Nicklos Ciolino v. Theodore Frank , 716 F.3d 1173 ( 2013 )


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  •                  FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER                  No. 11-16097
    LITIGATION,
    D.C. No.
    5:05-cv-03580-
    NICKLOS CIOLINO, individually and               JF
    on behalf of all those similarly
    situated; DANIEL FEDER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,     OPINION
    v.
    THEODORE H. FRANK; KIMBERLY
    SCHRATWIESER,
    Objectors-Appellants,
    v.
    HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of California
    Jeremy D. Fogel, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    November 5, 2012—San Francisco, California
    Filed May 15, 2013
    2           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Before: Ronald M. Gould, Marsha S. Berzon,
    and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;
    Dissent by Judge Berzon
    SUMMARY*
    Class Action Fairness Act / Attorneys’ Fees
    The panel reversed the district court’s orders granting
    final approval to a class action settlement between Hewlett-
    Packard Company and a nationwide class of consumers who
    purchased certain HP inkjet printers, and awarding attorneys’
    fees.
    The panel held that the attorneys’ fee award to class
    counsel violated the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),
    and specifically 
    28 U.S.C. § 1712
    (a)-(c), which governs the
    calculation of attorneys’ fees in class action cases containing
    a coupon component. The panel held that when a settlement
    provides for coupon relief, either in whole or in part, any
    attorneys’ fee that is “attributable to the award of coupons”
    must be calculated using the redemption value of the
    coupons. The panel reversed and remanded, because the
    district court awarded fees that were “attributable to” the
    coupon relief, but failed to first calculate the redemption
    value of those coupons.
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              3
    Judge Berzon dissented, and would hold that there was no
    violation of § 1712 of CAFA, where the district court did not
    award a contingency fee calculated as a percentage of the
    purported value of the total class recovery, but instead chose
    to award a lodestar fee, calculated on the basis of hours
    worked and rates charged, carefully limited by a fair estimate
    of the amount of the benefit received by the class. Judge
    Berzon would affirm the district court because the fee award
    was consistent with CAFA.
    COUNSEL
    Theodore H. Frank (argued), Center for Class Action Fairness
    LLC, Washington, D.C., for Objectors-Appellants.
    Niall P. McCarthy (argued), Justin T. Berger and Eric J.
    Beuscher, Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP, Burlingame,
    California; Steven N. Berk, Berk Law PLLC, Washington,
    D.C., for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    Peter Sullivan, Samuel G. Liversidge (argued), and
    Christopher Chorba, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Los
    Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    Objectors Kimberly Schratwieser and Theodore Frank
    (Objectors) appeal the district court’s orders granting final
    approval to a class action settlement between Hewlett-
    Packard Company (HP) and a nationwide class of consumers
    4          IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    who purchased certain HP inkjet printers between September
    6, 2001 and September 1, 2010. The district court approved
    a settlement that provides both coupon and injunctive relief
    to the class members. The district court also approved an
    award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,500,000 and
    costs in the amount of $596,990.70.
    Objectors argue that the settlement is neither fair,
    reasonable, nor adequate, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 23(e)(2) and Section 3 of the Class Action Fairness
    Act (CAFA), codified at § 28 U.S.C. 1712(e). Objectors
    contend that the settlement is the product of tacit collusion
    between class counsel and HP. Objectors also challenge the
    fee award, arguing it too violates CAFA, and specifically
    § 1712(a)–(c), which govern the calculation of attorneys’ fees
    in class action cases containing a coupon component.
    Because we agree that the fees award violates CAFA, we do
    not address any of Objectors’ other contentions. See Hanlon
    v. Chrysler Corp., 
    150 F.3d 1011
    , 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)
    (holding that a class action settlement “must stand or fall in
    its entirety”); see also In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab.
    Litig., 
    654 F.3d 935
    , 945–46 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that
    vacatur of a fees award necessitates invalidation of a
    settlement approval order where the parties “expressly
    negotiated” a potentially unreasonable amount of fees).
    When a settlement provides for coupon relief, either in whole
    or in part, any attorney’s fee “that is attributable to the award
    of coupons” must be calculated using the redemption value of
    the coupons. § 1712(a). Since the district court awarded fees
    that were “attributable to” the coupon relief, but failed to first
    calculate the redemption value of those coupons, we reverse
    the orders of the district court and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         5
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Plaintiffs filed three putative class actions in the Northern
    District of California alleging that HP engaged in unfair
    business practices relating to its inkjet printers’ use of ink
    cartridges.1 Each of the three actions was aggressively
    litigated, and attorneys for both sides engaged in extensive
    motions practice and discovery. Ultimately, however,
    plaintiffs suffered numerous setbacks including dismissal of
    several claims on the pleadings, denial of nationwide class
    certification in one of the actions, and a determination by the
    district judge presiding over all of the lawsuits that the
    plaintiffs’ evidence of injury and causation was “weak.”
    In August 2010, more than five years after the first action
    was filed, the parties agreed to a global settlement. In
    exchange for the plaintiffs’ release of all claims against it, HP
    agreed to: (1) provide eligible class members with up to $5
    million in “e-credits” redeemable for printers and printer
    supplies on HP’s website; (2) make additional disclosures on
    its website, in its user manuals, or in its software interfaces to
    explain its business practices to future purchasers of HP
    printers and ink; (3) pay up to $950,000 for class notice and
    settlement administration costs; and (4) pay up to $2,900,000
    1
    The first action, Ciolino, was filed on June 16, 2005, and alleged that
    HP misled consumers into believing that replacement of an ink cartridge
    was necessary when the cartridge was not empty, and was capable of
    additional printing. The Rich action was filed on May 22, 2006, and
    alleged that HP failed to disclose that its color printers use color ink to
    print black and white text and images, a process known in the printing
    industry as “underprinting.” The Blennis action was filed on January 17,
    2007, and alleged that HP concealed that certain of its ink cartridges
    contained an “expiration date,” after which time the cartridges would no
    longer work regardless of how much ink remained in the cartridge.
    6           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The “e-credits”—a
    euphemism for coupons—expire six months after issuance,
    are non-transferable, and cannot be used with other discounts
    or coupons.2 By the express terms of the settlement, no
    coupons may issue until after all appeals are resolved.
    On October 1, 2010, the district court consolidated the
    three putative class actions for settlement, granted
    preliminary settlement approval, provisionally certified a
    nationwide settlement class, and directed that the parties
    provide notice of the settlement. In compliance with the
    court’s order, the parties provided notice via email,
    publication, and online advertisements, reaching
    approximately 74 percent of potential class members. Of the
    millions of class members who received notice, three filed
    formal objections, 458 submitted informal comments, 810
    opted out of the settlement, and 122,000 filed claims.
    On January 28, 2011, the district court held a fairness
    hearing at which Objectors appeared. During the hearing, the
    district judge noted that the underlying actions had been
    litigated heavily and that there were several motions “where
    the Court had an opportunity to evaluate the strength of the
    claims.” Based on its previous evaluation, the court
    concluded that “[t]he claims are not particularly strong” and
    weighed in favor of settlement.
    2
    The face value of the coupons varies depending on class membership.
    Under the settlement approved by the district court, the Ciolino class
    members are to receive $5 coupons for each affected HP printer they own,
    Rich class members are to receive $2 coupons, and Blennis class members
    are to receive $6 coupons.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                       7
    On March 29, 2011, the district court granted final
    settlement approval and certified a nationwide settlement
    class. The court determined that the settlement was fair,
    reasonable, and adequate because: (1) “the settlement was
    arrived at as a result of arms-length, non-collusive
    negotiations”; (2) due to the complexity, expenses, and
    duration of the litigation, class members would receive
    “meaningful benefits on a much shorter time frame than
    otherwise possible”; (3) class counsel supported the
    settlement; (4) there was “no reason to believe that the
    posture of any of the cases would improve through further
    litigation”; and (5) the number of class members
    disapproving of the settlement is “miniscule by any measure.”
    The court also issued a separate ruling on class counsels’
    request for fees and expenses. Although the plaintiffs
    submitted bills for over $7 million in fees and expenses, class
    counsel requested only the portion of its lodestar HP agreed
    to pay—$2.3 million in fees and roughly $600,000 in costs.
    Citing its independent duty to determine the reasonableness
    of any fees award, the court meaningfully reduced the
    proposed award. The court held that the lodestar method was
    applicable under section 1712(b)(1) of CAFA and that the
    “key consideration” in determining the appropriate fees is
    reasonableness in light of the results actually achieved.
    Analyzing those results, the court acknowledged that while
    the e-credits were worth significantly less than their face
    value, the injunctive relief would confer some benefit on class
    members, although nothing close to the $16–41 million
    estimated by plaintiffs.3 The court estimated the “ultimate
    3
    We agree with our dissenting colleague that the district court could
    reasonably assume that “injunctive relief would be of benefit to some
    number of class members, because the groups of present and future
    8            IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    value” of the settlement to the class at roughly $1.5 million.
    Recognizing that it would be improper to award fees that
    outstrip the calculated class benefit, the court ordered HP to
    pay a reduced lodestar amount of $1.5 million and
    $596,990.70 in costs. Objectors timely appealed both the
    Approval and Fees Orders.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review
    a district court’s award of fees and costs to class counsel, and
    its method of calculation, for abuse of discretion. In re
    Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at
    940 (citing Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular
    of Cal., Inc., 
    222 F.3d 1142
    , 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2000)).
    DISCUSSION
    Congress passed CAFA “primarily to curb perceived
    abuses of the class action device.” Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co.,
    
    561 F.3d 945
    , 952 (9th Cir. 2009). One such perceived abuse
    is the coupon settlement, where defendants pay aggrieved
    class members in coupons or vouchers but pay class counsel
    in cash. See generally Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class
    Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
    80 Tul. L. Rev. 1617
    , 1632–33
    (2006); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary
    Class Action Settlements, 
    60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 97
    , 102,
    107–12 (1997). Congress was rightfully concerned with such
    consumers of HP printer products overlap.” Dissent at 32–33 n.4; see also
    Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 
    246 P.3d 877
    , 895 (Cal. 2011) (re-
    affirming that injunctions “are the primary form of relief available under
    [California’s unfair competition laws] to protect consumers from unfair
    business practices,” while monetary awards are a “type of ancillary
    relief”).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                       9
    settlements: by decoupling the interests of the class and its
    counsel, coupon settlements may incentivize lawyers to
    “negotiate settlements under which class members receive
    nothing but essentially valueless coupons, while the class
    counsel receive substantial attorney’s fees.”4 S. Rep. 109-14,
    at 29–30 (2005); see also Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-
    Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and
    Consumer Class Action Litigation, 
    49 UCLA L. Rev. 991
    ,
    991 (2002) (“Because class counsel are paid in cash, the
    attorneys have insufficient interest in ensuring that the
    settlement coupons confer value on the class.”).
    Section 1712 codifies Congress’s effort to regulate
    coupon settlements. That regulation takes two forms. The
    first invites increased judicial scrutiny of coupon settlements
    generally. § 1712(e); see also Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL
    Express (USA), Inc., 
    463 F.3d 646
    , 653–54 (7th Cir. 2006);
    True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
    749 F. Supp. 2d 1052
    , 1069
    (C.D. Cal. 2010); S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 27 (stating that
    CAFA “requires greater scrutiny of coupon settlements”).
    The second involves a series of specific rules that govern the
    award of attorneys’ fees in coupon class actions.
    4
    Although we recognize that coupon settlements are generally
    disfavored, we do not mean to cast aspersions on all coupon settlements.
    The legislative history of CAFA makes clear that Congress did “not intend
    to forbid all non-cash settlements.” S. Rep. No 109-14, at 31. Indeed,
    coupon or other in-kind settlements may be particularly appropriate in
    situations “where they provide real benefits to consumer class members.”
    
