Richard Kindred v. Marisa Bigot ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 20 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICHARD SCOTT KINDRED,                          No.    17-17431
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01652-AWI-MJS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MARISA BIGOT; KENNETH BELL,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted June 12, 2018**
    Before:      RAWLINSON, CLIFTON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    California civil detainee Richard Scott Kindred appeals pro se from the
    district court’s order denying his motions for a preliminary injunction and a
    temporary restraining order. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
    We review for an abuse of discretion. Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Int’l, Inc. v. Scott, 
    869 F.2d 1306
    , 1309 (9th Cir. 1989). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred’s requests
    for preliminary injunctive relief against Bell because Kindred failed to demonstrate
    that he would likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the requested relief.
    See Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco, 
    746 F.3d 953
    , 958 (9th Cir. 2014)
    (setting forth requirements for obtaining a preliminary injunction); Stuhlbarg Int’l
    Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 
    240 F.3d 832
    , 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (explaining that standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a
    preliminary injunction are “substantially identical”); Goldie’s Bookstore v.
    Superior Court, 
    739 F.2d 466
    , 472 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not
    constitute irreparable injury.”); see also Gomez v. Vernon, 
    255 F.3d 1118
    , 1128
    (9th Cir. 2001) (“In general, injunctive relief is to be used sparingly, and only in a
    clear and plain case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kindred’s requests
    for preliminary injunctive relief against individuals not before the district court
    because the district court could not provide relief against such individuals. See
    Zepeda v. INS, 
    753 F.2d 719
    , 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (federal courts “may not attempt
    to determine the rights of persons not before the court”).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Kindred’s contentions that
    defendants did not serve Kindred copies of defendants’ motions to strike and that
    2                                    17-17431
    the district court failed to recognize Kindred is a civil detainee.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                17-17431