Julie Soler Amor v. Nancy Berryhill ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 23 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JULIE A. SOLER AMOR,                            No.    16-35254
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:14-cv-01526-TC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
    Commissioner Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted November 9, 2018
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: TALLMAN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,** District Judge.
    Julie Soler Amor appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
    Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Soler Amor’s application for social
    security supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
    Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo, Ghanim v.
    Colvin, 
    736 F.3d 1154
    , 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
    This Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council’s decision to
    deny “a request for review of an ALJ’s decision, because the Appeals Council
    decision is a non-final agency action.” Brewes v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    682 F.3d 1157
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). Although we may review evidence submitted to
    and considered by the Appeals Council as part of the administrative record, 
    id. at 1162
    , here the Appeals Council only looked at the evidence, and determined it did
    not meet the standard for consideration, see 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.1470
    (b)(1987) (stating
    that “if new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider
    the additional evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the date of
    the administrative law judge hearing decision”) (current version at 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.1470
    (b)( (2018). Therefore, the new evidence did not become part of the
    record, and we may not consider it. Lowry v. Barnhart, 
    329 F.3d 1019
    , 1024 (9th
    Cir. 2003).
    Soler Amor’s argument that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical
    evidence and conducting a residual functional capacity assessment fails because
    the argument is premised on the new medical evidence submitted to but not
    considered by the Appeals Council, which is not part of the administrative record
    before this Court.
    2                                    16-35254
    Soler Amor argues that this Court should retroactively apply Social Security
    Ruling 16-3p, which supersedes a prior Social Security Ruling addressing
    credibility. This Court has recognized that SSR 16-3p “makes clear what our
    precedent already required,” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 
    871 F.3d 664
    , 678 n.5 (9th Cir.
    2017). Here, the ALJ’s reasoning satisfies SSR 16-3p and this Court’s precedent.
    The ALJ identified specific, clear and convincing reasons that are supported
    by substantial evidence for discounting Soler Amor’s testimony regarding the
    debilitating effects of her symptoms: (1) she lacked motivation to work; (2) there
    were inconsistencies between her subjective complaints and activities of daily
    living; and (3) her subjective complaints are not consistent with the medical
    evidence. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    , 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming an
    ALJ’s determination the claimant’s little propensity to work “negatively affected
    her credibility regarding her inability to work”); Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    ,
    1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (listing among proper considerations for credibility
    assessment an engagement in activities of daily living that are inconsistent with the
    alleged symptoms); Burch v. Barnhart, 
    400 F.3d 676
    , 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding
    that an ALJ can consider a lack of supporting medical evidence when assessing
    credibility). The ALJ incorrectly discounted her testimony on the basis that her
    substance abuse and drug-seeking behavior contributed to her condition, but this
    was harmless error because the ALJ gave several other specific, clear and
    3                                     16-35254
    convincing reasons. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    359 F.3d 1190
    , 1197
    (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that error was harmless even if the record did not
    support one of the ALJ’s stated reasons for disbelieving a claimant’s testimony).
    The ALJ properly gave limited weight to case manager Mr. O’Neill’s
    testimony because he infrequently met with Soler Amor. The ALJ reasonably
    inferred that his testimony lacked foundation. Crane v. Shalala, 
    76 F.3d 251
    , 254
    (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that lay witnesses must have sufficient contact with a
    claimant during the relevant period to qualify as competent).
    The ALJ properly gave some weight to Ms. Scott’s statement, agreeing that
    Soler Amor has symptoms of depression and anxiety. The ALJ properly reasoned
    that the activities that Ms. Scott listed do not reflect disabling limitations and
    objective testing in the record does not support her stated physical limitations.
    Inconsistency with medical evidence and activities of daily living are germane
    reasons for discrediting lay witness testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    ,
    1218 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ also gave a germane reason to discount Ms. Scott’s
    letter because she described mental limits that conflicted with examining
    psychologist Dr. Duvall’s assessment. 
    Id.
    The ALJ properly gave little weight to Ms. Juul’s statement that Soler Amor
    is nervous and easily districted, causing her to cry and panic because it was
    inconsistent with Dr. Duvall’s opinion that Soler Amor could pay attention and
    4                                     16-35254
    concentrate. The ALJ erred in giving little weight to Ms. Juul’s letter because she
    did not have objective information or testing. An ALJ may not reject lay testimony
    simply because the lay witness is not “knowledgeable in the medical and/or
    vocational field.” Bruce v. Astrue, 
    557 F.3d 1113
    , 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
    However, this error was harmless because the ALJ gave a germane reason to give
    little weight to her letter because it conflicts with Dr. Duvall’s opinion. See
    Bayliss, 
    427 F.3d at 1218
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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