    Id.
     For instance, coupon settlements may be appropriate where a
    defendant is in financial distress or where class members have repeat-
    business relationships with the defendant. See Lisa M. Mezzetti &
    Whitney R. Case, The Coupon Can Be the Ticket: The Use of “Coupon”
    and Other Non-Monetary Redress in Class Action Settlements, 
    18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1431
    , 1433–34 (2005).
    10           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    § 1712(a)–(d); see also Vance, supra, at 1632–33. Our sole
    task on this appeal is to interpret and apply the attorneys’ fees
    provisions of § 1712.
    I.
    Class counsel are duty bound to represent the best
    interests of class members. Staton v. Boeing Co., 
    327 F.3d 938
    , 960 (9th Cir. 2003). Still, because the interests of class
    members and class counsel nearly always diverge, courts
    must remain alert to the possibility that some class counsel
    may “urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-
    optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.”5
    Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 
    925 F.2d 518
    , 524
    (1st Cir. 1991).
    Typically, courts try to ensure faithful representation by
    tying together the interests of class members and class
    counsel. That is, courts aim to tether the value of an
    attorneys’ fees award to the value of the class recovery. See,
    e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 436 (1983)
    (explaining that “the most critical factor [in determining an
    appropriate attorneys’ fee] is the degree of success
    obtained”); McCown v. City of Fontana, 
    565 F.3d 1097
    ,
    1103–05 (9th Cir. 2008). Where both the class and its
    attorneys are paid in cash, this task is fairly effortless. The
    district court can assess the relative value of the attorneys’
    fees and the class relief simply by comparing the amount of
    5
    See generally Leslie, supra, at 1042–52 (describing how agency
    costs—which “exist when a principal hires an agent to perform a task but
    the agent’s remuneration is not directly tied to the principal’s gain such
    that the agent may increase her payoff by being faithless”—create a risk
    of collusion between defendants and class counsel).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         11
    cash paid to the attorneys with the amount of cash paid to the
    class. The more valuable the class recovery, the greater the
    fees award. Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 436
    . And vice versa.
    But where class counsel is paid in cash, and the class is
    paid in some other way, for example, with coupons,
    comparing the value of the fees with the value of the recovery
    is substantially more difficult. Unlike a cash settlement,
    coupon settlements involve variables that make their value
    difficult to appraise, such as redemption rates and restrictions.
    See Miller & Singer, supra, at 111. For instance, a coupon
    settlement is likely to provide less value to class members if,
    like here, the coupons are non-transferable, expire soon after
    their issuance, and cannot be aggregated.6 See Leslie, supra,
    at 1014–27; see also James Tharin & Brian Blockovich,
    6
    Objectors presented evidence that the prices charged at HP.com—the
    only retailer that will accept the settlement coupons—are higher than those
    charged by other retailers. For instance, Objectors presented evidence that
    the same HP “Combo Pack Ink Cartridge” sells for $42.99 on HP.com,
    while selling for $36.99 on Amazon.com. The $6 price difference is equal
    to the face value of the e-credits to be awarded to Blennis class members,
    and is greater than the face value of the e-credits to be awarded to the Rich
    and Ciolino class members. Thus, with the possible exception of the
    Blennis class members, Objectors have presented evidence that tends to
    show that the redemption rate of the e-credits may be very low;
    presumably Rich and Ciolino class members will prefer to allow their
    coupons to expire rather than pay a higher price solely to gain the
    satisfaction of using their coupons. Considered together with the
    numerous other restrictions on the offered e-credits, we strongly disagree
    with the dissent’s assessment that “[g]iven the effort involved in obtaining
    the coupons, it was fair [for the district court] to assume that most of the
    individuals who had applied for the e-credits would redeem them.”
    Dissent at 32–33 n.4; see also Leslie, supra, at 1030–32 (describing how
    a defendant “can render settlement coupons worthless by simply
    increasing the base price of their product by the face value of the
    coupon.”).
    12            IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Coupons and the Class Action Fairness Act, 
    18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1443
    , 1445 (2005). Of course, consideration of these
    variables necessarily increases the complexity of the district
    court’s task—comparing the ultimate “value” of the coupon
    relief with the value of a proposed fees award. And perhaps
    more importantly, the additional complexity also provides
    class counsel with the opportunity to puff the perceived value
    of the settlement so as to enhance their own compensation.7
    As one commentator succinctly put it, “[p]aying the class
    members in coupons masks the relative payment of the class
    counsel as compared to the amount of money actually
    received by the class members.” Leslie, supra, at 1049.
    Congress was well aware of these problems when it
    passed § 1712 of CAFA. See, e.g., S. Rep. 109-14, at 16–20
    (listing dozens of examples of coupon settlements “in which
    most—if not all—of the monetary benefits went to the class
    counsel, rather than the class members those attorneys were
    supposed to be representing”). Indeed, if the legislative
    history of CAFA clarifies one thing, it is this: the attorneys’
    fees provisions of § 1712 are intended to put an end to the
    “inequities” that arise when class counsel receive attorneys’
    fees that are grossly disproportionate to the actual value of
    the coupon relief obtained for the class. See id. at 29–32.
    This point cannot be overemphasized, for we can only
    properly interpret CAFA’s text if we keep the statute’s
    purposes clearly in mind. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
    7
    We do not mean to suggest any intentional fiduciary breach by class
    counsel here. But “[e]ven if the plaintiff’s attorney does not consciously
    or explicitly bargain for a higher fee at the expense of the beneficiaries, it
    is very likely that this situation has indirect or subliminal effects on the
    negotiations.” Staton, 
    327 F.3d at 964
     (quoting Court Awarded Attorney
    Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 
    108 F.R.D. 237
    , 266
    (1985)).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                       13
    
    546 U.S. 481
    , 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a [statutory]
    word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory
    text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and
    consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the
    analysis.”). We now turn to that interpretation.
    II.
    Objectors argue that the attorneys’ fees award in this case
    violates § 1712(a)–(c), which govern the calculation of
    attorneys’ fees in coupon class action cases.8 Those sections
    provide in full:
    (a) Contingent fees in coupon settlements.–
    If a proposed settlement in a class action
    provides for a recovery of coupons to a class
    member, the portion of any attorney’s fee
    award to class counsel that is attributable to
    the award of the coupons shall be based on the
    value to class members of the coupons that are
    redeemed.
    (b) Other attorney’s fee awards in coupon
    settlements.–
    8
    Section 1712(d) also relates to the calculation of attorneys’ fees in
    coupon class actions. Specifically, subsection (d) provides that a district
    court may “receive expert testimony from a witness qualified to provide
    information on the actual value to the class members of the coupons that
    are redeemed.” § 1712(d). That is, subsection (d) allows the district court
    to receive expert testimony relevant to calculating the redemption value
    of the coupons, as required by § 1712(a). See, Parts II.A, II.B and II.C,
    infra. Because the district court here did not attempt to calculate the
    redemption value of the coupons under § 1712(a), § 1712(d) plays little
    role in our analysis.
    14      IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    (1) In general.– If a proposed settlement
    in a class action provides for a recovery of
    coupons to class members, and a portion
    of the recovery of the coupons is not used
    to determine the attorney’s fee to be paid
    to class counsel, any attorney’s fee award
    shall be based upon the amount of time
    class counsel reasonably expended
    working on the action.
    (2) Court approval.– Any attorney’s fee
    under this subsection shall be subject to
    approval by the court and shall include an
    appropriate attorney’s fee, if any, for
    obtaining equitable relief, including an
    injunction, if applicable. Nothing in this
    subsection shall be construed to prohibit
    application of a lodestar with a multiplier
    method of determining attorney’s fees.
    (c) Attorney’s fee awards calculated on a
    mixed basis in coupon settlements.– If a
    proposed settlement in a class action provides
    for an award of coupons to class members and
    also provides equitable relief, including
    injunctive relief–
    (1) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be
    paid to class counsel that is based upon a
    portion of the recovery of the coupons
    shall be calculated in accordance with
    subsection (a); and
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              15
    (2) that portion of the attorney’s fee to be
    paid to class counsel that is not based
    upon a portion of the recovery of coupons
    shall be calculated in accordance with
    subsection (b).
    § 1712(a)–(c).
    In construing the provisions of a statute, we first analyze
    its language to determine whether its meaning is plain.
    Satterfied v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 
    569 F.3d 946
    , 951 (9th
    Cir. 2009) (citing McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 
    548 F.3d 774
    ,
    780 (9th Cir. 2008)). “The preeminent canon of statutory
    interpretation requires us to presume that the legislature says
    in a statute what it means and means in a statute what is says
    there. Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and
    ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    alteration omitted) (quoting BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United
    States, 
    541 U.S. 176
    , 183 (2004)). Where the statutory text
    is ambiguous, however, we may “look to other interpretive
    tools, including the legislative history” in order to determine
    the statute’s best meaning. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
    Servs., Inc., 
    545 U.S. 546
    , 567 (2005).
    Both the majority of our panel and our dissenting
    colleague agree that CAFA is poorly drafted. We have
    previously commented on the “clumsy” and “bewildering”
    wording of other provisions of CAFA. See, e.g., Abrego
    Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 
    443 F.3d 676
    , 681, 686 (9th
    Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Unfortunately, § 1712 fares no
    better. After all, CAFA “resulted from years of intense
    lobbying . . . partisan wrangling, and, following two
    successful filibusters, fragile compromises.” Stephen B.
    Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
    16          IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Context: A Preliminary View, 
    156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439
    , 1441
    (2008). Still, when § 1712(a)–(c) are “interpreted collectively
    and in context, and read together with the statute’s purpose
    and legislative history,” Dissent at 38, we believe their
    meaning is clear.
    A.
    Subsection 1712(a) states, in relevant part, that “the
    portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is
    attributable to the award of coupons shall be based on the
    value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.”
    Congress’s use of the words “any” and “shall” indicate that
    subsection (a) is not permissive. See Alabama v. Bozeman,
    
