against the California counties of Santa Clara, San Mateo,
and Contra Costa (“the Counties”). Altman alleged that the Counties’ retail-closure
orders during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Second
Amendment rights by excluding firearm vendors and ranges from the list of
“essential businesses” permitted to remain open. Because the Counties lifted some
restrictions on retail during the pendency of the litigation, the district court dismissed
as moot Altman’s claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and nominal
damages. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo a
district court’s determination of mootness. See Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020,
1025 (9th Cir. 2004). We conclude that Altman’s claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief are moot and that Altman forfeited the argument that the claim for
nominal damages preserves this otherwise moot controversy. Thus, we affirm.
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. Our recent en banc decision in Brach v.
Newsom forecloses Altman’s attempt to resurrect claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief against the Counties. 38 F.4th 6 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). There,
we held that plaintiffs’ challenges to California’s suspension of in-person schooling
in 2020 and early 2021 were moot after the state rescinded its orders and reopened
classrooms. Id. at 9. Emphasizing that “our jurisdiction is limited to live
controversies and not speculative contingencies,” we concluded that “the mere
possibility that California might again suspend in-person instruction is too remote to
save this case.” Id.Just as in Brach, here there is “no longer any [county] order for the court to
declare unconstitutional or to enjoin.” Id. at 11. By the time that the district court
dismissed Altman’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Counties had not only
permitted outdoor and curbside retail and recreation but also had made provisions to
resume indoor retail altogether. Although the Counties’ original orders did not
“expire[] by their own terms,” like the school regulations in Brach, 38 F.4th at 12,
the Counties’ continued commitment to reopening retail and the consistent
improvement of public health conditions still render Altman’s fears of recurrence
too “remote and speculative” for either mootness exception to apply, see id. at 14;
see also Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2014) (outlining
factors for assessing the voluntary cessation exception); Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d
1335, 1340–43 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the burden that plaintiffs face in
demonstrating the likelihood of repeated injury). More than two years have passed
since the Counties ceased the challenged conduct, and they have displayed no “track
record of moving the goalposts,” Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021)
(per curiam) (quotation marks omitted), and wielded no “constant threat” of
reimposition, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68
(2020) (per curiam).
Nominal Damages. Altman forfeited the argument that the nominal damages
claim should have preserved the controversy, even if the other claims were moot.
The district court acknowledged that Altman had amended its complaint to include
nominal damages. Indeed, as to certain counties, the court ruled that Altman’s
nominal damages claims “are live.” Thus, the district court well understood the law.
However, as to the three Counties involved in this appeal, the district court
concluded that Altman had waived its argument that the nominal damages claim was
not moot: “Plaintiffs did not make a nominal damages argument in the supplemental
briefing the Court ordered on the mootness question during the preliminary
injunction proceedings. They have thus waived this argument.” And Altman took
no steps in the district courts to dispute this ruling, move for reconsideration, or
advise the court otherwise. After the fact, on appeal, Altman is asking us to revive
a claim that the district court provided ample opportunity to address.
As a general matter, “[a] live claim for nominal damages will prevent a
dismissal for mootness.” Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872
(9th Cir. 2002); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801–02 (2021)
(holding that nominal damages “satisf[y] the redressability element of standing”
when a plaintiff’s other prayers for relief fail). However, the Ninth Circuit strongly
disfavors arguments that were waived or forfeited before the district court and raised
for the first time on appeal. See In re Mortg. Electronic Sys., Inc., 754 F.3d 772, 780
(9th Cir. 2014); see also Fitzgerald v. Century Park, Inc., 642 F.2d 356, 359 (9th
Cir. 1981) (declining to review a request for nominal damages raised for the first
time on appeal). While waiver requires the “intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right,” forfeiture is a more implicit, passive failure to
timely assert that right. United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2012).
For instance, a plaintiff’s failure to raise a choice-of-law argument in multiple
memoranda submitted to a magistrate judge and during a hearing before the district
court judge amounted to forfeiture of that argument and foreclosed its motion for
reconsideration. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 891 (9th
Cir. 2000). Although judges may at any point raise issues, such as mootness, that
concern the validity of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Bernhardt, 279
F.3d at 871, this court has not applied the same principle to parties’ new arguments
in support of jurisdiction.
Despite multiple opportunities, Altman neglected to invoke the nominal
damages claim as a possible defense to mootness. Altman did not raise the argument
at the May 20, 2020 district court hearing or within the supplemental briefing that
the district court then ordered on the issue of mootness. Although Altman contends
that the hearing and briefing were concerned only with the effect the new “curbside
pickup” option on the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the record does not
support such a restrictive view. Altman also declined subsequent opportunities to
draw the district court’s attention to the nominal damages claim, despite filing a
motion for clarification. Thus, the district court was correct to conclude that Altman
had “waived” (or, more precisely, forfeited) this argument with regard to Santa
Clara, San Mateo, and Contra Costa counties.
AFFIRMED.1
1
We grant the Counties’ unopposed motion to take judicial notice of the
Settlement Agreement between Altman and Alameda County and exhibits
containing COVID-19 case and vaccination data (Dkt. 19).
FILED
Altman v. County of Santa Clara, No. 21-15602 DEC 22 2022
Paez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the plaintiffs’
(“Altman’s”) claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot under Brach II.
38 F.4th 6 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). In my view, however, Altman’s claim for
nominal damages remains live and should have precluded the district court from
dismissing the county defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Our caselaw has long recognized that a claim for nominal damages prevents
mootness. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002);
see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801-02 (2021). The majority
holds that although Altman expressly prayed for nominal damages in her First
Amended Complaint, she forfeited this claim by failing to raise it at certain points
during and after the district court proceedings. Neither the record nor our caselaw
supports this proposition.
In the context of this litigation, Altman fairly understood the district court’s
request for supplemental briefing as limited to the effect of curbside retail on her
claims for prospective relief (i.e., whether those claims were moot). The majority
cites no authority that supports the proposition that a plaintiff forfeits a claim by
not addressing it in supplemental briefing although she has properly and clearly
asserted it in her complaint. The fact that Altman did not argue that her request for
nominal damages claim was not moot before the district court is immaterial.
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Because she properly pleaded the claim in her complaint, its existence precluded a
finding of mootness. Further, the majority’s conclusion that Altman’s failure to
include nominal damages in her motion for clarification contributed to forfeiture is
likewise unsupported. No authority requires a plaintiff to take such steps to
preserve a claim for appeal after having asserted it in her complaint. Indeed,
Altman continued to pursue her nominal damages claim by timely appealing the
district court’s decision that she had waived it.
The majority’s decision embraces a hypertechnical view of claim
preservation that allows the district court to effectively decline to hear Altman’s
constitutional claim despite the existence of a live controversy. This result is
antithetical to the federal courts’ duty to decide cases before them. See BP P.L.C.
v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2021). I therefore
respectfully dissent from this aspect of the majority’s disposition.
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