Ricky Paugh v. Anthony Flores ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 12 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICKY BELMONTE PAUGH, No. 17-55262
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:14-cv-01800-H-KSC
v.
ANTHONY FLORES, R.N., in his MEMORANDUM*
individual capacity and L. GONZALES, c/o,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2019**
Before: WALLACE, FARRIS, and TROTT, Circuit Judges
Ricky Belmonte Paugh, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment following a jury verdict in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Lam v. City of San
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Jose, 869 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2017) (formulation of jury instructions);
Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidentiary
rulings); Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000) (trial supervision);
Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d 466, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Paugh’s writs of
habeas corpus ad testifcandum because the district court properly determined that
the effort and resources to produce the witnesses was not justified by their
proposed testimony. See Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F.2d at 468 n.1
(standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing limited testimony
regarding Paugh’s criminal history because this evidence was admissible, in its
own right, under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1)(A). Contrary to Paugh’s
contentions, the district court was not required to allow evidence of the defendants’
litigation or employment history as a condition of introducing Paugh’s criminal
history. See Harper, 533 F.3d at 1030 (standard of review).
We reject as without merit Paugh’s contentions that his appointed counsel
was ineffective, either in failing to maintain his witness list, or in failing to object
to the court’s final jury instructions. See Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426,
1427 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff in a civil case has no right to effective assistance of
2 17-55262
counsel).
We reject as without merit Paugh’s contention that he received untimely
notice of changes to jury instructions. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(1) (service of
pleadings must be made on a party’s attorney unless the court orders service on the
party).
We reject as undeveloped Paugh’s contentions (1) that the district court did
not allow his counsel to have sidebar conferences; and (2) that his mother was not
allowed to testify. See Ind. Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925,
929-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (bare assertion of an issue does not preserve a claim; “We
require contentions to be accompanied by reasons.”).
AFFIRMED.
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