    533 U.S. 146
    , 153 (2011) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily ‘the
    language of command.’”) (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 
    295 U.S. 490
    , 493 (1935)).9 If the district court awards “any”
    attorney’s fees, and those attorney’s fees are “attributable to
    the award of coupons,” then the fees award must be
    calculated in the manner prescribed by § 1712(a) (i.e., using
    the redemption value of the coupons). The crucial question,
    therefore, is what it means for an attorneys’ fees award to be
    “attributable to” the award of coupons.
    Congress did not define the term “attributable to”
    anywhere in CAFA. Where a statute does not define a key
    term, we look to the word’s ordinary meaning. See Schindler
    Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 
    131 S. Ct. 1885
    ,
    1891 (2011) (citations omitted); see also Scalia & Garner,
    9
    See also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
    The Interpretation of Legal Texts 112 (2012) (“The traditional,
    commonly repeated rule [of statutory interpretation] is that ‘shall’ is
    mandatory . . . .”).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                        17
    supra, at 69 (“The ordinary-meaning rule is the most
    fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”). Fortunately
    for our purposes, the meaning of the term “attributable to” is
    plain. “Attributable to” means “to explain as caused or
    brought about by: regard as occurring in consequence or on
    account of.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
    (2002). Alternatively, it means “to regard as arising from a
    particular cause or source; ascribe.” American Heritage
    Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011). Thus,
    applying the dictionary definition, an attorneys’ fees award is
    “attributable to” an award of coupons where the attorneys’
    fees award is a “consequence” of the award of coupons. Or,
    put differently, attorneys’ fees are “attributable to” an award
    of coupons where “the [singular] award of the coupons” is the
    condition precedent to the award of attorneys’ fees.10
    § 1712(a) (emphasis added).
    10
    Congress used the term “award” twice in § 1712(a); first in the phrase
    “any attorney’s fee award to class counsel” and again in the phrase “the
    award of the coupons.” The dissent claims that the word “award” as used
    in § 1712(a) necessarily refers to the “monetary value” of the fees and
    coupons. Dissent at 42–43. But this interpretation ignores the plain
    meaning of the statutory language. An “award” is “something that is
    conferred or bestowed upon a person.” Webster’s Third New
    International Dictionary (2002); see also American Heritage Dictionary
    of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) (defining an “award” as
    “[s]omething awarded or granted, as for merit”). Hence, the equivalent of
    the phrase “the award of coupons” is “the grant of coupons” or the
    “conferral” of coupons. Similarly, the equivalent of the phrase “the
    portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel” is “the portion of any
    attorney’s fee granted to class counsel.” Taken together, the plain
    language of § 1712(a) commands that “the portion of any attorney’s fee
    granted to class counsel that is attributable to the grant of the coupons
    shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons that are
    redeemed.”
    18         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Were this conclusion in any doubt, a simple hypothetical
    confirms the majority’s understanding of § 1712(a). Consider
    a settlement that only provides for coupon relief. In such a
    case, the portion of any attorneys’ fees award that is
    attributable to the award of the coupons must be one hundred
    percent. Because the settlement contains only coupons, the
    fees award cannot be “attributable to” anything but the
    coupons.
    Of course, one might argue that the fees award in this
    hypothetical case is “attributable to” the work of class
    counsel on the action, rather than the coupons. But one
    would be mistaken. Attorney’s fees are never “attributable
    to” an attorney’s work on the action. They are “attributable
    to” the relief obtained for the class. See Class Plaintiffs v.
    Jaffe & Schlesinger, P.A., 
    19 F.3d 1306
    , 1308 (9th Cir. 1994).
    An attorney who works incredibly hard, but obtains nothing
    for the class, is not entitled to fees calculated by any method.
    For although class counsel’s hard work on an action is
    presumably a necessary condition to obtaining attorney’s
    fees, it is never a sufficient condition. Plaintiffs attorneys
    don’t get paid simply for working; they get paid for obtaining
    results. Because it is the class relief that is both a necessary
    and a sufficient condition to an award of attorney’s fees, it
    follows that an attorney’s fees award can only be “attributable
    to,” or the consequence of, the class relief, not the attorney’s
    hard work. Hence, returning to the language of § 1712(a),
    where the “portion” of the attorneys’ fees that are
    “attributable to the award of the coupons” is necessarily one
    hundred percent—as in a case where the settlement provides
    only coupon relief—“any attorney’s fee award to class
    counsel . . . shall be based on the value to class members of
    the coupons that are redeemed.” § 1712(a); see also S. Rep.
    109-14, at 30 (“[I]n class action settlements in which it is
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                        19
    proposed that an attorney fee award be based solely on the
    purported value of the coupons awarded to class members,
    the fee award should be based on the demonstrated value of
    coupons actually redeemed by the class members.”).
    Our dissenting colleague disagrees and argues that “[i]n
    some cases, no portion of the attorney’s fees will be
    ‘attributable to’ the coupon award in the sense of calculated
    as a percentage of the coupon value, and therefore § 1712(a)
    will not apply.” Dissent at 43 (emphasis added). Put simply,
    the dissent is premised on the argument that Congress
    understood the term “attributable to” in § 1712(a) to mean
    “calculated as a percentage of” and the term “award” to be
    synonymous with “value.” But the dissent points to no
    dictionary, case, or any other source that supports that view.
    Not one. Nor does the dissent provide any principled reason
    for ignoring the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
    text.11 And if we accept, as we must, that Congress meant to
    give the terms “attributable to” and “award” their ordinary
    (dictionary) definitions, the dissent’s analysis is rendered
    untenable. For instance, as discussed above, in a case where
    the class receives only coupon relief, it simply cannot be true
    that “no portion of the attorney’s fees will be ‘attributable to’
    the coupon award.” Dissent at 43. We decline to join the
    dissent’s attempt to render § 1712(a) a nullity. See Duncan
    v. Walker, 
    533 U.S. 167
    , 174 (2001) (explaining that courts
    11
    The dissent relies on the headings of the various subsections of § 1712
    in order to create artificial uncertainty about the otherwise plain language
    of § 1712(a). But “the Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘the title of a
    statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the
    text.’” Northstar Financial Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 
    615 F.3d 1106
    , 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore
    & O.R. Co., 
    331 U.S. 519
    , 528–29 (1947)); see also Intel Corp. v.
    Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
    542 U.S. 241
    , 256 (2004).
    20           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    are “reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any
    setting” particularly where the terms occupy a “pivotal place
    in the statutory scheme”) (internal alterations and citations
    omitted); see also Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The
    Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to
    Class Settlements, 
    80 Tul. L. Rev. 1695
    , 1699 (2006)
    (observing that § 1712(a) is “[t]he principal provision”
    Congress passed to address abusive coupon settlements).
    B.
    Whereas § 1712(a) governs cases where the class obtains
    only coupon relief, § 1712(b) applies in situations where a
    coupon settlement also provides for non-coupon relief, such
    as equitable or injunctive relief. Specifically, subsection (b)
    requires that if “a portion of the recovery of the coupons is
    not used to determine the attorney’s fee to be paid to class
    counsel, any attorney’s fee shall be based upon the amount of
    time class counsel reasonably expended working on the
    action.” § 1712(b)(1) (emphasis added). Like § 1712(a), the
    language of § 1712(b) is not permissive—if class counsel
    wants to be paid “any” fees, and the “recovery of the coupons
    is not used to determine” those fees, the entirety of the
    payment “shall be” calculated “based upon the amount of
    time class counsel reasonably expended working on the
    action,” i.e., using the lodestar method. Section 1712(b)(2)
    further confirms that a court may, in its discretion, apply an
    appropriate multiplier to any lodestar amount it awards under
    subsection (b)(1) for obtaining non-coupon relief.12
    12
    The dissent argues that the “use of the word ‘include,’ and the phrases
    ‘if any’ and ‘if applicable,’” in § 1712(b)(2) make clear that the “lodestar
    fee provided for in subsection (b)(1) is not limited to equitable relief.”
    Dissent at 47. Not so. The better reading of subsection (b)(2) is that only
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         21
    Despite the statutory language indicating that § 1712(b)
    only applies where “the recovery of the coupons is not used
    to determine the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel,”
    the dissent argues that a district court can award lodestar fees
    under § 1712(b) to compensate class counsel for obtaining
    either coupon relief or non-coupon relief.13 To reach that
    conclusion, however, our dissenting colleague must entirely
    ignore the language of § 1712(a). As we have already
    explained, the unambiguous command of § 1712(a) requires
    that “any attorney’s fee” awarded for obtaining coupon relief
    be calculated using the redemption value of the coupons. The
    dissent’s interpretation of § 1712(b) would read § 1712(a)
    “appropriate” lodestar fees should be awarded under § 1712(b)(1). Just
    because the class obtains equitable or injunctive relief does not mean
    attorneys’ fees are necessarily appropriate. The phrases “if any” and “if
    applicable” confirm that a district court may refuse to award any lodestar
    fees for obtaining equitable or injunctive relief if such fees would not
    otherwise be warranted. For instance, a district judge might refuse to
    award any lodestar fees where the value of the equitable or injunctive
    relief obtained for the class is de minimis.
    13
    The dissent cites to a smattering of district court cases that hold that
    subsection (b) “allows the calculation of fees in a coupon settlement on
    the basis of [the] hours class counsel worked.” Dissent at 48 n. 11. Of
    course, that is hardly controversial, as we now hold the same. Our
    dissenting colleague does not cite any cases, however, that hold what she
    otherwise would—that the lodestar method may be used to award fees in
    exchange for class counsel obtaining exclusively coupon relief. We
    further note that a number of academics who have considered the issue
    have rejected the dissent’s interpretation. See, e.g., Vance, supra, at
    1632–33 (noting that “any portion of the attorneys’ fee that is based on the
    coupon award must be based on the value of the coupons redeemed”);
    Klonoff & Herrmann, supra, at 1703–04 (observing that CAFA “makes
    clear that the coupon-related fee award in settlements that include both
    coupon and noncoupon components will be calculated based on the
    coupons that are redeemed. The portion of fees based on the equitable
    relief portion of the settlement must be based on lodestar principles.”).
    22         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    completely out of the statute. “Under accepted canons of
    statutory interpretation, we must . . . mak[e] every effort not
    to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other
    provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or
    superfluous.” Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States EPA,
    
