United States v. Hector Ornelas , 825 F.3d 548 ( 2016 )


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  •                                FOR PUBLICATION                             FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUN 03 2016
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 15-10522
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 2:03-cr-00284-JAM-1
    v.
    OPINION
    HECTOR ORNELAS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 13, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Ikuta:
    Hector Ornelas appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to
    reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He argues that the district
    court erred in calculating the guideline range that applied to him at sentencing
    because it did not take into account a downward departure to his criminal history,
    see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Had the court included this downward departure, Ornelas
    argues, he would have been eligible for a sentence reduction. We have jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo whether a district court has
    jurisdiction to resentence a defendant under § 3582. See United States v. Pleasant,
    
    704 F.3d 808
    , 810 (9th Cir. 2013). We hold that the district court was correct to
    calculate the guideline range that applied to Ornelas at sentencing without taking
    into account the § 4A1.3 downward departure, and we therefore affirm.
    I
    Before addressing the facts of this case, we explain the framework for
    analyzing Ornelas’s argument that the district court erred in declining to reduce his
    sentence.
    “As a general matter, courts may not alter a term of imprisonment once it
    has been imposed.” United States v. Hicks, 
    472 F.3d 1167
    , 1169 (9th Cir. 2007),
    abrogated on other grounds by Dillon v. United States, 
    560 U.S. 817
    (2010).
    Congress has created an exception to this rule in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).1 Under
    1
    Section 3582(c)(2) provides:
    [I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
    imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
    lowered by the Sentencing Commission ..., upon motion of the defendant
    or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court
    may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
    forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a
    reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
    (continued...)
    2
    this section, a court may reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment if (1) the
    defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
    that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission” by an
    amendment to the Guidelines2 and (2) “such a reduction is consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 3582(c)(2).
    The “applicable policy statement” relevant here is § 1B1.10 of the
    Sentencing Guidelines. See 
    Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 809
    –10. Under this section, if
    “a defendant is serving a term of imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable
    to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment” that
    is listed in § 1B1.10(d),3 the court has the discretion to “reduce the defendant’s
    term of imprisonment” consistent with § 1B1.10. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1).
    1
    (...continued)
    Sentencing Commission.
    2
    The parties do not address the first prong of § 3582(c)(2), which requires
    the defendant to have been sentenced “based on” a sentencing range lowered by an
    amendment to the Guidelines.
    3
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) provides: “Covered Amendments.—Amendments
    covered by this policy statement are listed in Appendix C as follows: 126, 130,
    156, 176, 269, 329, 341, 371, 379, 380, 433, 454, 461, 484, 488, 490, 499, 505,
    506, 516, 591, 599, 606, 657, 702, 706 as amended by 711, 715, 750 (parts A and
    C only), and 782 (subject to subsection (e)(1)).”
    3
    In order to determine the defendant’s eligibility under this section, the court
    must determine “the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to
    the defendant if the amendment(s) to the guidelines” listed in § 1B1.10(d) “had
    been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced.” 
    Id. § 1B1.10(b)(1).4
    In
    determining this amended guideline range, the court substitutes the new
    amendment “for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the
    defendant was sentenced,” but must “leave all other guideline application decisions
    unaffected.” 
    Id. After the
    court calculates the amended guideline range, it must
    determine whether the defendant’s term of imprisonment is greater or less than the
    minimum of this amended guideline range. Under § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B), “[a]
    reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment” is not authorized if the new
    amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
    4
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1) provides:
    In General.--In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in
    the defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and
    this policy statement is warranted, the court shall determine the amended
    guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the
    amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (d) [Covered
    Amendments] had been in effect at the time the defendant was
    sentenced. In making such determination, the court shall substitute only
    the amendments listed in subsection (d) for the corresponding guideline
    provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall
    leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.
    4
    guideline range.” 
    Id. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).5
    Therefore, if the defendant’s term of
    imprisonment is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range, then the
    defendant is ineligible for a sentence reduction.
