Isaiah Williams v. Debra Williams , 633 F. App'x 413 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 02 2016
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ISAIAH NOEL WILLIAMS, No. 13-17284
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:07-cv-04464-CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
DEBRA WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Isaiah Williams argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on his due process claim, and that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence during trial regarding his
alleged membership in a prison gang and one of his tattoos. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appellant Williams is an inmate in state prison. He alleges a due process
violation based on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Wolff accorded
prisoners certain limited due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings “to
insure that [a] state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Id. at 557. The Court
applied the “minimum requirements of procedural due process” because “the
determination of whether [prisoner misconduct] has occurred becomes critical”
when a state deducts good time credits as punishment. Id. at 558. Unlike Wolff, the
sole plaintiff in this case admitted commission of misconduct by starting a prison
fight. This fight was the subject of the challenged disciplinary hearing. Appellant
does not claim that his rights have been “arbitrarily abrogated” or explain how he
was prejudiced by not attending the hearing. Thus, we decline to remand his case
to the district court for a trial on his due process claim.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it admitted into
evidence the name of a white supremacist prison gang to which he allegedly
belongs, and when it admitted into evidence testimony regarding one of his tattoos.
If a district court abuses its discretion by admitting evidence improperly, this
court must determine whether or not the error was harmless. United States v.
Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1244 (9th Cir. 2004). An error is harmless if it is
“more probable than not that the erroneous admission of the evidence did not affect
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the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006,
1017 (9th Cir. 1995)). This court will not reverse a jury verdict absent a showing of
prejudice. Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir.
1994) (citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 1991)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about
the gang name and the tattoo. But even assuming that these rulings were erroneous,
it is more probable than not that the same jury verdict would have obtained. Absent
the challenged evidence, the jury still would have heard that Plaintiff was validated
as a member of a prison gang, and that he picked a fight with a rival gang member.
To the extent that the jury was swayed by reference to the name of the gang and
Plaintiff’s tattoo, it would likely still be swayed in the same manner by the
evidence that Plaintiff belonged to an apparently violent prison gang. Thus,
Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial.
AFFIRMED.
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