    942 F.2d 1427
    , 1432 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Scalia &
    Garner, supra, at 180 (“[I]t is invariably true that intelligent
    drafters do not contradict themselves . . . .”).
    The dissent’s interpretation of § 1712(b) is also belied by
    that subsection’s legislative history. For instance, the Senate
    Report from the Committee on the Judiciary states that
    “Section 1712(b) confirms the appropriateness of determining
    attorney’s fees on [a lodestar] basis in connection with a
    settlement based in part on coupon relief.” S. Rep. 109-14,
    at 30 (emphasis added). The Committee Report does not say
    that § 1712(b) “confirms the appropriateness” of awarding
    lodestar fees in cases based “solely” on coupon relief. As
    already noted, if the Committee Report did say that, it would
    nullify the command of § 1712(a). Rather, the legislative
    history of § 1712(b) confirms the majority’s understanding of
    § 1712(b)—a district court may award lodestar fees under
    subsection (b)(1) but only where the settlement is based “in
    part” on coupon relief. Id.
    C.
    To the extent that § 1712(a) and (b) leave any ambiguity
    regarding the meaning of CAFA’s attorneys’ fees provisions,
    § 1712(c) eliminates that doubt. Section 1712(c) begins by
    defining its scope: subsection (c) applies whenever a
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         23
    settlement provides both coupon and equitable relief.14 In
    such “mixed” settlements, § 1712(c) serves to ensure that
    class counsel get paid for all of the benefits they secure for
    the class. Specifically, the statutory language in § 1712(c),
    which in part incorporates the standard of § 1712(a),
    establishes this general rule: If a settlement gives coupon and
    equitable relief and the district court sets attorneys’ fees
    based on the value of the entire settlement, and not solely on
    the basis of injunctive relief, then the district court must use
    the value of the coupons redeemed when determining the
    value of the coupons part of the settlement.
    The practical effect of § 1712(c) is that the district court
    must perform two separate calculations to fully compensate
    class counsel. First, under subsection (a), the court must
    determine a reasonable contingency fee based on the actual
    redemption value of the coupons awarded.15 Second, under
    subsection (b), the court must determine a reasonable lodestar
    amount to compensate class counsel for any non-coupon
    relief obtained.16 This lodestar amount can be further
    adjusted upwards or downwards using an appropriate
    multiplier. § 1712(b)(2). In the end, the total amount of fees
    14
    Specifically, the first phrase of § 1712(c) reads: “If a proposed
    settlement in a class action provides for an award of coupons to class
    members and also provides for equitable relief, including injunctive
    relief—.”
    15
    Section 1712(c)(1) states: “that portion of the attorney’s fee to be paid
    to class counsel that is based upon a portion of the recovery of the
    coupons shall be calculated in accordance with subsection [1712](a)[.]”
    16
    Section 1712(c)(2) provides: “that portion of the attorney’s fee to be
    paid to class counsel that is not based upon a portion of the recovery of the
    coupons shall be calculated in accordance with subsection [1712](b).”
    24        IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    awarded under subsection (c) will be the sum of the amounts
    calculated under subsections (a) and (b).
    Although we believe the language of § 1712(c) is clear,
    we note that the legislative history confirms our
    understanding of § 1712(c). Describing that section, the
    legislative history states:
    In some class action settlements, the terms
    may be a combination of coupon relief, plus
    some form of equitable relief, including an
    injunction.     In such circumstances, the
    settlement may also include fees for obtaining
    the equitable relief. Thus, if a proposed
    settlement provides for both coupons and
    equitable relief, then the portion of the award
    that is a contingent fee based on the value of
    the coupons must be calculated based on the
    value of the redeemed coupons, and the
    portion not based on the value of the coupons
    should be based on the time spent by class
    counsel on the case.
    S. Rep. 109-14, at 31(emphasis added). The above-quoted
    passage makes clear that CAFA only permits district courts
    to award lodestar fees when those fees are “not based on the
    value of the coupons.” Id. That is, § 1712(c) confirms that
    lodestar fees may only be awarded in exchange for obtaining
    non-coupon relief. Indeed, it can be no other way. If a
    settlement contains only equitable relief, then it is not a
    coupon settlement and § 1712 simply does not apply. If a
    settlement contains only coupon relief, however, § 1712(a)
    must apply, because the attorneys’ fees awarded in such a
    case must necessarily be “based on the value of the coupons.”
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              25
    Id; see supra Part II.A. Section 1712(b), therefore, can only
    come into play when a settlement contains both coupon relief
    and equitable relief—precisely the situation described in
    § 1712(c).
    The dissent attempts to explain away the meaning of
    § 1712(c), but is once again tripped up by the language of
    § 1712(a). For instance, our dissenting colleague argues that
    “[n]othing in the text of either subparagraph [of § 1712(c)]
    excludes the possibility that, in cases involving both coupon
    and equitable relief, no portion of the fee award is to be paid
    in the manner addressed by that paragraph.” Dissent at 49.
    Our colleague is mistaken. Section 1712(c) directs the
    district court to calculate fees in mixed settlements “in
    accordance with” subsections (a) and (b). And the language
    of § 1712(a) does “exclude the possibility” that lodestar fees
    may be awarded in exchange for coupon relief. By
    incorporating the standard of § 1712(a) into its own, then,
    § 1712(c) dictates that lodestar fees may only be awarded
    where class counsel obtains non-coupon relief.
    Finally, we note that in addition to its other flaws, the
    dissent’s interpretation of § 1712 runs counter to one of the
    main purposes of CAFA: discouraging coupon settlements—
    particularly those where presumably valuable (but actually
    worthless) coupons form some part of the basis for an
    attorneys’ fees award. See supra Part I. By tying attorney
    compensation to the actual value of the coupon relief,
    Congress aimed to prevent class counsel from walking away
    from a case with a windfall, while class members walk away
    with nothing. See S. Rep. 109-14, at 30 (“[T]he fee award
    should be based on the demonstrated value of coupons
    actually redeemed by the class members. Thus, if a
    settlement agreement promises the issuance of $5 million in
    26           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    coupons to the putative class members, but only 1/5 of
    potential class members actually redeem the coupons at issue,
    then the lawyer’s contingency fee should be based on a
    recovery of $1 million—not a recovery of $5 million.”). The
    dissent, however, would apparently allow district courts to
    award attorneys’ fees based entirely on the perceived value of
    the coupons. Indeed, our dissenting colleague argues that we
    should permit district courts to award lodestar fees in
    exchange for coupon relief without ever requiring the district
    court to consider the actual value of the class relief, as
    measured by the coupons’ redemption value.17 Thus, in spite
    of Congress’s clear intention to tie class counsels’
    compensation to that of the class, the dissent asks us to
    tolerate the precise abuse § 1712 set about to eliminate.18 We
    decline to do so.
    17
    If § 1712(a) means anything, it means that Congress has determined
    that the best way to appraise the size of the benefit class members receive
    from a coupon settlement is to calculate the redemption value of the
    coupons.
    18
    It is worth noting that the dissent’s proposed approach would violate
    not only CAFA, but the Supreme Court’s established attorneys’ fees
    jurisprudence as well. Even under the lodestar method, the district court
    must adjust the amount of any fees award “to account for the degree of
    success class counsel attained.” In re Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at 944
    ; see also
    Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 436
    . But a court cannot judge counsels’ success
    without first calculating the value of the class relief. And in a coupon
    class action, the court cannot value the class relief without knowing the
    redemption value of the coupons. Thus under Hensley and its progeny,
    any lodestar cross-check should be performed in reference to the
    redemption value of the coupons—something our dissenting colleague
    apparently would not require. It is the dissent’s approach, not the
    majority’s, that “ignores the safeguards that exist independent of CAFA
    to prevent” class action abuse. Dissent at 51.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                27
    III.
    We now return to the Objectors’ contention that the
    district court erred when it awarded $1.5 million in attorneys’
    fees using solely the lodestar method, without first calculating
    the redemption value of the coupons. We agree with
    Objectors that the district court erred. The district court
    awarded lodestar fees based on its supposition that the
    “ultimate value” of this settlement is $1.5 million. This $1.5
    million figure included the court’s valuation of both the
    injunctive and coupon relief. But § 1712(a) and (c) required
    the district court to calculate the redemption value of the
    coupons before awarding any attorneys’ fees that were
    “attributable to” the coupon relief. See supra Part II. Hence,
    the district court abused its discretion where it made a rough
    estimate of the ultimate value of this settlement, and then
    awarded fees in exchange for obtaining coupon relief without
    considering the redemption value of the coupons.
    We note, however, that the responsibility for this error
    lies principally with the parties. Because the settlement
    agreement specifies that no coupons may issue until after
    entry of a final judgment, it would have been impossible for
    the district court to calculate the redemption value of the
    coupons as required by § 1712(a). By structuring the
    settlement in this way, the parties essentially invited the error
    here. Of course, had the settlement been structured so that
    the redemption value of the coupons was ascertainable before
    final settlement approval, plaintiffs’ attorneys would have
    been entitled to seek compensation for both the coupon and
    28           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    the injunctive relief obtained for the class.19 See § 1712(c).
    Because the parties did not do so, however, we are required
    to reverse.
    CONCLUSION
    Under § 1712 of CAFA, a district court may not award
    attorneys’ fees to class counsel that are “attributable to” an
    award of coupons without first considering the redemption
    value of the coupons. A district court may, however, award
    lodestar fees to compensate class counsel for any non-coupon
    relief they obtain, such as injunctive relief. Because the
    19
    For example, a fees award can be bifurcated or staggered to take into
    account the speculative nature of at least a portion of a class recovery.
    See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions,
    
    148 F.3d 283
    , 334 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The district court’s plan [to bifurcate
    the fees award was a sound exercise of its discretion that] was designed
    to overcome the speculative nature of the tentative and imprecise
    settlement valuations. It took into account the settlement’s more definite
    terms by providing an immediate payment based on a percentage of the
    guaranteed minimum recovery of $410 million, while requiring future
    payments to be based on actual results in recognition that the ultimate
    class recovery is not quantifiable at this point.”); In re AT&T Corp.,
    
