Patrick Caldwell v. Arizona Department of Public S ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 5 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK DEMON CALDWELL II,                      No. 18-15926
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02582-DLR-ESW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
    SAFETY, named as Department of Public
    Safety; B. HOUCHENS, Highway Patrol
    Officer,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted November 27, 2018**
    Before:      CANBY, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Patrick Demon Caldwell II appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging various constitutional claims
    relating to a traffic stop and impoundment of his vehicle. We have jurisdiction
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Hamilton v. Brown, 
    630 F.3d 889
    , 892 (9th Cir. 2011).
    We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Caldwell’s action for failure to state a
    claim because Caldwell failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim.
    See Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se
    pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a
    plausible claim); see also Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 810 (1996) (no
    Fourth Amendment violation when officer has probable cause to believe a traffic
    violation occurred); Soldal v. Cook County, 
    506 U.S. 56
    , 61 (1992) (defining a
    seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment); Serrano v. Francis, 
    345 F.3d 1071
    ,
    1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of an equal protection claim).
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                     18-15926