    Before 2011, the Guidelines did not provide guidance on how a court should
    determine the applicable guideline range under § 1B1.10. The Second, Third, and
    Fourth Circuits agreed that at a minimum, the applicable guideline range included
    a reduction in a defendant’s criminal history category, as allowed under § 4A1.3
    (2009) (“Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy
    Statement)”), if such a criminal history category “substantially over-represents the
    seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history,” 
    id. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
    See United
    States v. Flemming, 
    617 F.3d 252
    , 271–72 (3rd Cir. 2010); United States v. Munn,
    
    595 F.3d 183
    , 194–95 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. McGee, 
    553 F.3d 225
    ,
    228–30 (2d Cir. 2009). These courts generally reasoned as follows: When a
    sentencing court follows the Guidelines’ seven steps for calculating a defendant’s
    applicable guideline range, § 1B1.1(a)–(g) (2009), the sentencing court must
    5
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B) provides:
    Exclusions.—A reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not
    consistent with this policy statement and therefore is not authorized
    under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) if— . . . (B) [a]n amendment listed in
    subsection (d) [Covered Amendments] does not have the effect of
    lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.
    5
    determine the defendant’s criminal history category at step six, § 1B1.1(f).6
    According to the Fourth Circuit, a sentencing court deciding to apply a departure
    under § 4A1.3 is merely determining the defendant’s correct criminal history
    category at step six, before calculating the guideline range that corresponds to the
    “offense level and criminal history category determined above” at step seven,
    § 1B1.1(g). See 
    Munn, 595 F.3d at 192
    –93. Therefore, in determining whether a
    new amendment has lowered the guideline range applicable to the defendant, Munn
    explained, the sentencing court should look at the guideline range as calculated
    with the criminal history category that was determined after the § 4A1.3 departure.
    Id.; see also 
    Flemming, 617 F.3d at 268
    –69 (noting a similar rationale for
    determining the guideline range applicable to a defendant for purposes of
    § 1B1.10(a)). The Third Circuit explained that to the extent the guidelines are
    ambiguous regarding how to determine the guideline range applicable to a
    6
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(f) (2009) provides: “Determine the defendant’s criminal
    history category as specified in Part A of Chapter Four. Determine from Part B of
    Chapter Four any other applicable adjustments.” Part A of Chapter Four sets forth
    the method for determining criminal history. It includes § 4A1.3, “Departures
    Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy Statement).” Part B of
    Chapter Four provides adjustments for Career Offenders and other recidivists.
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(g) (2009) provides “Determine the guideline range in Part A of
    Chapter Five that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category
    determined above.”
    6
    defendant, a court must “apply the rule of lenity and resolve the conflict in the
    defendant’s favor.” 
    Flemming, 617 F.3d at 269
    –72 & n.26 (quoting 
    Munn, 595 F.3d at 194
    ); see also 
    McGee, 553 F.3d at 229
    (applying the rule of lenity in
    holding the same).
    On the other side of this split, the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits held that
    the guideline range applicable to a defendant is the range that the district court
    calculated before granting any departures, including the downward departure
    allowed by § 4A1.3. These circuits noted that “departure” is defined “for purposes
    of § 4A1.3” as the “assignment of a criminal history category other than the
    otherwise applicable criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence outside
    the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E). Because a
    departure by definition takes the sentence “outside the applicable guideline range,”
    a court must determine the applicable guideline range before any departures were
    granted. See, e.g., United States v. Pembrook, 
    609 F.3d 381
    , 385–86 (6th Cir.
    2010); United States v. Darton, 
    595 F.3d 1191
    , 1196–97 (10th Cir. 2010); United
    States v. Blackmon, 
    584 F.3d 1115
    , 1116 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    In 2011, the Commission issued Amendment 759, which amended § 1B1.10
    Application Note 1 to address this circuit split. As the Commission explained in its
    statement of reasons, the “First, Second, and Fourth Circuits have held that, for
    7
    § 1B1.10 purposes, at least some departures (e.g., departures under § 4A1.3
    (Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category) (Policy
    Statement)) are considered before determining the applicable guideline range,
    while the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the only applicable
    guideline range is the one established before any departures.” U.S.S.G. supp.
    app’x C, amend. 759 (Reason for Amendment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The Commission stated that its amendment “adopts the approach of the Sixth,
    Eighth, and Tenth Circuits and amends Application Note 1 to clarify that the
    applicable guideline range referred to in § 1B1.10 is the guideline range
    determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of
    any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.” 
