Robin Combs, Sr. v. Washington State , 660 F. App'x 515 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
AUG 31 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN BLAKE COMBS, Sr., No. 14-35821
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-05280-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WASHINGTON STATE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 29, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Robin Combs appeals the district court’s order entering summary judgment
for defendants on various claims arising from Combs’s treatment by Washington
state prison officials. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly entered summary judgment for defendants on
Combs’s free exercise claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See U.S. Const.
amend. I. Reviewing the record de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883
(9th Cir. 2008), we agree with the district court’s conclusion that no disputed
question of material fact exists as to whether prison officials intentionally and
substantially burdened Combs’s right freely to exercise his fundamentalist Jewish
faith. The sporadic mistakes in kosher food preparation principles here resulted
from inadvertence and did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See
Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that “short-term
and sporadic” interference with free exercise rights does not violate the First
Amendment).
A prison policy that refused to provide Combs a “Shabbat sack”—a bag
delivered on Fridays containing breakfast, lunch and dinner for consumption on
Saturdays—worked no substantial burden on Combs’s faith when Combs routinely
used personal funds to purchase commissary meals for in-cell consumption. See,
e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“[A] substantial burden must place more than an inconvenience on
religious exercise.”) (internal quotation omitted); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418
F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (defining “substantial burden,” in analogous
2
statutory context, as a regulation that “impose[s] a significantly great restriction or
onus upon [free] exercise”).1
The district court properly entered summary judgment for defendants on
Combs’s deliberate indifference claims. See U.S. Const. amend VIII. No disputed
question of material fact exists as to whether prison officials chose “medically
unacceptable” treatments in “conscious disregard of an excessive risk” to Combs’s
health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996). Combs offers no
evidence establishing that prison officials chose medically unacceptable treatments
for (1) Combs’s gastroesphegeal reflux disease, and (2) Combs’s inguinal hernia.
Prison officials did not “inflict[] . . . unnecessary suffering . . . inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency” when they initially prescribed Combs a
painkiller similar to that which he requested. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-
04 (1976). Finally, decisions of the prison’s Care Review Committee reflected
only permissible differences in medical opinion. See Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d
240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
1
Combs’s remaining free exercise claims lack merit. Combs’s unsupported
allegations that the kosher diet “[did] NOT contain an adequate variety of
nutrients,” do not rebut the state’s record evidence demonstrating that the kosher
diet complied with dietetic requirements. The record does not demonstrate that
prison officials intended certain deprivations during Passover. And Combs
concedes that a requirement that kosher inmates add identifying ties to their diet
cards did not compel disclosure of religious association.
3
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded as
hearsay several Internet articles about Combs's medical conditions. See Larez v.
City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 642-44 (9th Cir. 1991). Neither did the district
court abuse its discretion when it denied Combs's motion to appoint independent
medical and dietary experts.
AFFIRMED.
4