Mark Edwards v. Gary Swarthout , 552 F. App'x 715 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MARK L. EDWARDS, No. 12-16541
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:10-cv-04923-PJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: TROTT and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.**
California state prisoner Mark L. Edwards appeals from the district court’s
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and argues that the state court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable David A. Ezra, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
decision affirming his conviction was “contrary to” federal law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). We affirm.
Edwards first asserts that the phrase “great bodily injury” as used in his
sentence enhancement is unconstitutionally vague. Edwards’s contention is
without merit. As the California Court of Appeals properly found, the phrase
“great bodily injury” has a well-settled, common-law meaning and is therefore not
void for vagueness. See Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 578 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“When a term has a well-settled common law meaning, it will not violate due
process ‘notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which
estimates might differ.’” (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926))); see also Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 521 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding
that the common usage of the phrase “serious bodily injury” afforded sufficient
clarity to comport with due process).
Edwards next argues that the three-year sentencing enhancements he
received for personally inflicting serious bodily injury constituted double jeopardy.
We disagree. The California appellate court properly concluded that sentencing
enhancements are not “multiple punishments” within the meaning of the double
jeopardy prohibition. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998); Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995).
-2-
AFFIRMED.
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