    Id. The Commission
    noted that this approach was also consistent with its 2010 amendment
    to § 1B1.1 (the instructions for determining the appropriate guidelines range),
    which had clarified that a court first determines the guideline range and then
    considers “the policy statements and commentary to determine whether a departure
    is warranted.” 
    Id. § 1B1.1(b);
    see also U.S.S.G. supp. app’x C, amend. 759
    (Reason for Amendment) (“As amended, subsection (a) addresses how to apply the
    provisions in the Guidelines Manual to properly determine the kinds of sentence
    and the guideline range. Subsection (b) addresses the need to consider the policy
    8
    statements and commentary to determine whether a departure is warranted.”
    (quoting U.S.S.G. supp. app’x C, amend. 741 (Reason for Amendment))).
    As amended, Application Note 1 to § 1B1.10 now states: “Eligibility for
    consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is triggered only by an amendment
    listed in subsection (d) that lowers the applicable guideline range (i.e., the
    guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and criminal history category
    determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), which is determined before consideration of
    any departure provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance).” U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A) (effective Nov. 1, 2011) (emphasis added).
    As a result of the Sentencing Commission’s Amendment 759, all circuits
    that have addressed the issue after 2011, including those on the wrong side of the
    circuit split, have recognized that a court must not consider any departures or
    variances (including departures under § 4A1.3) in determining the applicable
    guideline range for purposes of § 1B1.10. See United States v. Hogan, 
    722 F.3d 55
    , 59–61 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Montanez, 
    717 F.3d 287
    , 292–94 (2d
    Cir. 2013); United States v. Flemming, 
    723 F.3d 407
    , 411–13 (3rd Cir. 2013);
    United States v. Boyd, 
    721 F.3d 1259
    , 1262–64 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v.
    Hargrove, 
    732 F.3d 1253
    , 1254 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013). In Montanez, for instance,
    the Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that § 1B1.1 required a
    9
    sentencing court to apply a departure under § 4A1.3 as part of the calculation of
    criminal history before determining the defendant’s applicable guideline range,
    because “the Commission has foreclosed the exact approach” that the defendants
    were 
    advocating. 717 F.3d at 294
    . Similarly, the Third Circuit acknowledged that
    its prior reading of the Guidelines was superseded by the new definition of
    “applicable guidelines range” and that the language of the amendment “makes
    clear that regardless of when a § 4A1.3 departure is calculated, that departure is
    ignored for purposes of determining the ‘applicable guideline range.’” 
    Flemming, 723 F.3d at 412
    . Therefore, the court held that the “applicable guideline range” is
    “the range calculated pursuant to the career offender designation of § 4B1.1, and
    not the range calculated after applying any departure or variance.” 
    Id. We have
    likewise concluded that the “applicable guideline” range for
    purposes of a sentencing reduction under § 3582(c)(2) “is derived pre-departure
    and pre-variance.” 
    Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 812
    . Pleasant held that a defendant who
    qualified as a career offender (a defendant who has a criminal history category of
    Category VI), but who was sentenced under a crack-cocaine guideline
    range—which was later amended—pursuant to a plea agreement, nevertheless was
    ineligible for a sentencing reduction because his “applicable guideline range” for
    purposes of § 1B1.10 was the career offender guideline range. 
    Id. at 811–12.
    In so
    10
    holding, we relied on the plain language of the Commission’s amended
    Application Note 1(A), which states the applicable range is “determined before
    consideration of any departure provision,” and that the Commission added the
    relevant language to resolve the circuit split in favor of courts that held the same.
    
    Id. at 812.