    455 F.3d 160
    , 175 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that a bifurcated fees
    structure “obviate[d] the need to guesstimate the value of the
    settlement.”); see also Foster v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 
    810 F.2d 1021
    ,
    1024 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting district court’s decision to award attorney’s
    fees to prevailing parties after each stage of a bifurcated trial). We leave
    open the question how best to award attorneys’ fees under § 1712. See
    Klonoff & Herrmann, supra, at 1701–02 (discussing procedures district
    courts might employ to award attorneys’ fees based on the redemption
    value of coupon relief).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                29
    attorneys’ fees award in this case violates § 1712, we reverse
    and remand to the district court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED, VACATED AND REMANDED.
    BERZON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent. I decidedly disagree with the
    majority’s analysis of the fee award’s compliance with
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1712
    ,1 the coupon settlement provision of the
    Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No.
    109-2, 
    119 Stat. 4
     (codified in scattered sections of
    28 U.S.C.).
    The majority interprets CAFA as requiring that any
    attorney’s fees awarded for work done toward a coupon
    settlement be calculated as a percentage of the value of
    coupons redeemed. That interpretation of § 1712 would
    allow lodestar fees for work resulting in injunctive relief, but
    not for work resulting in coupons. As to the latter, the
    majority insists that the district court must award fees as a
    percentage of the coupons actually redeemed, rather than
    calculating fees on the basis of hourly rates for time
    reasonably expended, under a lodestar approach. See Lane v.
    Facebook, Inc., 
    696 F.3d 811
    , 818 (9th Cir. 2012). That is
    not what the statute says.
    1
    All further references to § 1712 are to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1712
    .
    30         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    On my reading of the statute, CAFA allows the use of a
    lodestar to calculate attorney’s fees on the basis of hours
    reasonably expended on the class action as a whole, rather
    than as a percentage of the value of the class recovery. That
    permission applies whether the relief obtained for the class
    involves, in whole or in part, coupons, or whether it does not.
    The limit CAFA imposes with regard to cases in which there
    is a coupon recovery is a limit on the district court’s method
    of calculating percentage-of-recovery fees, should it choose
    that approach. So viewed, § 1712(a) regulates how a
    percentage-of-recovery fee should be calculated, if that
    method is used to award attorney’s fees for a coupon
    settlement; it does not dictate whether a percentage- of-
    recovery method must be used. Subsections 1712(b) and (c),
    in turn, provide that a lodestar method may be used either as
    an alternative to, or in combination with, a percentage-of-
    recovery calculation.
    I
    To begin, it is helpful to review the process the district
    court used to determine the fee award in this case, as that
    account helps to illuminate the impracticalities of the
    majority’s CAFA interpretation. The starting point for the
    court’s analysis was the plaintiffs’ asserted lodestar figure of
    $7,109,247.09, representing more than 17,000 hours of time
    “spent on litigation.” Of that total, the plaintiffs requested
    thirty-two percent, or $2.3 million plus $600,000 in costs,
    recognizing that the settlement represented at best a very
    partial vindication of the class claims. See Hensley v.
    Eckerhart, 
    461 U.S. 424
    , 436 (1983). The plaintiffs in their
    submission did not distinguish between hours worked toward
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         31
    the coupon portion of the settlement and hours worked
    toward the injunctive relief.2
    Nor could they have. The record indicates that the bulk
    of the approximately 17,000 hours worked were spent on the
    merits of the lawsuit. The relief agreed upon was determined
    in the course of negotiating the settlement, but was not the
    subject of the discovery disputes, motions, briefs, and
    arguments that constituted the underlying litigation.3
    2
    The settlement left the district court full authority to determine a
    reasonable fee. The defendants promised only not to contest an award of
    $2,900,000 or less.
    3
    The district court docket sheets for the three consolidated actions
    indicate that there was fairly extensive motion practice between January
    2006 and March 2010, including, inter alia, motions to dismiss, motions
    for class certification, motions for summary judgment, and motions to
    compel discovery responses. An April 2008 status report on the discovery
    motions in the Ciolino action indicates that the plaintiffs had reviewed 179
    Hewlett Packard (HP) “i-Care” entries (customer complaints to HP).
    According to the declaration submitted on behalf of class counsel in
    support of their motion for attorney’s fees, the investigation into the facts
    and law relating to the complaints included:
    (1) the depositions of approximately a dozen witnesses;
    (2) the review of hundreds of thousands of pages of
    documents; (3) more than 100 written discovery
    requests; (4) the inspection of several of the HP Inkjet
    printers at issue; (5) consultations with industry
    personnel; (6) extensive work with experts including
    the design and implementation of independent testing;
    (7) numerous interviews of witnesses and putative
    members of the classes; (8) the evaluation of
    information provided by current or former employees
    of HP (including the HP engineers with primary
    32           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Just as the plaintiffs did not differentiate fees according
    to the relief obtained, so, too, the district court considered the
    reasonableness of the attorney’s fees in light of the benefit
    conferred on the class by both the e-credits and the injunctive
    relief. The court found the actual cash value of the e-credits
    to be “significantly less than [the] $1.5 million” face value of
    the credits approved as of the date of the order. After
    acknowledging that “the discount in the cash value of the e-
    credits is mitigated by [the] value of the injunctive relief
    achieved by the settlement,” but finding that “no precise
    value can be placed on the settlement in light of the many
    uncertainties involved,” the court concluded that “the
    ultimate value of the settlement to the class is roughly $1.5
    million.”4 To that ballpark estimate of the total value of the
    responsibility for the design of some of the HP inkjet
    printer models at issue and matters related thereto); and
    (9) legal research as to the sufficiency of the claims.
    In January 2010, the parties to the three actions filed stipulations
    continuing the adjudication of pending motions to allow for mediation and
    settlement discussions to proceed. From that point—four years into the
    litigation—counsel expended time in mediation, working toward a
    settlement. It thus appears that the vast majority of the fees were incurred
    prior to the commencement of settlement negotiations. And although
    some portion of the 17,000 hours represents work done toward negotiating
    the coupon and injunctive relief, given how settlement negotiations
    ordinarily proceed, sorting out hours applicable to one kind of relief or the
    other is likely to be exceedingly difficult.
    4
    Notably, although it was not yet known at the time of settlement how
    many e-credits would be redeemed, many class members had already
    taken affirmative steps to obtain e-credits. Unlike the typical coupon
    settlement in which the defendants automatically send coupons to all
    eligible class members, in this case, class members were required to apply
    before the settlement approval for the e-credits, using an online claim
    form. At the time of the district court’s approval of the fee award, “the
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         33
    coupon and equitable relief, combined, the court compared
    the plaintiffs’ requested lodestar figure, adjusting the fees
    downward to $1.5 million plus costs to ensure the fee award
    reflected the class members’ limited recovery.
    Precisely because the value of the award obtained by the
    class members here—e-credits and injunctive relief—is
    difficult to quantify, it made sense for the court to calculate
    the fee amount as a function of the hours counsel worked on
    the case, rather than a percentage of the class recovery. See
    Staton v. Boeing Co., 
    327 F.3d 938
    , 974 (9th Cir. 2003). As
    in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 
    150 F.3d 1011
     (9th Cir. 1998),
    the district court used its approximate valuation of the coupon
    and injunctive relief “only as a cross-check of the lodestar
    amount, reject[ing] the idea of a straight percentage recovery
    because of its uncertainty as to the valuation of the
    settlement.” Staton, 
    327 F.3d at 973
     (alteration in original)
    settlement administrator had received 122,410 claims for 202,176
    printers.” Given the effort involved in obtaining the coupons, it was fair
    to assume that most of the individuals who had applied for the e-credits
    would redeem them. The court, therefore, reasonably looked to the
    number of coupons applied for as of the date of settlement, and used, as
    a rough cross-check on lodestar-based fees, their collective face value of
    $1,465,629.00, discounted in light of the additional steps necessary to
    obtain the credits and the restrictions placed on their use.
    In addition, in valuing the relief obtained, the district court could
    reasonably assume the injunctive relief would be of benefit to some
    number of class members, because the groups of present and future
    consumers of HP printer products overlap. As printers are quasi-durable
    goods, their owners who purchase HP printer supplies and accessories
    today are also likely to purchase those products in the future, and therefore
    likely to benefit from improvements in the accuracy of information and
    instructions disclosed by HP online, in user manuals, and on product
    packaging.
    34           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    (quoting Hanlon, 
    150 F.3d at 1029
    ) (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    This approach—CAFA aside for the moment—was
    entirely appropriate. There are no statutory fees at issue here,
    as there are in some civil rights class actions. So the
    attorney’s payment had to come from a constructive or
    “putative” common fund. Cf. id. at 966 (referring to the
    hypothetical “fund” constructed by adding together the
    amount defendants agreed to pay in damages, attorney’s fees,
    and costs, and a gross amount of money ascribed to the
    injunctive relief, as a “putative fund”). Our uniform case law,
    both before and after CAFA, affords district courts discretion
    to calculate attorney’s fees in common fund cases either on a
    percentage-of-recovery basis, according to which the court
    sets fees as a percentage of the overall fund, or on a lodestar
    basis.5 See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.,
    
    654 F.3d 935
    , 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that courts
    have discretion to choose either method as a primary basis for
    calculation, provided they exercise their discretion “so as to
    achieve a reasonable result”); In re Mercury Interactive Corp.
    Secs. Litig., 
    618 F.3d 988
    , 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Powers
    v. Eichen, 
    229 F.3d 1249
    , 1256 (9th Cir. 2000)); Staton,
    
    327 F.3d at
    967–68; Hanlon, 
    150 F.3d at 1029
    ; In re Wash.
    5
    As we explained in Staton, where parties seek an attorney’s fee award
    calculated as a percentage of the value of a common fund—whether
    putative or actual—they may agree on a total fund amount and then “class
    counsel will apply to the court for an award from the fund, using common
    fund fee principles,” to ensure sufficient judicial checks on the
    reasonableness of the fee award. Staton, 
    327 F.3d at 972
    . “In those
    circumstances, the agreement as a whole does not stand or fall on the
    amount of fees. Instead, after the court determines the reasonable amount
    of attorney’s fees, all the remaining value of the fund belongs to the class
    rather than reverting to the defendant.” 
    Id.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION             35
    Pub. Power Supply Sys. Secs. Litig., 
    19 F.3d 1291
    , 1295–96
    (9th Cir. 1994).
    Although a lodestar figure is “presumptively reasonable,”
    Cunningham v. Cnty. of L.A., 
    879 F.2d 481
    , 488 (9th Cir.
    1989), district courts have an independent obligation under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) to ensure the
    reasonableness of fees. See Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at 440
    ; In re
    Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at
    941 (citing Staton, 
    327 F.3d at
    963–64). To meet this obligation, our case law specifies, the
    fairness of the lodestar amount should be gauged against the
    overall class recovery, see In re Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at 942
    ,
    adjusting the lodestar fees upward or downward as necessary
    to ensure their reasonableness, see Hanlon, 
    150 F.3d at 1029
    ;
    see also Kerr v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 
    526 F.2d 67
    , 70
    (9th Cir. 1975) (enumerating factors that bear on whether a
    court should deviate from the lodestar figure). In doing so,
    the district court must weigh the requested lodestar figure
    against a variety of factors, foremost among them the results
    obtained for the class, monetary and non-monetary alike. See
    Hensley, 
    461 U.S. at
    434–36; McCown v. City of Fontana,
    
