United States v. Fawn Tadios , 822 F.3d 501 ( 2016 )


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  •                         FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 14-30231
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      4:13-cr-00051-BMM-1
    FAWN PATRICIA ANN TADIOS,
    Defendant-Appellant.                      OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Montana
    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
    Seattle, Washington
    Filed May 18, 2016
    Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Richard C. Tallman,
    Circuit Judges and Sharon L. Gleason,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge McKeown
    *
    The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge for the
    District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
    2                   UNITED STATES V. TADIOS
    SUMMARY**
    Criminal Law
    The panel affirmed the district court’s inclusion in its loss
    calculation at sentencing the estimated salary paid to the
    defendant, the CEO of a federally-funded health care clinic
    located on the Chippewa Cree’s Rocky Boy Reservation, for
    time she spent visiting her husband when she claimed to be
    traveling on business.
    The defendant was convicted for converting federal funds
    for personal use, using federal funds for personal benefit, and
    misapplying clinic funds.
    The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that because
    she was an exempt employee, the Chippewa Cree suffered no
    loss in paying her full salary for when she was visiting her
    husband instead of performing clinic duties. The panel held
    that including in the loss calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1
    the estimated value of the time the defendant should have
    reported as annual leave was not clear error.
    The panel addressed the defendant’s remaining arguments
    concerning her conviction and sentencing in a memorandum
    disposition.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    UNITED STATES V. TADIOS                            3
    COUNSEL
    Steven Thomas Potts (argued), CJA, Great Falls, Montana;
    Jeffry M. Foster, CJA Panel Attorney, Davis, Hatley,
    Haffeman & Tighe, P.C., Great Falls, Montana, for
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Carl E. Rostad (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,
    District of Montana, Great Falls, Montana, for Plaintiff-
    Appellee.
    OPINION
    McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
    Fawn Patricia Ann Tadios asks us to ignore the old adage
    “time is money” and hold that the value of an exempt
    employee’s time cannot be used to calculate loss due to fraud
    or theft under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We
    decline to do so.1
    For eight years, Tadios served as the Chief Executive
    Officer (“CEO”) of the Rocky Boy’s Health Board Clinic
    (“the Clinic”), a federally funded health care facility located
    on the Chippewa Cree’s (the “Tribe”) Rocky Boy Reservation
    in Montana. As CEO, Tadios was entrusted with the
    management of the Clinic’s health care programs and its $14
    million annual budget.
    1
    We address Tadios’s remaining arguments concerning her conviction
    and sentencing in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this
    opinion. See United States v. Tadios, ___ Fed App’x ___ (9th Cir. 2016).
    4                 UNITED STATES V. TADIOS
    During Tadios’s tenure with the Clinic, her husband,
    Tribal Chairman Raymond Parker, was sentenced to the
    federal penitentiary in Yankton, South Dakota for embezzling
    tribal funds. Tadios took a series of trips to see him, partially
    funding these personal visits with her tribal credit card and
    Clinic travel advances. Rather than claim annual leave for
    her absences, Tadios attempted to cover up the personal
    nature of her trips. For example, Tadios listed the purpose of
    a five-day March trip as a “site visit” to tour a nearby tribal
    health clinic. As it turned out, Tadios spent only two hours
    touring the healthcare facility—the rest of the excursion was
    devoted to visiting her husband. Indeed, each time Tadios
    visited her husband, she told her board that she was traveling
    for “official business purposes.”          Memorializing her
    dissimulation, Tadios submitted timesheets listing eight hours
    of “travel” on most of the days she spent in Yankton with
    Parker.
    Tadios was convicted for converting federal funds
    allocated to the Clinic for personal use in violation of
    18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), using federal funds for personal
    benefit in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1163, and misapplying
    Clinic funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 669. Recognizing her
    otherwise exemplary record, the district court sentenced
    Tadios to a prison term of one year and a day, followed by
    two years of supervised release, and ordered $15,000 in
    restitution to the Tribe.
    In calculating the loss Tadios inflicted on the Tribe under
    § 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines (dealing with economic
    offenses involving, inter alia, theft, fraud or deceit), the
    district court included the estimated salary the Clinic paid to
