Epifanio Perez v. Jefferson Sessions ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 29 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EPIFANIO MARTINEZ PEREZ,                        No.   16-73326
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A070-560-143
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted May 17, 2018
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: BERZON and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and DEARIE,** District Judge.
    Epifanio Martinez Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
    of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal of
    the denial by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of his applications for withholding of
    removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and review the BIA’s factual findings for
    substantial evidence. See Lopez-Birrueta v. Holder, 
    633 F.3d 1211
    , 1214 (9th Cir.
    2011). We deny the petition for review.
    1. “[A] petitioner may establish eligibility for withholding of removal (A) by
    establishing a presumption of fear of future persecution based on past persecution,
    or (B) through an independent showing of clear probability of future persecution.”
    Tamang v. Holder, 
    598 F.3d 1083
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)–(2)). Even taking Perez’s testimony as true, substantial evidence
    supports the IJ’s and BIA’s finding that Perez had not established that the Mexican
    government was “unable or unwilling to control” his alleged persecutors. See
    Gormley v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F.3d 1172
    , 1177 (9th Cir. 2004). When Perez reported his
    fear of being falsely accused of child molestation to police officers, they assured him
    that there were no charges pending against him. See Truong v. Holder, 
    613 F.3d 938
    , 941 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]he Truongs’ professed belief that the
    Italian government was complicit in or unwilling to stop their harassment is
    undermined by the fact that the Truongs repeatedly sought assistance from the Italian
    police, who dutifully made reports after each incident and indicated that they would
    investigate.”). After Perez’s grandfather allegedly threatened him, officers agreed
    to place Perez in protective custody. Even assuming the truth of Perez’s contention
    that a police officer then accepted a bribe to allow Perez’s grandfather and his
    2
    associates into the jail, Perez does not assert that the police allowed the men to harm
    him. Rather, he claims officers detained them in a separate cell and then released
    him well before them.
    2. Perez provided country condition reports and expert testimony describing
    the Mexican police as corrupt. A petitioner may “use generalized country conditions
    information to show that reporting . . . activity to the police would have been futile,
    or that doing so might have placed the applicant in greater danger.” Afriyie v.
    Holder, 
    613 F.3d 924
    , 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). But, “when an
    applicant attempts to report persecution to the police or request protection from
    them, the authorities’ response . . . may provide powerful evidence with respect to
    the government’s willingness or ability to protect the requestor.” Id.; see also
    Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 
    458 F.3d 1052
    , 1056 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of
    background country conditions alone cannot establish that specific acts of
    persecution did or did not occur.”). The BIA reasonably found that “while country
    conditions reflect that there is widespread corruption among local law enforcement
    in Mexico, such evidence does not negate the fact that [Perez] has sought and
    received protection from local law enforcement on multiple occasions in [Mexico].”
    3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that Perez had not
    established a clear probability of future persecution as an “indigent Mexican[] with
    serious and apparent mental impairment who lack[s] familial support.” Perez
    3
    previously received mental health treatment in Mexico, paid for by his sister.
    Moreover, “an inadequate healthcare system is not persecution and is not harm
    inflicted because of membership in a particular social group.” Mendoza-Alvarez v.
    Holder, 
    714 F.3d 1161
    , 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
    4. “To qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show it is more likely
    than not he or she would be tortured . . . by or with the acquiescence of a government
    official or other person acting in an official capacity.” Tamang, 
    598 F.3d at
    1095
    (citing 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16
    (c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1)). For the reasons noted above, the
    record does not compel a conclusion that Perez would be tortured with the
    acquiescence of a government official. See 
    id.
    DENIED.
    4