    565 F.3d 1097
    , 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
    In settled cases involving constructive common funds, we
    have encouraged district courts to review the reasonableness
    of lodestar fees by cross-checking the lodestar calculations
    against a percentage fee, thereby “guard[ing] against an
    unreasonable result” and “assur[ing] that counsel’s fee does
    not dwarf class recovery.” In re Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at
    944–45 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “If
    the lodestar amount overcompensates the attorneys according
    to the 25% benchmark standard, then a second look to
    evaluate the reasonableness of the hours worked and rates
    claimed is appropriate.” In re Coordinated Pretrial
    36          IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
    109 F.3d 602
    ,
    607 (9th Cir. 1997).
    Notably, our cases do not suggest that the fee award must
    be equally justifiable under both the lodestar and the
    percentage methods, or that the percentage method, when
    used as a cross-check, must be precise. For example, in
    Torrisi v. Tucson Electric Power Company, 
    8 F.3d 1370
    ,
    1376–77 (9th Cir. 1993), we upheld as reasonable a
    percentage fee award of nearly $8 million, although the
    lodestar amount came to only $3 million. An equal
    justification requirement would defeat the purpose of
    affording district courts the choice to employ one method
    when the other is impracticable, such as when the value of
    class relief is difficult to quantify.
    Here, the district court did the comparison and took the
    requisite second look: The court explicitly calculated “a
    reasonable lodestar amount”; compared “the settlement’s
    attorney’s fee award and the benefit to the class or degree of
    success in the litigation”; and adjusted the lodestar amount
    accordingly. See In re Bluetooth, 
    654 F.3d at 943
    . In the
    end, the district court reduced the fee award considerably
    below the requested amount, 32% of the lodestar figure, even
    though there was “no reason at all to doubt that counsel put
    in the hours they claim.” By doing so, the district court here
    conscientiously did “assure itself—and us—that the amount
    awarded [to counsel] was not unreasonably excessive in light
    of the results achieved.”6 In contrast, the district court in
    6
    Anything more than nominal or de minimis relief can justify lodestar
    fees, especially where the fees awarded are only a small fraction of the
    lodestar request. See Farrar v. Hobby, 
    506 U.S. 103
    , 116–18 (1992)
    (O’Connor, J., concurring). “The Farrar exception, which would allow
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         37
    Bluetooth simply accepted the fee amount requested by the
    plaintiffs and not contested by the defendants.
    According to the majority, the district court’s approach,
    even if fully compliant with the methodology for determining
    fees for settled class action cases laid out in our precedent,
    was all wrong under § 1712 of CAFA. That statute, the
    majority maintains, mandates that the district court: (1) could
    not determine the fee award at all until after the e-credits
    were redeemed; (2) was required to award a large part of the
    fees by the percentage method rather than as lodestar fees;
    and (3) was required somehow to separate out the fees
    traceable to the e-credit relief from the fees traceable to the
    injunctive relief, even though nearly all of the time spent by
    the lawyers dealt with liability issues and not with relief.
    the court to dispense with the calculation of a lodestar and simply
    establish a low fee or no fee at all, is limited to cases in which the civil
    rights plaintiff ‘prevailed’ but received only nominal damages and
    achieved only ‘technical’ success.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 
    96 F.3d 359
    , 362–63 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh’g, 
    108 F.3d 981
    (9th Cir. 1997); accord Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, 
    593 F.3d 1054
    , 1059
    (9th Cir. 2010).
    It is true that the e-credits offered by Hewlett Packard are worth
    somewhat less than their face value, and that the injunctive relief is worth
    far less than the plaintiffs’ estimate of $16–$41 million. But the
    settlement achieved here is not a merely “technical” or “de minimis”
    victory like that of the plaintiffs in Farrar, who were awarded only one
    dollar out of the $17 million they sought. See Farrar, 
    506 U.S. at 108
    .
    The district court’s estimate of the total value of the relief as $1.5 million
    is supported by the record; the majority does not suggest otherwise.
    38         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    II
    I turn now to whether, as the majority supposes, the
    CAFA provisions concerning coupon settlements outlaw the
    district court’s approach to determining fees, and substitute
    instead the majority’s rigid approach, just outlined. They do
    not. The CAFA provisions on which the majority relies
    permit lodestar-based fees for coupon settlements, and they
    do not withdraw that permission when, as our precedents for
    fee settlements require, the district court considers an
    estimate of the total benefit conferred in determining the
    amount of a reasonable lodestar-based fee.
    The majority insists that § 1712 (a) is perfectly clear, and
    can only mean that any attorney’s fees for litigation that
    results in a settlement including coupons must be calculated,
    at least in part, as a percentage of the coupon recovery, rather
    than as traditional lodestar fees. Not so. When the pertinent
    subsections of § 1712 are interpreted collectively and in
    context, and read together with the statute’s purpose and
    legislative history, it becomes clear that the provisions permit
    two methods—not one—of calculating attorney’s fees in
    cases involving coupon settlements: the percentage-of-
    recovery method, referred to in the statute as “contingent
    fees,” see § 1712(a) (“Contingent fees in coupon
    settlements”), and the lodestar, payment-for-reasonable-time-
    worked method, discussed in § 1712(b) (“Other attorney’s fee
    awards in coupon settlements”). The dichotomy addressed in
    § 1712 as a whole is between these two approaches to
    awarding attorney’s fees in coupon settlements—not, as the
    majority suggests, between two types of class relief: coupons
    and injunctions. Section 1712 provides for the use of either
    fee calculation method, as alternatives or in combination,
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                         39
    regulating how each method should be applied, not which
    method a court should use.
    A
    Section 1712 is titled “Coupon settlements,” indicating
    that the section applies generally to such settlements, whether
    coupons represent the totality of a class award or a
    component thereof.7 As relevant here, subsections (a)
    through (c) discuss attorney’s fees in such actions.8 The
    7
    Although the title of a statute or section heading cannot limit the plain
    meaning of the statutory text or create ambiguity where none exists, see
    Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 
    331 U.S. 519
    , 528–29
    (1947); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, – F.3d –,
    
    2013 WL 1092793
    , at *11 n.13 (9th Cir. Mar. 14 2013); Northstar Fin.
    Advisors, Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 
    615 F.3d 1106
    , 1120 (9th Cir. 2010); Pike
    v. United States, 
    340 F.2d 487
    , 489 (9th Cir. 1965), “statutory titles and
    section headings are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the
    meaning of a statute.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias,
    Inc., 
    554 U.S. 33
    , 47 (2008) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 
    534 U.S. 516
    , 528
    (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Almendarez-Torres
    v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 234 (1998); Frankl v. HTH Corp.,
    
    650 F.3d 1334
    , 1351 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, “[a]lthough statutory titles are
    not part of the legislation, they may be instructive in putting the statute in
    context.” Singh v. Gonzales, 
    499 F.3d 969
    , 977 (9th Cir. 2007).
    Here, the section title and all of the subheadings of the CAFA
    provision codified at 
    28 U.S.C. § 1712
     were included in the original bill.
    See CAFA, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 
    119 Stat. 4
     (2005). Where that is so, and
    particularly where a section title or heading is reinforced by legislative
    history, it can be presumed that it “does not reflect careless, or mistaken,
    drafting.” See Almendarez-Torres, 
    523 U.S. at 234
    .
    8
    Subsections 1712(d) and (e), not discussed in the majority opinion,
    provide for, respectively, the court’s receipt of expert testimony regarding
    the actual value to the class members of coupons redeemed and the
    holding of a hearing to determine whether the settlement is fair,
    40           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    majority asserts that subsection (a) of § 1712 “governs cases
    where the class obtains only coupon relief,” while section (b)
    addresses cases in which the settlement includes mixed forms
    of relief. Maj. Op. at 20. But nothing in the text of either
    subsection (a) or (b) turns its application on the composition
    of the class relief. Rather, subsections (a) through (c) all
    address remuneration of attorneys in cases involving coupon
    relief; what distinguishes them is the methodologies of fee
    calculation that they describe, not the type of relief to which
    they apply.
    I begin, as does the majority, with § 1712(a), entitled
    “Contingent fees in coupon settlements,” which states: “If a
    proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery
    of coupons to a class member, the portion of any attorney’s
    fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of
    the coupons shall be based on the value to class members of
    the coupons that are redeemed.” § 1712(a). The language of
    the subsection, the term “contingent fee” in the heading, and
    the legislative history of CAFA all comfortably support a
    reading of “attributable to the award of the coupons” as
    denoting “derived from” or “calculated as a percentage of”
    the coupons’ value. And, as I explain in Parts B and C, infra,
    only with that understanding can § 1712(a) coexist sensibly
    with the other pertinent provisions, § 1712(b) and (c).
    reasonable, and adequate. Although both concern fee calculations, neither
    is directly relevant here.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION                      41
    The phrase “contingent fees” is a term of art in the
    attorney’s fee realm9: “Contingency fee arrangements . . . are
    arrangements where an attorney’s fee is based on a
    percentage of the amount recovered by his client.” Chalmers
    v. City of L.A., 
    796 F.2d 1205
    , 1212 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986), as
    amended on denial of reh’g, 
    808 F.2d 1373
     (9th Cir. 1987).
    Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “contingent fee”
    as: “A fee charged for a lawyer’s services only if the lawsuit
    is successful or is favorably settled out of court. Contingent
    fees are usu[ally] calculated as a percentage of the client’s net
    recovery (such as 25% of the recovery if the case is settled,
    and 33% if the case is won at trial).” Black’s Law Dictionary
    362 (9th ed. 2009). In contrast to lodestar fees, then,
    contingent fees hinge on the outcome for the clients, rather
    than the input of the attorneys, and ordinarily are calculated
    as a percentage of the clients’ recovery.10 In short, as used in
    9
    “[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
    legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows
    and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word
    in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use
    will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.” INS v. St.
    Cyr, 
    533 U.S. 289
    , 312 n.35 (2001) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
    
