Marc Cella v. Cargotec Services USA ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 19 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARC CELLA, No. 17-70998
Petitioner, LABR No. 16-0281
Dept of Labor
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CARGOTEC SERVICES USA; et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Benefits Review Board
Submitted June 7, 2018**
Seattle, Washington
Before: BYBEE and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,*** District Judge.
Petitioner Marc Cella worked as a longshoreman in the Port of Tacoma,
Washington, for many years. During his employment with Cargotec Services USA,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern Florida, sitting by designation.
Petitioner suffered a series of work and non-work related injuries. Petitioner
contends that his work-related injuries caused him permanent total-disability and to
stop working. He claims benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act (the “Act”), 33 U.S.C. § 908, from his employer, Cargotec
Services, USA, and its insurance carrier (collectively, “Respondents”). An
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) rejected Petitioner’s permanent disability claim
and, instead, awarded Petitioner compensation for temporary total disability from
the date of his second work injury through the Maximum Medical Improvement
(“MMI”) date, August 11, 2011, determined by Petitioner’s treating orthopedist,
Dr. Dagher. The ALJ’s award was affirmed by the Benefits Review Board (“the
Board”). This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §
921(c), and we affirm.
“It is well settled that the Board’s findings may not be disturbed unless they
are unsupported by ‘substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.’”
Cordero v. Triple A Mach. Shop, 580 F.2d 1331, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass’n, 390 U.S. 459, 467 (1968)). Moreover, “[t]he
ALJ’s findings must be accepted when they are supported by substantial evidence.”
Lockheed Shipbuilding v. Dir., OWCP, 951 F.2d 1143, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1991).
Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Amos v. Dir., OWCP, 153 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1998), amended, 164 F.3d 480(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
1. The ALJ determined that Petitioner lacked credibility due to his
inconsistent, unsubstantiated, and exaggerated reporting of medical symptoms.
“Where the ALJ relies on witness credibility in reaching his decision, our court
will interfere only where the credibility determinations conflict with the clear
preponderance of the evidence, or where the determinations are inherently
incredible or patently unreasonable.” Cordero, 580 F.2d at 1335 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Here, the ALJ’s credibility determination,
including his decision to discount Petitioner’s subjective reporting of medical
symptoms, neither conflicts with the clear preponderance of the evidence nor is
inherently incredible or patently unreasonable. The ALJ set out in detail several
instances of Petitioner reporting pain at maximum possible levels despite
remaining ambulatory, alert, and oriented (which, the ALJ noted, is not possible),
discussing medical symptoms experienced after the work incidents that are absent
from emergency room records, and providing widely inconsistent reports of his
symptoms and medical history to different medical providers. Petitioner’s
description of one of the work incidents also differed substantially from accounts
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provided by other witnesses. Finally, Petitioner admitted that his memory of past
medical visits and missed work was weak. Based on this evidence, the ALJ’s
decision to find Petitioner not credible will not be disturbed.
2. The ALJ also did not err by discounting medical opinions of one of
Petitioner’s treating physicians, Dr. Connolly, which were based on Petitioner’s
subjective medical reporting. Instead, the ALJ relied on the opinion of another
treating physician, Dr. Dagher, and of examining physicians, Drs. Bays, Brooks,
and Kirschner, who each examined Petitioner and reviewed his medical records to
determine their respective medical opinions.
An ALJ has discretion to credit a non-treating physician over a treating
physician.
Where the opinion of the claimant’s treating physician is
contradicted, and the opinion of a nontreating source is based on
independent clinical findings that differ from those of the treating
physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be
substantial evidence; it is then solely the province of the ALJ to
resolve the conflict.
Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). But at the same time, an
ALJ may not discard the “special deference” owed to a treating physician’s opinion
unless it is somehow contradicted or discredited as unreasonable. Amos, 153 F.3d
at 1054.
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There was a substantial conflict between Dr. Connolly’s opinions and the
opinions of examining, non-treating physicians. The ALJ rejected Dr. Connolly’s
opinion that Petitioner suffers from cervical radiculopathy which was based on Dr.
Connolly’s interpretation of MRI results combined with Petitioner’s subjective
reporting of related symptoms. Instead, the ALJ found more persuasive Drs. Bays,
Brooks, and Kirschner’s view that without objective evidence of specific
accompanying, relevant symptoms, MRI results alone do not signal cervical
radiculopathy.
The ALJ also found unpersuasive Dr. Connolly’s opinion that the work
incidents permanently aggravated Petitioner’s pre-existing genetic disorder,
McArdle’s disease, because the record did not establish objective evidence of a
link between the claimed injuries and aggravation of the McArdle’s disease beyond
a temporary symptom flare-up. Rather, the ALJ relied on Drs. Dagher, Bays,
Brooks, and Kirschner’s conclusions that the work injuries did not affect
progression of the disease. The ALJ also relied on Drs. Bays and Kirschner’s
conclusions, rendered after their review of the pertinent medical literature, that the
McArdle’s disease could not be permanently aggravated by Petitioner’s injuries
stemming from the work incidents. The ALJ’s decision not to defer to Dr.
Connolly was therefore supported by substantial evidence.
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3. The ALJ’s finding that Petitioner reached MMI on August 11, 2011 is
also supported by substantial evidence in the record. The MMI date “triggers a
change in the classification of a claimant’s disability from temporary to
permanent.” Hawaii Stevedores, Inc. v. Ogawa, 608 F.3d 642, 653 (9th Cir. 2010).
Determination of an MMI date is a question of fact decided by the ALJ through his
evaluation of the medical evidence. Id.The ALJ relied on Dr. Dagher’s MMI determination to find that Petitioner’s
work injuries would have resolved by August 11, 2011. After Dr. Dagher
examined Petitioner several times prior to and after the work incidents, Dr. Dagher
concluded, based on Petitioner’s medical history and examinations, that Petitioner
could return to work by August 11, 2011. After reviewing Petitioner’s medical
records, Drs. Bays and Kirschner agreed that Petitioner’s work-related injuries
would have resolved by that date. The only contrary evidence is Petitioner’s own
testimony, which the ALJ found unreliable, and Dr. Connolly’s impression that
Petitioner’s McArdle’s disease requires that he continue to be limited to sedentary
duty. As discussed above, however, no objective evidence supports a conclusion
that any of Petitioner’s medical issues existing beyond August 11, 2011 related to
the work injuries. On review, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s MMI
determination.
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4. The Board properly rejected Petitioner’s contention that the ALJ erred
by not addressing a claim for work-related headaches caused by the work
incidents.1 Here, Petitioner failed to properly submit notice that he claimed
headaches as an injury for which he sought compensation. The Supreme Court has
held that a claimant must give adequate notice of an injury giving rise to a claim
for compensation under the Act. U.S. Indus. / Fed. Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Dir.,
OWCP, 455 U.S. 608, 613 & n.6–7 (1982) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 912(b)). Substantial
evidence supports the Board’s finding that the ALJ did not err by not addressing
Petitioner’s headaches as a separate work-related injury.
The judgment of the Board is AFFIRMED.
1
While Petitioner did not allege an independent claim for headaches, the
ALJ did address Petitioner’s headaches within a discussion of Petitioner’s
credibility. The ALJ cited several examples of Petitioner inconsistently reporting
headaches and accompanying symptoms to different doctors in support for his
conclusion that Petitioner was not credible.
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