    Tadios, an exempt, management-level employee, for the time
    she spent visiting her husband when she claimed to be
    UNITED STATES V. TADIOS                              5
    traveling on business.2 The heart of this appeal—and an issue
    of first impression in our circuit—is whether the district court
    committed clear error by including the salary loss. See
    United States v. Torlai, 
    728 F.3d 932
    , 937 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (“We review the district court’s factual determinations,
    including the calculation of the victim’s loss, for clear error.”
    (internal quotations, citations and alterations omitted)).
    Because Tadios was a salaried employee, the district court
    estimated the value of her time by calculating her hourly rate
    and multiplying that figure by the number of hours that she
    should have claimed as annual leave.3 Reliance on time and
    salary records was sufficient, as the court “need only make a
    reasonable estimate of loss, given the available information.”
    United States v. Burns, 
    104 F.3d 529
    , 536 (2d Cir. 1997); see
    also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) (In determining intended
    loss, a district court “need only make a reasonable estimate of
    the loss . . . based upon th[e] evidence.”).
    Tadios argues that, because she was an exempt employee,
    she was entitled to her full base pay for every pay period in
    which she performed any work, regardless of her travel or
    vacation schedule. Thus, she asserts that the Tribe suffered
    no loss in paying her full salary on days and for hours when
    2
    This inclusion resulted in a sentencing enhancement and an increased
    restitution award. The district court calculated the total loss amount as
    just under $16,000, including both travel expenditures for personal use and
    lost salary, resulting in a four-point increase in the sentencing level. See
    U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C). Without inclusion of the estimated salary,
    Tadios would not have qualified for this enhancement.
    3
    The court estimated Tadios’s hourly rate by dividing her annual salary
    by the number of hours in an average work year, assuming a standard 40-
    hour work week.
    6                   UNITED STATES V. TADIOS
    she was visiting her husband instead of performing Clinic
    duties. She also claims that the lack of evidence monetizing
    her vacation leave dooms the loss calculation. We disagree.
    Under Tadios’s best of both worlds theory, she could
    sleep on the job full time or visit her husband 40 hours per
    week without imposing a financial loss on the Tribe because,
    as an exempt employee, she would be paid anyway. This
    argument strains credulity, underscores the duplicitous nature
    of her conduct, and would make a farce of public
    accountability.
    “Public accountability is the notion that ‘governmental
    employees should not be paid for time not worked due to the
    need to be accountable to the taxpayers for expenditure of
    public funds.’” Serv. Emps. Intern. Un., Local 102 v. County.
    of San Diego, 
    60 F.3d 1346
    , 1352 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
    Hilbert v. District of Columbia, 
    23 F.3d 429
    , 435 (D.C. Cir.
    1994) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
    According to this principle, even exempt public employees
    must honestly account for time away from work.4
    The public accountability principle underscores that time
    has value. It was thus not clear error for the district court to
    include the estimated value of the time that Tadios should
    have reported as annual leave in calculating the total losses
    Tadios inflicted on the Tribe. By failing to claim or deduct
    4
    The Tribe’s own personnel policies reflect the accountability principle,
    providing that “[s]ubmittal of a fraudulent time sheet will be grounds for
    disciplinary action or termination,” and “exempt employees are not
    compensated for overtime and therefore may require a more flexible
    workday on occasion. . . . Exempt employees who abuse this policy will
    be required to utilize the time clock.”
    UNITED STATES V. TADIOS                      7
    annual leave for the dates when she visited her husband and
    told her board she was traveling for work, Tadios harmed the
    Clinic twice over: first, by getting the Clinic to pay for travel
    expenses it had no obligation to cover, and again by getting
    the Clinic to pay her salary for time she was supposed to be
    working but was not.
    Tadios abused her status as an exempt employee by
    submitting fraudulent time sheets and falsely claiming to be
    working or traveling rather than taking annual leave when she
    visited her husband. In so doing, she deprived the Tribe of
    her honest services, and thereby “obviously inflicted some
    level of pecuniary harm on the organization.” United States
    v. Crawley, 
    533 F.3d 349
    , 357 (5th Cir. 2008). The district
    court’s calculation of this harm by estimating the loss Tadios
    inflicted on the Tribe was not clearly erroneous.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-30231

Citation Numbers: 822 F.3d 501

Filed Date: 5/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023