    342 U.S. 246
    , 263 (1952)).
    10
    Commentators have interpreted CAFA’s provision on “contingent
    fees,” § 1712(a), as regulating the use of the percentage method of
    calculating fees where the class award includes coupons. See, e.g., Report
    on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation, 
    25 Rev. Litig. 459
    , 473
    (2006) (describing how CAFA changed the application of the “percentage
    fee method” for coupon settlements in federal court); Charles W. “Rocky”
    Rhodes, Attorneys’ Fees in Common-Fund Class Actions: A View from the
    Federal Circuits, 35 The Advoc. (Texas) 56, 60 (2006) (explaining that
    “CAFA authorizes employing the percentage method” whereby fees are
    “based on the value of the coupons actually redeemed rather than
    estimating a redemption rate in percentage cases”).
    42         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    the heading for § 1712(a), the term “contingent fees” is best
    understood as a synonym for “percentage-of-recovery fees.”
    Consistent with that understanding, § 1712(a) refers to
    “the portion of any attorney’s fee award attributable to the
    award of the coupons . . . ” (emphasis added). The majority’s
    discussion of § 1712(a) downplays the word “portion,” (and,
    as we shall see, the majority entirely elides the term “portion”
    in its discussion of subsections (b) and (c)). Maj. Op. at
    16–20. But “[c]ourts must aspire to give meaning to every
    word of a legislative enactment.” Miller v. United States,
    
    363 F.3d 999
    , 1008 (9th Cir. 2004). And the word “portion”
    is an aid in understanding the meaning of the entire
    “contingent fee” provision in CAFA.
    A “portion” means a “share” or “allotted part,” a fraction.
    See Black’s Law Dictionary 1280 (9th ed. 2009).
    Accordingly, the phrase “a portion of an attorney’s fee
    award” only makes sense if the word “award” refers to a
    divisible item or amount—here, the monetary sum awarded
    to counsel. If “award” in this context referred only to a “final
    judgment or decision,” Black’s Law Dictionary 157 (9th ed.
    2009), rather than the actual value of the fees assessed, it
    would make little sense to speak of a “portion” of the award.
    The word “award” appears again in the same section, in
    reference to the “award of the coupons.” § 1712(a). “[I]t is
    a ‘normal rule of statutory construction’ that ‘identical words
    used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
    same meaning.’” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 
    132 S. Ct. 1997
    , 2004–05 (2012) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd
    Co., Inc., 
    513 U.S. 561
    , 570 (1995)); see also Sun v. Ashcroft,
    
