Jose Solano v. Affinia Default Services, LLC ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 24 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOSE R. SOLANO,                                 No.    18-56128
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01116-R-JEM
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    AFFINIA DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC; et
    al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 17, 2019**
    Before:      McKEOWN, BYBEE, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Jose R. Solano appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to foreclosure proceedings.
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district
    court’s dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Vess v.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 
    317 F.3d 1097
    , 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Solano’s Racketeer Influenced and
    Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and fraud claims because Solano failed to
    allege facts sufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading standard set forth in
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 
    567 F.3d 1120
    , 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing heightened pleading standard under
    Rule 9(b), which applies to state law claims alleging fraudulent conduct);
    Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 
    486 F.3d 541
    , 547-48, 553-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
    (setting forth elements of RICO claim and noting that RICO fraud allegations are
    subject to heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b)).
    The district court properly dismissed Solano’s Real Estate Settlement
    Procedures Act (“RESPA”) claim because Solano failed to allege facts sufficient to
    show that he suffered actual damages from an alleged RESPA violation. See 12
    U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1) (limiting recovery to actual damages where there is no pattern
    or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of § 2605).
    The district court properly dismissed Solano’s cancellation of instruments
    claim because Solano failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the instruments
    at issue were either void or voidable. See Thompson v. Ioane, 
    218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501
    , 512 (Ct. App. 2017) (elements of a cancellation of instruments claim under
    California law).
    2                                       18-56128
    Because all of Solano’s claims were properly dismissed, the district court
    properly denied Solano’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief because
    Solano had no claim upon which to request relief or remedies. See Mt. Graham
    Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 
    954 F.2d 1441
    , 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying
    claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary injunctive relief
    would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot); Stock W.,
    Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 
    873 F.2d 1221
    , 1225 (9th
    Cir. 1989) (in order “[t]o obtain declaratory relief in federal court, there must be an
    independent basis for jurisdiction”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Solano’s
    complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See
    Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 
    232 F.3d 719
    , 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
    standard of review and explaining that “[a] district court acts within its discretion
    to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”).
    Contrary to Solano’s contention that defendants violated Local Rule 7-3,
    defendants did not violate the local rule because they were exempt from complying
    with it. See C.D. Cal. R. 7-3 (rule does not apply to cases exempted under Local
    Rule 16-12), C.D. Cal. R. 16-12(c) (exempted cases include “[a]ny case in which
    the plaintiff is appearing pro se”).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    3                                    18-56128
    in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    We reject as unsupported by the record Solano’s contentions that the district
    court engaged in any judicial misconduct or failed to evaluate properly Solano’s
    claims.
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                  18-56128