Richard Kile v. Usaa Casualty Ins. Co. ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 12 2019
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RICHARD KILE, Personal Representative            No. 17-16431
    of the Estate of Edward Kile,
    D.C. No. 4:15-cv-00380-RM
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Rosemary Márquez, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 4, 2019
    Phoenix, Arizona
    Before: CLIFTON, IKUTA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Richard Kile appeals the district court’s partial grant of USAA Casualty
    Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment. Although the parties did not
    raise the question of our jurisdiction, we must consider it sua sponte. WMX Techs.,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Inc. v. Miller, 
    104 F.3d 1133
    , 1135 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We dismiss for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    Orders granting partial summary judgment generally are not final appealable
    orders because they do not dispose of all claims. Cheng v. Comm’r IRS, 
    878 F.2d 306
    , 309 (9th Cir. 1989). Although we take a pragmatic approach to finality where
    events after a nonfinal order fulfill the purposes of the final judgment rule, we have
    repeatedly admonished that parties may not avoid this rule “without fully
    relinquishing the ability to further litigate unresolved claims.” Dannenberg v.
    Software Toolworks Inc., 
    16 F.3d 1073
    , 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
    The stipulated dismissal here was labeled “with prejudice,” but Kile
    conceded at oral argument that it was not really with prejudice because the parties
    agreed that a dismissed claim could be reinstated on remand if we were to reverse.
    This stipulation is insufficient to create appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise
    nonfinal order. See id.; 
    Cheng, 878 F.2d at 310
    . Kile’s proposed resolution – to
    dismiss the claim that could be reinstated – was not part of the record, and we did
    not receive from the parties an unqualified offer to make it part of the record. Nor
    did the parties cite authority showing that this proposed resolution would create
    appellate jurisdiction.
    2
    In sum, nothing the parties did after the district court entered partial
    summary judgment was sufficient to give us jurisdiction.
    DISMISSED.
    3