Tyrone Rogers v. G. Giurbino ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 20 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TYRONE ROGERS, No. 17-55693
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:11-cv-00560-WQH-RBB
v.
G. J. GIURBINO; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 18, 2018**
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Tyrone Rogers appeals pro se the district court’s
judgment dismissing Rogers’s action alleging that defendants implemented prison
lockdowns violating his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§§ 2000cc, et seq. (“RLUIPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Rogers’s individual-capacity claims
against Giurbino, the director of the Division of Adult Operations for the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, because Rogers failed to
allege Giurbino’s personal involvement in any constitutional violation or a causal
connection between his conduct and any such violation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”);
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant may be held
liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal
involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Rogers’s official-capacity claims
seeking money damages because those claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984) (“It is clear . . . that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or
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one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the
Eleventh Amendment.”); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir.
1982) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to actions against state officers
sued in their official capacities because such actions are, in essence, actions against
the governmental entity[.]”).
To the extent that Rogers sought to bring individual-capacity RLUIPA
claims seeking money damages, the district court properly dismissed the claims
because such claims are not available under RLUIPA. See Wood v. Yordy, 753
F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a plaintiff may not seek damages under
RLUIPA against prison officials in their individual capacities).
The district court properly dismissed Rogers’s RLUIPA claims seeking
injunctive relief because Rogers failed to allege facts showing that those claims
were not moot. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
538 U.S. 167, 170 (2000) (“A case might become moot if subsequent events made
it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to occur.”).
The district court properly dismissed the remaining individual-capacity First
Amendment claims because Kuzil-Ruan and Uribe are entitled to qualified
immunity. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (government
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officials are entitled to qualified immunity where there is no violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional right or the right at issue was not “clearly established” at the time of
the alleged violation); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“The relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” (emphasis,
citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to
amend because Rogers did not cure the complaint’s deficiencies despite the district
court’s specific instructions about how to do so. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the
complaint cannot be cured by amendment); see also Fid. Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The district
court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the court has
already given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.”).
AFFIRMED.
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