Andrea Holloway v. Nancy Berryhill , 714 F. App'x 772 ( 2018 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MAR 12 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ANDREA DEE HOLLOWAY,                             No.   15-35908
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              D.C. No. 6:14-cv-01657-TC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
    Commissioner Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Thomas M. Coffin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 8, 2018**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: FISHER, N.R. SMITH and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    Andrea Holloway appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
    decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for
    disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We have
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
    oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, see Berry v. Astrue, 
    622 F.3d 1228
    , 1231 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
    1. The ALJ properly excluded conversion disorder or psychogenic dystonia.
    No “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” resulted in
    a finding or diagnosis of this impairment. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 
    420 F.3d 1002
    ,
    1005 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted); 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(3).
    2. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discrediting
    Holloway’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Smolen v.
    Chater, 
    80 F.3d 1273
    , 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Even assuming the ALJ erred by
    considering Holloway’s criminal history, see SSR 16-3p, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 14166
    ,
    14171, any error was harmless.
    3. The ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons that were supported by
    substantial evidence for discrediting Dr. Dieter’s opinion. See Bayliss v. Barnhart,
    
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 
    533 F.3d 1035
    , 1041
    (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is based ‘to
    a large extent’ on a claimant's self-reports that have been properly discounted as
    incredible.”) (citation omitted).
    2
    4. The ALJ provided germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of
    Thomas Miller, Holloway’s boyfriend, because his testimony was inconsistent with
    the medical record. See Bayliss, 
    427 F.3d at 1218
    .
    5. The ALJ’s finding that jobs exist in significant numbers that Holloway
    could perform was supported by substantial evidence. See Smolen, 
    80 F.3d at 1279
    . The ALJ was permitted to rely on the job testimony offered by the
    vocational expert. See Johnson v. Shalala, 
    60 F.3d 1428
    , 1435 (9th Cir. 1995).1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    In light of our disposition, we need not address Holloway’s remaining
    contentions regarding her 2008 applications.
    3