    Although Pleasant did not address the situation where a court had
    granted a defendant a departure from the defendant’s criminal history category
    under § 4A1.3, its reasoning is applicable in this context as well.
    II
    We now turn to the facts of this case. Hector Ornelas was arrested after he
    was spotted leaving 766 grams of methamphetamine in a red and white cooler at a
    house in Sacramento, California. In March 2004, he pleaded guilty to: (1)
    possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (2) being a deported alien found in the
    United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
    The presentence investigation report (PSR) made the following calculations.
    First, it determined the base offense level for a violation of § 841(a)(1). Under the
    drug quantity table set forth at § 2D1.1(c)(2), offenses involving at least 500 grams
    but less than 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine were assigned a base offense
    11
    level of 36.7 This base offense level was reduced three points for an adjustment for
    acceptance of responsibility, see § 3E1.1, leading to a total offense level of 33.
    The PSR calculated Ornelas’s criminal history score of 14, establishing a criminal
    history category of VI. A total offense level of 33 and a criminal history category
    of VI corresponded to a resulting guideline range of 235 to 293 months. The PSR
    also noted that the plea agreement stated the criminal history category VI was
    overstated and recommended a category IV, which corresponded to a guideline
    sentencing range of 188 to 235 months.
    On June 29, 2004, the district court held a sentencing hearing and
    determined that the total offense level was 33, that a criminal history category of
    VI was appropriate, but that a downward departure was also appropriate because
    the record overstated Ornelas’s criminal history. The court then imposed a term of
    178 months.8
    7
    Under § 3D1.4 (providing directions for determining the combined offense
    level when there are multiple counts) the § 1326(d) conviction did not add to the
    base offense level.
    8
    Although the record is not entirely clear, the parties do not dispute that the
    court granted this departure pursuant to § 4A1.3. The district court did not identify
    the criminal history category it deemed to be applicable to Ornelas under this
    departure.
    12
    In November 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment
    782, which generally amended the drug quantity table in § 2D1.1(c) to reduce the
    base offense levels assigned to specified quantities of specified controlled
    substances by two levels. See U.S.S.G. supp. app’x C, amend. 782. This
    amendment is listed in § 1B1.10(d) as a “covered amendment,” and the Sentencing
    Commission authorized district courts to apply Amendment 782 retroactively. See
    U.S.S.G. supp. app’x C, amend. 788.
    Because Amendment 782 would have applied to his sentence, Ornelas filed a
    motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). After hearing
    argument, the district court denied the motion. It stated that at the 2004 sentencing
    hearing, the sentencing court found that Ornelas had a total offense level of 33 and
    a criminal history of VI, resulting in a guideline range of 235 to 293 months, but
    the sentencing court then imposed a 178-month sentence. Under Amendment 782,
    Ornelas would have a total offense level of 31. Substituting this offense level for
    the original offense level of 33, and leaving “all other guidelines application
    decisions unaffected,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), the court calculated that a total
    offense level of 31 and a criminal history of VI resulted in a guideline range of 188
    to 235 months. Because Ornelas’s sentence of 178 months was less than the
    minimum of the amended applicable guideline range (188 months), as determined
    13
    pre-departure and pre-variance, the court determined that Ornelas was not eligible
    for a reduction. Ornelas timely appealed.
    III
    On appeal, Ornelas argues that the district court erred by not including a
    § 4A1.3 downward departure in calculating the applicable guideline range for
    purposes of § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B1.10. Specifically, Ornelas contends that in
    sentencing him to a 178-month term of imprisonment, the sentencing court used a
    criminal history category of III (after departing from the criminal history category
    of VI pursuant to § 4A1.3), and a total offense level of 33, resulting in a guideline
    range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. Amendment 782 lowers his total
    offense level to 31, and with a criminal history category of III, this would result in
    a range of 135 to 168 months. Since the minimum of the amended guideline range
    applicable to Ornelas (135 months) is less than his actual term of imprisonment
    (178 months), according to Ornelas, the district court should have found he is
    eligible for a reduction.
