Guetatchew Fikrou v. First American Trustee, LLC ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GUETATCHEW FIKROU, No. 17-16940
Plaintiff-counter- D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00908-JCM-
defendant-Appellant, GWF
v.
MEMORANDUM*
FIRST AMERICAN TRUSTEE
SERVICING SOLUTIONS, LLC;
RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees,
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,
FKA The Bank of New York, as Trustee for
the Certificate Holders of CWMBC, Inc.,
CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-J2
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2007-J2,
Defendant-counter-claimant-
Appellee,
and
SUNRIDGE HEIGHTS,
Counter-defendant.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Guetatchew Fikrou appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his diversity action alleging quiet title and declaratory relief claims.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of
discretion. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal for
failure to comply with a court order); see also Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d
779, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (entry of default judgment). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Fikrou’s action
because Fikrou failed to comply with the district court’s orders to file a joint
pretrial order in compliance with the local rules after the district court warned him
that continued failure to comply would result in dismissal. See Pagtalunan, 291
F.3d at 642-43 (discussing the five factors to consider in determining whether to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order);
Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although dismissal is a
harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment
against Fikrou on Bank of New York Mellon’s counterclaim because the factors
supported entry of default as a sanction for Fikrou’s failure to prosecute and
comply with the court’s orders. See Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 786
(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors to consider before
declaring a default).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fikrou’s motion for
reconsideration because Fikrou failed to set forth any basis for relief from the
judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for
relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).
We reject as unsupported by the record Fikrou’s contentions regarding
judicial bias or fraud by opposing counsel.
In light of our disposition, we do not consider the underlying merits of
Fikrou’s quiet title claim. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.
1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after final judgment, are not
appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the failure to
prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation and
3 17-16940
internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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