Orlando Garcia v. Peter Beck ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ORLANDO GARCIA, No. 22-15594
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-04575-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
PETER J. BECK, in individual and
representative capacity as Trustee of The
Beck Family Trust; et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 9, 2023**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, BYBEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellants Peter Beck, Lola Beck, and Lola’s Chicken Shack
(collectively, “Lola’s Chicken Shack”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff-Appellee Orlando Garcia’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
claim, the denial of their motion to designate Garcia as a “vexatious litigant,” and
the denial of sanctions against Garcia. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we dismiss this appeal in part and affirm in part.
1. Lola’s Chicken Shack first challenges the district court’s dismissal of
Garcia’s ADA claim against it. Lola’s Chicken Shack argues that the district court
should have ruled that Garcia lacked standing to bring an ADA claim as a “serial
tester.” Instead, the district court dismissed Garcia’s ADA claim against Lola’s
Chicken Shack as moot because it found all alleged ADA violations had been
remediated and Garcia was not entitled to any further injunctive relief under the
ADA. In other words, the district court’s order made Lola’s Chicken Shack the
prevailing party on the ADA claim.
In general, “a party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor,
for the purpose of obtaining a review of findings he deems erroneous which are not
necessary to support the decree.” United States v. Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d
487, 488 (1994) (simplified). Although there is an exception to the “prevailing
party” rule when an “adverse ruling can serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in
subsequent litigation,” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 520 (9th Cir.
1999), Lola’s Chicken Shack does not claim the exception applies. “To the extent
that the district court was not favorable to appellants, it does not bind them in
subsequent litigation.” Good Samaritan Church, 29 F.3d at 489. We thus dismiss
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Lola’s Chicken Shack’s claim under the ADA.
2. Lola’s Chicken Shack next argues that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to designate Garcia a “vexatious litigant.” Lola’s Chicken
Shack sought an order requiring Garcia to receive the court’s permission to file
future ADA claims against Alameda, California businesses. See Weissman v. Quail
Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (“District courts have the inherent
power to file restrictive pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants with abusive and
lengthy histories of litigation. Such pre-filing orders may enjoin the litigant from
filing further actions or papers unless he or she first meets certain requirements, such
as obtaining leave of the court. . . .” (simplified)). The district court denied the
motion.
Lola’s Chicken Shack lacks Article III standing to appeal this decision. To
having standing to appeal, appellants must have a “direct stake” in the outcome of
their appeal. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 705–06 (2013). Since an order
requiring Garcia to seek court permission for future ADA claims would not impact
the instant suit, Lola’s Chicken Shack has no “direct stake” in the outcome of the
appeal. Any injury caused by Garcia’s instant lawsuit and suffered by Lola’s
Chicken Shack has already occurred, and is not redressable by a reversal of the
vexatious litigant order. Instead, the vexatious litigant order would only benefit third
parties from Garcia’s lawsuits.
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Furthermore, even if Lola’s Chicken Shack had argued that the pre-filing
order could protect it from future suits by Garcia, such an allegation is so speculative
that it would not confer Article III standing here. See Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402,
410 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting standing when a fear of a future injury was “too
speculative to confer standing”). Garcia has never sued Beck before, and the record
does not reflect that Garcia makes a practice of repeatedly suing the same businesses
once ADA violations are remediated. Thus, it would be entirely speculative to
assume that Garcia may sue appellants in the future.
3. Lola’s Chicken Shack lastly contends that the district court abused its
discretion by denying its motion for sanctions against Garcia. It argues that Garcia
should be sanctioned as a vexatious litigant and that it should receive the fees
incurred from litigating the vexatious litigant motion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lola’s Chicken
Shack’s motion for sanctions. A court’s imposition of sanctions under inherent
power is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Am. Unites for Kids v. Rosseau, 985 F.3d
1075, 1087 (9th Cir. 2021). “[T]he simple fact that a plaintiff has filed a large
number of complaints, standing alone, is not a basis for designating a litigant as
‘vexatious.’” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.
2007). And here, given that Lola’s Chicken Shack remediated the ADA violations
alleged in Garcia’s lawsuit, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
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the lack of “meritless, harassing, or improper” conduct to warrant the award of
sanctions against Garcia. We thus affirm the denial of sanctions.
DISMISSED in part and AFFIRMED in part.1
1
Lola’s Chicken Shack asked this court to take judicial notice of court
documents purporting to show that Garcia is a vexatious litigant and of the
legislative history of the ADA. Given that we do not reach the merits of these issues,
we deny the motion.
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