    370 F.3d 932
    , 939 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, just as the
    “attorney’s fee award” refers to the monetary value of the
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              43
    fees assessed, the “award of the coupons” refers to the
    monetary value of the coupons. The words “attributable to,”
    in the phrase “the portion of any attorney’s fee award . . .
    attributable to the award of the coupons,” therefore describe
    the relationship between these values—that of a portion of the
    attorney’s fees and that of the coupons. In other words, the
    term “attributable” supplies the connection between two
    measures of value, indicating that the section is concerned
    with those situations in which the value of fees, in whole or
    in part, is derived from the value of the coupons provided.
    It follows, then, that the mandatory language in § 1712(a),
    “shall be based on the value to class members of the coupons
    that are redeemed,” applies only to that portion of any
    attorney’s fee award that is calculated as a percentage of the
    coupon-based relief. In some cases, no portion of the
    attorney’s fees will be “attributable to” the coupon award in
    the sense of calculated as a percentage of the coupon value,
    and therefore § 1712(a) will not apply.
    The majority assumes, contrary to this analysis, that “the
    portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is
    attributable to the award of the coupons” means any fee for
    obtaining coupon relief. But the text of § 1712(a) does not
    refer to fees “for obtaining coupon relief” (emphases added).
    See Maj. Op. at 21. Instead, as noted, it refers to
    circumstances where the fee is “attributable” to the coupon
    “award,” where, in context, “award” connotes a measure of
    value. Moreover, as will shortly appear, the majority’s
    construction would deprive § 1712 (b) and (c) of their role as
    alternative approaches to the calculation of attorney’s fees.
    Statutory interpretation cannot be sensibly accomplished by
    isolating closely interrelated subsections from each other.
    Instead, each such subsection may throw light on the
    44         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    others—and, as I shall soon discuss, subsections (b) and (c)
    expressly contemplate lodestar-based fees where coupons are
    awarded.
    Moreover, the legislative history cited by the majority
    fully confirms my understanding of § 1712(a). See Maj. Op.
    at 24. The Senate Report from the Committee on the
    Judiciary provides that attorney’s fees should be “based on
    the demonstrated value of coupons actually redeemed” when
    “it is proposed that an attorney fee award be based solely on
    the purported value of the coupons.” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at
    30 (emphases added). This language confirms that § 1712(a)
    was concerned with fees calculated based on the value of
    coupons—that is, traditional or percentage “contingent”
    fees—and not with all fees in class actions that result in
    coupon settlements, even if calculated on a lodestar basis.
    This passage from the legislative history also confirms that
    class counsel retain, under § 1712, the option to decide
    whether to seek attorney’s fees based on the value of the
    coupon relief or not. If the majority were correct, and some
    portion of the fee award would always be “attributable to” the
    coupon award in settlements involving coupon relief, then
    counsel would have no such flexibility.
    In short, § 1712(a) requires only that if fees are calculated
    as a percentage of the value of coupons awarded, that value
    must comprise only redeemed coupons. The subsection does
    not mandate that whenever coupons are awarded, the
    percentage method—or “contingent fee” method—must be
    used.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              45
    B
    Subsection 1712(b) strongly reinforces—indeed,
    compels—this understanding of § 1712(a), by directly and
    comprehensively addressing the use of the lodestar technique
    for attorney’s fee awards in coupon settlements. The title of
    § 1712(b), “Other attorney’s fee awards in coupon
    settlements” (emphasis added), refers without limitation to
    fees “in coupon settlements” (emphasis added), not to fees for
    equitable relief only, indicating that § 1712(b) contemplates
    an alternative method of calculating attorney’s fees “in
    coupon settlements” generally.
    Subsection (b) goes on to specify that if “a portion of the
    recovery of the coupons is not used to determine the
    attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel,” then “any
    attorney’s fee award shall be based upon the amount of time
    class counsel reasonably expended working on the action.”
    § 1712(b)(1) (emphases added). Again, “a portion” means a
    percentage, which is, of course, just another way of
    expressing a fraction. So, to determine fees using a “portion
    of the recovery of the coupons” means to calculate fees as a
    percentage of the value of the coupons—in other words, to
    calculate a “contingent fee,” in attorney’s fee lingo.
    Subsection (b)(1) thus applies whenever a proposed
    settlement includes recovery of coupons, whether exclusively
    or in part, but does not calculate fees as a percentage of the
    coupons provided by the settlement; § 1712(b)(1) specifies
    that in that instance, a lodestar fee should be awarded. In
    other words, if the percentage-of-recovery method described
    in § 1712(a) is not used, then the lodestar method should be
    used instead. And that directive applies to “any” attorney’s
    fee award “in coupon settlements,” not only to fees tied to
    equitable relief.
    46         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    The majority insists on a contrary interpretation—that the
    lodestar method set forth in § 1712(b) is applicable only in
    situations in which a coupon settlement also provides for non-
    coupon relief, pertains only to that non-coupon relief, and is
    mandatory for any fees for obtaining non-coupon relief. Maj.
    Op. at 20. But nothing in § 1712(b)(1) limits the application
    of the lodestar method to fees for hours worked on obtaining
    equitable or other non-coupon relief. Rather, the heading of
    subsection (b)(1), “[i]n general,” and the reference to “any
    attorney’s fee” (emphasis added), both indicate that it applies
    whenever the settlement “provides for a recovery of coupons”
    and the percentage-of-recovery method described in
    § 1712(a) is not used.
    The majority comes to a contrary conclusion only by
    repeatedly truncating the language of § 1712(b), as if it
    applied whenever “recovery of the coupons is not used to
    determine” the fee (a grammatically incoherent phrase, I
    note), see Maj. Op. at 21, as opposed to whenever “a portion
    of the recovery of the coupons is not used to determine the
    attorney’s fee,” § 1712(b) (emphasis added). But, once again,
    the “portion” term is essential here, indicating that the
    distinction is between percentage fees and lodestar fees, not
    between fees for coupons and fees for equitable relief. Once
    one places the word “portion” back where it belongs in
    § 1712(b), the majority’s accusation that my reading of
    § 1712(b) renders § 1712(a) a nullity, Maj. Op. at 19, falls
    flat: Subsection 1712(a), on my reading, covers
    circumstances in which fees are calculated, in whole or part,
    as a “portion”—a percentage—of the coupons awarded, while
    § 1712(b) covers circumstances in which the percentage
    method is not the one used.
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION               47
    This conclusion is reinforced by the phrase “used to
    determine” in § 1712(b)(1). That phrase indicates that the
    circumstances excluded from § 1712(b) are those in which
    the percentage method “determine[s]” the fee, and not simply
    those in which fees are awarded in whole or part “for
    obtaining coupon relief.” Maj. Op. at 21.
    Moreover, § 1712(b) does not isolate the type of class
    relief for which counsel is compensated. Instead, subsection
    (b)(1) refers to work done “on the action” (emphasis added),
    thereby permitting the use of a lodestar method to calculate
    fees based on time spent on the case as a whole—including
    time spent obtaining coupon relief. Subsection (b)(2)
    reinforces this directive, by specifying that a lodestar fee
    under subsection (b) “shall include an appropriate attorney’s
    fee, if any, for obtaining equitable relief, including an
    injunction, if applicable.” § 1712(b)(2) (emphases added).
    The use of the word “include,” and the phrases “if any” and
    “if applicable,” to refer to equitable relief confirm that the
    lodestar fee provided for in subsection (b)(1) is not limited to
    equitable relief.
    Last, the actual distinction drawn by § 1712(b), rather
    than the one the majority invents, makes perfect sense in the
    context of the concerns that motivated § 1712—namely, the
    potential for huge fees through a percentage approach, where
    the percentage was of all coupons that could be redeemed,
    even though few were. See S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 30.
    In sum, from its title to its substantive reach to its
    operative text, § 1712(b) evidences that lodestar fees are an
    available method of calculating fees for settlements that
    48           IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    include coupon awards, whether or not the settlement also
    includes equitable relief.11
    C
    Finally, § 1712(c)—titled “Attorney’s fee awards
    calculated on a mixed basis in coupon settlements”—builds
    upon § 1712(a) and (b), addressing how the percentage-of-
    recovery and lodestar methods described in each of those
    preceding subsections may be used in combination to award
    fees for a coupon settlement. Nothing in subsection (c)
    requires that both methods of fee calculation be used when
    the settlement includes both coupon and non-coupon relief.
    As is evident from the subsection’s title, what is mixed in
    instances covered by § 1712(c) is the method for calculating
    fees, not the nature of the settlement award (i.e., coupons,
    equitable or monetary relief). Although the first phrase of
    subsection (c) refers to mixed types of class
    relief12—settlements involving both coupon and equitable
    relief—the substantive provisions, subsections (c)(1) and
    (c)(2), break out the application of the preceding subsections,
    11
    There is little case law interpreting § 1712(b), but courts that have
    addressed the issue recognize that the subsection allows the calculation of
    fees in a coupon settlement on the basis of hours class counsel worked.
    See, e.g., True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
    749 F. Supp. 2d 1052
    , 1077
    (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he lodestar method of awarding fees is permissible
    under CAFA . . . .”); Fleury v. Richemont N. Am., Inc., No. C-05-4525
    EMC, 
    2008 WL 4680033
    , at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008) (unpublished);
    Perez v. Asurion Corp., No. 06-20734-CIV, 
    2007 WL 2591180
    , at *1–2
    (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2007) (unpublished) (citing S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 31).
    12
    That phrase reads: “If a proposed settlement in a class action provides
    for an award of coupons to class members and also provides for equitable
    relief, including injunctive relief—.” § 1712(c).
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION              49
    § 1712 (a) and (b), based not on the relief granted but on the
    fee methodology used. Thus, each subparagraph refers to
    “that portion of the attorney’s fee” calculated in a certain
    manner—either “based upon a portion of the recovery of the
    coupons” or “not based upon a portion of the recovery of the
    coupons” (emphasis added). Nothing in the text of either
    subparagraph excludes the possibility that, in cases involving
    both coupon and equitable relief, no portion of the fee award
    is to be paid in the manner addressed by that paragraph. That
    is, even when there is a mixed class remedy, it may be the
    case—as it was here—that the only fees assessed are those
    calculated in accordance with § 1712(b), as lodestar fees.
    The majority yet again goes wrong by ignoring the word
    “portion,” which appears twice in both § 1712(c)(1) and
    § 1712(c)(2). In both instances, the first use of the term
    refers to the “portion” of the fee award, but the second refers
    to the calculation of fees as “a portion of the recovery of the
    coupons” (emphasis added)—that is, contingent or percentage
    fees. So, once again, the distinction between the application
    of § 1712(a) and § 1712(b) is drawn on the basis of the
    methodology used, not the relief obtained. And the
    legislative history the majority quotes is similar, explaining
    the distinction as one between “the portion of the award that
    is a contingent fee based on the value of the coupons” and
    “the portion not based on the value of the coupons.” S. Rep.
    No. 109-14, at 31 (emphasis added); see Maj. Op. at 24.
    Lodestar fees are based on hours worked and rates charged,
    not on the value of recovery, and so are not the “contingent
    fee” to which the history quoted refers.
    50         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    D
    Looked at as a whole, then, § 1712(a), (b), and (c) set
    forth three approaches to calculating fees in coupon awards:
    as a percentage of the value of redeemed coupons; as a
    function of hours reasonably worked on the action; or as a
    combination of the two approaches. In a settlement involving
    coupons, if attorneys are, in whole or in part, awarded
    contingent fees—that is, fees equal to a percentage of the
    purported monetary value of the class relief—CAFA requires
    federal courts to assess those fees based on the value of the
    coupons actually redeemed. § 1712(a). But where a district
    court opts not to award fees on a percentage basis, CAFA
    requires the fees to be based on hours reasonably expended
    working on the action, using a lodestar approach.
    § 1712(b)(1)–(2).
    My understanding of the statute, but not the majority’s,
    comports with long-established principles underlying
    attorney’s fees in class actions generally. “[A] mechanical or
    formulaic application of either [the lodestar or the
    percentage-of-the-fund] method, where it yields an
    unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Fischel
    v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of the U.S., 
    307 F.3d 997
    , 1007
    (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Coordinated Pretrial, 
    109 F.3d at 607
    ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority
    supposes that, in CAFA, Congress broadly mandated such a
    mechanical, potentially unreasonable approach where a
    settlement includes coupons.          Under the majority’s
    interpretation, for example, if a coupon settlement were
    reached after plaintiffs’ attorneys did very little work, the
    attorneys would nonetheless be statutorily entitled to receive
    a fee equivalent to up to the benchmark twenty-five percent
    of the value of the redeemed coupons, instead of a lodestar
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION               51
    fee based on hours worked, which could amount to much less.
    For all the reasons already surveyed, Congress did not intend
    such unreasonable results, but instead left district courts with
    the discretion to calculate fees using either approach.
    The majority warns that allowing class counsel to obtain
    lodestar fees for an entire class settlement, including coupon
    relief, would enable counsel to “walk[] away from a case with
    a windfall, while class members walk away with nothing,”
    thereby “run[ning] counter to one of the main purposes of
    CAFA: discouraging coupon settlements—particularly those
    where presumably valuable (but actually worthless) coupons
    form some part of the basis for an attorneys fees award.” Maj.
    Op. at 25–26. But this scenario ignores the safeguards that
    exist independent of CAFA to prevent such outcomes. As I
    have explained, district courts have an obligation to ensure
    that attorney’s fees are reasonable by cross-checking lodestar-
    based awards against a variety of factors, including the
    estimated benefit obtained by the class, just as courts must
    cross-check percentage-based fees against a lodestar
    calculation.
    Moreover, the problem of excessive attorney’s fees is not
    limited to coupon settlements in which class members receive
    “scrip” while attorneys receive cash; the risk is also present
    in settlements providing a small cash award to each class
    member. In cases involving such cash relief, attorney’s fees
    could be greatly disproportionate to the benefit received by
    class members, whether calculated as a lodestar or a
    percentage-of-recovery, depending on a variety of
    factors—including, inter alia, the speed of settlement, the
    size of the class, and the strength and complexity of the
    plaintiffs’ claims. Nothing in CAFA addresses fee awards in
    such cases. Instead, the limited concern addressed in § 1712
    52         IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    of CAFA is the overvaluing of a coupon recovery to boost a
    percentage-of-fund fee award.
    E
    Although legislative history has been downplayed in
    recent years as a useful tool for statutory interpretation, I
    continue to find it helpful when properly used. Of course,
    “[e]xtrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation
    only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting
    Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”
    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
    545 U.S. 546
    ,
    568 (2005). As I have stated elsewhere, see James v. City of
    Costa Mesa, 
    700 F.3d 394
    , 409 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012) (Berzon,
    J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), self-conscious
    congressional declarations of interpretive or application
    precepts are indeed manipulable and may reflect an attempt
    to enforce principles that would not have been adopted if
    incorporated into the statute. See Exxon Mobil, 
    545 U.S. at 568
    . But clues discernable from legislative materials, such as
    the Senate Report on which I here rely, concerning how the
    legislators considering the bill were speaking about the
    statute at hand, aid rather than impede statutory
    interpretation. The manner in which language was used when
    the bill was under consideration may illuminate apparent
    imprecisions in the later-enacted statute.
    Here, the legislative history of CAFA confirms that courts
    are not obliged to base attorney’s fees on the value of
    coupons, but rather retain the choice to use either of the
    traditional methods, subject to the qualifications set forth in
    § 1712. I have already quoted some of the relevant language.
    In addition, the “purpose” section of the Senate Judiciary
    Committee Report indicates that CAFA’s Consumer Class
    IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION           53
    Action Bill of Rights, codified at 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1711
    –1713,
    contains provisions
    specify[ing] the methods for calculating
    attorney’s fees in class settlements in which
    coupons constitute all or part of the relief
    afforded to claimants to ensure that such fee
    awards are consistent with the benefits
    afforded class members or the amount of real
    work that the class counsel have performed in
    connection with the litigation.
    S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 5 (emphases added). The Report goes
    on to describe the flexibility class counsel retains:
    In some cases, the proponents of a class
    settlement involving coupons may decline to
    propose that attorney’s fees be based on the
    value of the coupon-based relief provided by
    the settlement.     Instead, the settlement
    proponents may propose that counsel fees be
    based upon the amount of time class counsel
    reasonably expended working on the action.
    
    Id. at 30
     (emphasis added).
    So, as described in the Senate Report, § 1712 retained
    rather than replaced district courts’ discretion to choose
    between percentage-of-recovery and lodestar fees for coupon
    settlements. The concern reflected in § 1712(a), in other
    words, was with how a contingency fee should be calculated,
    not with whether only contingency fees—that is, percentage-
    of-recovery fees—should be allowed.
    54          IN RE: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION
    As I have explained, § 1712 (a), (b), and (c), especially
    when read in light of one another rather than in isolation,
    accomplish exactly what the Committee indicated the statute
    set out to do. They leave to district judges the flexibility to
    choose between the two primary fee calculation
    methodologies that they had available to them before CAFA
    and continue to have after CAFA in common fund cases
    involving monetary relief. Section 1712 did not disturb our
    case law requiring that fees be adjusted to reflect the benefits
    actually obtained, in part through a cross-check with the other
    methodology. But § 1712 did restrict the calculation of
    contingency fees, by requiring that a percentage-of-recovery
    fee be based on redeemed coupons, not on hypothetically
    available coupons.
    Conclusion
    Here, the district court proceeded exactly as required by
    our class action settlement case law and as permitted by
    § 1712: It did not award a contingency fee, calculated as a
    percentage of the purported value of the total class recovery.
    Instead, it chose to award a lodestar fee, calculated on the
    basis of hours worked and rates charged, carefully limited by
    a fair estimate of the amount of the benefit received by the
    class. There was no violation of § 1712 of CAFA.
    As I would hold the fee award consistent with CAFA,
    § 1712, I respectfully dissent.13
    13
    Because the majority does not do so, I do not address the other
    challenges the objectors mount to the settlement.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-16097

Citation Numbers: 716 F.3d 1173

Judges: Berzon, Gould, Marsha, Milan, Ronald, Smith

Filed Date: 5/15/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023

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