    In making this argument, Ornelas relies on the pre-2011 decisions in the
    First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, which had held that a § 4A1.3 departure
    is incorporated into the applicable guideline range for purposes of § 1B1.10
    because it is part of the “guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and
    14
    criminal history category determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a),” as defined by
    Application Note 1(A). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). He also argues, again
    echoing those pre-2011 decisions, that § 1B1.10 is ambiguous, so the Guidelines
    should be interpreted in his favor in light of the rule of lenity. Ornelas
    acknowledges that after Amendment 759 was issued in 2011, every circuit that has
    ruled on this issue has rejected these arguments. He also acknowledges that we
    have held the applicable guideline range must be determined before applying
    departures or variances. See 
    Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 812
    . Nevertheless, as he notes,
    we have not directly ruled that a court must determine the applicable guideline
    range before considering any downward departure under § 4A1.3.
    We now do so. We defer to the Application Notes, see Stinson v. United
    States, 
    508 U.S. 36
    , 38 (1993), and look to the Commission’s statements of reason
    for guidance, see 
    Boyd, 721 F.3d at 1263
    –64; see also 
    Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 812
    (relying on the Sentencing Commission’s statement of reasons for Amendment
    759); 
    Hogan, 722 F.3d at 61
    (same); 
    Montanez, 717 F.3d at 294
    (same); 
    Flemming, 723 F.3d at 413
    (same). A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under
    § 3582(c)(2) only if a new amendment lowers the “applicable guideline range,”
    which must be determined “before consideration of any departure provision in the
    Guidelines Manual.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A). Section 4A1.3 is identified
    15
    as a departure provision, see § 4A1.3 (“Departures Based on Inadequacy of
    Criminal History Category (Policy Statement)).” For purposes of § 4A1.3, the
    term “departure” has the meaning given that term in 1B1.1, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3
    cmt. n.1, and § 1B1.1 defines departure “for purposes of §4A1.3” as the
    “assignment of a criminal history category other than the otherwise applicable
    criminal history category, in order to effect a sentence outside the applicable
    guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(E). Because § 4A1.3 is a “departure”
    that effects a sentence “outside the applicable guideline range,” the applicable
    guideline range for purposes of § 1B1.10 must be determined before considering
    § 4A1.3. Further, the Commission’s November 2010 amendment to § 1B1.10
    makes clear that this interpretation is consistent with § 1B1.1. See U.S.S.G. supp.
    app’x C, amend. 741 (Reason for Amendment). Section 4A1.3 is identified as a
    policy statement, and under the current version of § 1B1.1, a court must first
    determine the applicable guideline range, 
    id. § 1B1.1(a),
    and only then consider
    any “policy statements” that might warrant consideration, 
    id. § 1B1.1(b).
    Accordingly, we conclude that for purposes of determining a defendant’s eligibility
    for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c) and § 1B1.10, a court must calculate the
    guideline range applicable to the defendant before considering any departure,
    including a departure under § 4A1.3. Our conclusion is supported by the
    16
    Commission’s statement that it amended Application Note 1(A) of § 1B1.10 to
    resolve a circuit split on this very issue, by the fact that every other circuit that has
    addressed this issue after Amendment 759 is in agreement, and by our binding
    precedent, see 
    Pleasant, 704 F.3d at 812
    .
    Because the district court here correctly determined Ornelas’s applicable
    guideline range by using the criminal history category applicable to Ornelas before
    consideration of a downward departure under § 4A1.3, it did not err in concluding
    that Ornelas was not eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c).9
    AFFIRMED.
    9
    Ornelas argues that, in the alternative, application of § 1B1.10(b)(1)
    violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. We have
    already rejected that argument. United States v. Waters, 
    771 F.3d 679
    , 680–81 (9th
    Cir. 2014).
    17
    COUNSEL
    John Balazs (argued), Sacramento, California, for defendant-appellant.
    Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Camil A. Skipper, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Jason Hitt (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, for plaintiff-
    appellee.
    18