Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. the Estate of Saiid Forouzan ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 5 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST                        No. 16-17079
    COMPANY,
    D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01947-APG-PAL
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    THE ESTATE OF SAIID FOROUZAN; et
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada
    Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted February 13, 2018
    San Francisco, California
    Before: HAWKINS and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and JACK,** District Judge.
    Appellants challenge the denial of their motion to dismiss and the adverse
    grant of summary judgment, contending that the district court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction, misapplied Nevada’s issue preclusion law, and erroneously determined
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Janis Graham Jack, United States District Judge for
    the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    that Branch Banking & Trust Company’s (“Branch Banking”) claims are timely. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm.
    The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is inapplicable in this case. That “narrow”
    doctrine, Skinner v. Switzer, 
    562 U.S. 521
    , 532 (2011), applies when a plaintiff “both
    asserts as [its] injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as [its] remedy
    relief from the state court judgment,” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 
    359 F.3d 1136
    , 1140
    (9th Cir. 2004). Because Branch Banking seeks relief from the Appellants for their
    breach of a guarantee agreement (the “Guarantee”) based on its ownership of the
    Guarantee under a 2011 assignment agreement (the “2011 Assignment”), its
    complaint does not constitute a de facto appeal of the prior state court actions, which
    addressed earlier, separate assignments that were found to be invalid. See 
    id.
    Nor was it error to hold that the Nevada state court actions did not preclude
    Branch Banking from litigating its right to collect under the Guarantee. For issue
    preclusion to apply, Nevada law requires that the issue sought to be precluded be
    identical to an issue actually and necessarily litigated in a final ruling on the merits
    in prior litigation. Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 
    194 P.3d 709
    , 713 (Nev. 2008)
    (en banc). The first and second Nevada state court actions did not address the
    transfer of the Guarantee under the 2011 Assignment. Therefore, the issue before
    the district court was neither identical to an issue in the Nevada state court actions
    nor actually and necessarily litigated in those actions. Cf. State, Univ. & Cmty. Coll.
    2                                     16-17079
    Sys. v. Sutton, 
    103 P.3d 8
    , 16 (Nev. 2004) (pre-termination hearing findings did not
    preclude issues in later litigation involving different employment contract).
    Finally, the parties agree that a six-year statute of limitations applies. Even
    assuming that Nevada’s accrual standard rather than the deferred accrual standard
    under the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (d)(14)(B), applies to Branch Banking’s claims, the claims are timely.
    Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Nevada Supreme Court has indicated that a
    cause of action for breach of a loan agreement accrues, at the earliest, on the date of
    default rather than the date of last payment. See Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortg.
    Corp. v. Vargas, 
    408 P.3d 560
     (Nev. 2017) (unpublished).
    Branch Banking submitted loan documents indicating that default did not
    occur until January 2009—less than six years before Branch Banking filed its
    complaint. Although Appellants argued that the borrower issued its last check on
    the loan in September 2008, they did not dispute the January 2009 date of default.
    Consequently, the cause of action for breach of the Guarantee could not have accrued
    prior to the January 2009 date of default. See 
    id.
    Costs are awarded to Plaintiff-Appellee.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     16-17079