Raja Mittal v. County of Clark ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 23 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAJA MITTAL,                                    No.    17-16081
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01037-KJD-VCF
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    COUNTY OF CLARK; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 13, 2018**
    Before:      LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Raja Mittal appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
    action alleging federal and state law claims arising from state custody proceedings.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
    dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Naffe v. Frey, 
    789 F.3d 1030
    , 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The district court properly dismissed Mittal’s federal claims against
    defendants County of Clark, Clark County Department of Family Services, Clark
    County Child Protective Services, and the County employees for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims
    constitute a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, or are
    “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 
    341 F.3d 1148
    ,
    1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see
    also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 
    474 F.3d 609
    , 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-
    Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because alleged legal injuries arose from
    the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought “would
    require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and
    thus void”).
    The district court properly dismissed Mittal’s federal claims against
    defendants Nyarko, Downey, Harder, Jarman, and Draskovich because Mittal
    failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v.
    Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter to
    allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    alleged misconduct); see also West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 48 (1988) (to state a
    claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was
    committed by a person acting under color of state law); Trerice v. Pedersen, 769
    2                                     17-16081
    F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (a § 1986 claim must be premised on a valid §
    1985 claim); Bretz v. Kelman, 
    773 F.2d 1026
    , 1028-30 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
    (elements of a § 1985 claim).
    The district court properly dismissed Mittal’s state law claims for negligence
    per se and medical malpractice against Nyarko, Downey, Harder, and Jarman
    because Mittal failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief.
    See Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    221 P.3d 1276
    , 1283 (Nev.
    2009) (setting forth elements of negligence per se claim under Nevada law);
    Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev. ex rel. County of
    Washoe, 
    148 P.3d 790
    , 794 (Nev. 2006) (“[A] medical malpractice complaint filed
    without a supporting medical expert affidavit is void ab initio, meaning it is of no
    force and effect.” (citation omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
    supplemental jurisdiction over Mittal’s state law claims against Draskovich.
    See Notrica v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Cty. of San Diego, 
    925 F.2d 1211
    , 1213-14 (9th Cir.
    1991) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that judicial economy,
    convenience, fairness, and comity should be considered in deciding whether to
    hear pendant state law claims).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, including the district court’s dismissal of Mittal’s claims
    3                                     17-16081
    against defendant Katowich, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time
    on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                   17-16081